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Mao’s War on Women: The Perpetuation of Gender Hierarchies Through Yin-Yang
Cosmology in the Chinese Communist Propaganda of the Mao Era, 1949-1976
by
Al D. Roberts, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2019

Major Professor: Dr. Clayton Brown
Department: History
Recent Western social theory has posited the idea that gender and sexuality are
not binaries, but a socially constructed spectrum. Even so, the history of sexuality often
follows a dichotomous male/female discourse since many past societies have socially
constructed their own understanding of sexuality along those lines. Communist China,
inheriting a tradition of conceptualizing sex as a contrast between yin and yang, has
proliferated this sexual model through its political propaganda, despite the Party’s stated
goals of eliminating “feudal remnants” and promoting gender equality. This binary
effects a disadvantage for women as well as ethnic minorities and the underprivileged.
The women in propaganda posters, comic books, and stage productions were
certainly more powerful than their grandmothers, who adhered to the strict Confucian
rules of female conduct in “old China.” However, regardless of women’s new elevated
position, the Party subtly cast femininity as inferior to masculinity in two ways. First,
they reinforced domestic and emotional stereotypes which prohibited female characters

from fully participating in the proletarian revolution. This is rooted in the Daoist

iv

philosophical concept of yin and yang, which held that yin, the natural essence of
femininity, caused women to be passive and subservient, while yang, the essence of
masculinity, caused men to be tougher and more powerful. Second, the Party framed the
political discourse in terms of black and white where a person was either a true
communist hero or a decadent bourgeois villain.
The latter is significant since, by portraying the Party with masculine yang, and
capitalism with feminine yin, the People’s Republic of China drew an implicit connection
between femininity and the evils of capitalism, imperialism, and individualism. Laboring
under such a paradigm, the Party’s efforts to promote gender equality were doomed to
fall flat. When Mao died in 1976, his successors continued his policies of promoting a
yin-yang binarism which has continually punished femininity by limiting women’s
political influence, by discriminating against the LGBT community, and by oppressing
ethnic and religious minority groups, all of which the Party has depicted in terms of
“inferior” yin.
(231 pages)

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

v

Mao’s War on Women: The Perpetuation of Gender Hierarchies Through Yin-Yang
Cosmology in the Chinese Communist Propaganda of the Mao Era, 1949-1976
Al D. Roberts

The Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China in
1949 with the intention of creating a social utopia with equality between the sexes and
China’s diverse ethnic groups. However, by portraying gender, ethnicity, and politics in
propaganda along the lines of yin and yang, the Party perpetuated a situation of
oppression for women and minorities.
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CCP

The Chinese Communist Party was established in 1921. In 1949, the Communist
Party won the civil war by defeating the Nationalist Party (referred to in this
thesis as the Guomindang, although the “Kuomintang” is a common
romanization). Mao Zedong assumed leadership of the Party in 1935 until his
death in 1976.

CRG

Beneath Mao, the Cultural Revolution Group (中央文革小组) was the de facto
ruling body in China from the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 until Mao’s
death in 1976. It was headed by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, who used her authority
to wholly “revolutionize” the propaganda ministry.

PLA

The People’s Liberation Army was established on 1 August 1927 as the military
arm of the Chinese Communist Party.

PRC

The People’s Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949 by the
Chinese Communist Party.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: A BINARY WORLD
On the first day of October 1949, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), stood atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace at the southern edge of
the Forbidden City and proclaimed to the assembled masses that “the Chinese people
have stood up.” This moment marked the end of China’s “Century of Humiliation”
(bainian guochi 百年国耻), a hundred years characterized by hordes of people addicted
to illegally smuggled British opium, European colonization, Japanese invasion, and civil
war. With the establishment of the Communist Party’s consolidated power over
mainland China, the citizens of the new People’s Republic eagerly awaited their chance
to start building a utopia free from class oppression, ethnic discrimination, and gender
inequality. The Party made impressive strides toward these goals, but it ultimately
failed.1 This work investigates the reconstruction of traditional Chinese conceptions of
gender, as well as its intersection with race and class, by examining the disparate
portrayals of men and women in Chinese Communist propaganda during the Mao era

1

Examples can be found in Roseann Lake’s Leftover in China: Women Shaping the World’s Next
Superpower, which explores different examples of how traditional Confucian attitudes toward women have
carried over into the twenty-first century. This includes the idea that unmarried women past the age of
twenty-five are “left overs” (page 25), and the common fantasy of Chinese men to marry someone who is
beautiful, doting, hardworking, and “willing to turn a blind eye when they cheat” (page 56). Further
demonstration can be found in Mei Fong’s One Child: The Story of China’s Most Radical Experiment,
which provides examples of forced sterilizations (page 24, 67); coerced abortions (page 61, 68); daughter
abandonment and sex-selective abortions caused by a preference for sons (page 109); laws regarding
domestic violence (page 115); and the widespread attitude of single men that a bride must obey her
husband and her in-laws (page 119). The Party also perpetuated class distinction by dividing society into
the binary categories of good “red” communists and bourgeois “black” individuals: see Liang Heng’s
memoir Son of the Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1984): 66-8. Examples of ethnic inequality are
most visible in the Tibetan and Uighur populations: see chapters nine and ten in John F. Avedon, In Exile
from the Land of Snows: The Definitive Account of the Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest
(repr., New York: Vintage Books, 2015); Canyon Sam, Sky Train: Tibetan Women on the Edge of History
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); and Chris Buckley, “Anti-Islam Detention Camps in
China,” New York Times (New York City, NY), Sept. 8, 2018.

2
(1949 to 1976). Since Confucianism became the official state ideology of the Han
Dynasty (202 BCE to 220 CE), traditional gender roles were shaped largely by the
philosophical principles of the family-state compact and the Daoist doctrine of yin and
yang. Mao intended to annihilate these traditional beliefs in favor of a “modern” Soviet
model of gender equality, but custom was not ultimately replaced by the new socialist
paradigm. Instead, the two merged into a new system which synthesized Confucian
patriarchy with socialist prudism.2 This synthetic gender paradigm undercut the Party’s
ostensible goal of gender equality by reinforcing a binary patriarchal structure in which
Han men were the pinnacle of society while all other groups fell into an intersectional
hierarchy of oppression which has carried over into the post-socialist era.
Incorporating “gender” into Western historical methodology is a relatively recent
development. With the rise of second wave feminism in the 1960s and 1970s, it was
Natalie Zemon Davis who first reminded historians that they should tell the stories of
both men and women, rather than only the “great men.”3 Ten years later, beyond simply
incorporating women to the historical narrative, Joan Scott redirected the trajectory of
Western historiography by conceptualizing “gender” as both a subject of inquiry and as a
method of conducting historical examinations of perceived power dynamics between
sexed bodies, and that the study of these power dynamics will invariably intersect with

2

This new “socialist prudism” is expressed succinctly by Zheng Tiantian in Tongzhi Living: Men
Attracted to Men in Postsocialist China: Mao reinforces the “heterosexual, marital, and reproductive sex
model” because “sex for reasons other than reproduction was deemed deviant and abominable and so
needed to be policed and regulated. These forms of sex included premarital sex, extramarital sex,
prostitution, and same-sex acts. Sexual desires were demonized as lowly, corrupt, decadent, and
incompatible with the state, because sex was believed to weaken, sap, and debilitate people’s energy that
should be devoted to building the state” (page 41).
3

Natalie Zemon Davis, “Women’s History in Transition: the European Case,” Feminist Studies 3
(1975-1976): 90.

3
race and class.4 Judith Butler took Scott’s idea one step further by arguing that gender
(and even biological sex for that matter) are not essential characteristics, but a repetitive
set of ritualized social performances that continuously reaffirm and simultaneously
reconstruct one’s gender identity.5 Today, with growing acceptance of the LGBT
movement, social theorists posit the idea that sex and gender are spectra wherein there
are a wide array of sexual identities.
When applying Scott’s theory to non-Western cultures, Gail Hershatter and Wang
Zheng recognize that gender is intrinsically linked to hierarchical power relations, but,
using China as an example, they also claim that the whole of Scott’s arguments are not
universally applicable to all cultures.6 Many Anglophone scholars accidentally approach
Chinese history from a Western Orientalist perspective by ignoring the Chinese scholarly
discourse on gender.7 Besides the obvious cultural variances, Hershatter and Wang point
to linguistic differences that create barriers to international academic discourse. They use
the example of sex and gender. In English, it is generally accepted that sex refers to the
biological reproductive distinctions between “males” and “females,” and that gender

4

Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” The American Historical
Review 91, no. 5 (1986): 1054, 1067.
5
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (repr., New York: Routledge, 2006), 152. Butler develops this
idea by analyzing Foucault’s research of an intersex individual named Herculine who, despite having been
raised as a girl, was later declared to be a man and was compelled to perform all of the social rituals
expected of men (pages 132-3, 136). Butler emphasizes her argument of gender performativity by quoting
Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that “one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one” (page 151). Zheng
Tiantian, in Tongzhi Living, provides an example of a contemporarily performed masculinity within the
Tongzhi (gay) community where performing a masculine role means not just behaving in a manly way, but
keeping a physical distance from other men, displaying a hyper-macho attitude toward women, getting a
wife/girlfriend, and having children (pages 152-3).
6

Gail Hershatter and Wang Zheng, “Chinese History: A Useful Category of Gender Analysis,”
The American Historical Review 113, no. 5 (2008): 1407.
7

Ibid., 1412.

4
refers to the socially constructed “masculine” and “feminine” identity of individuals
regardless of their biological sex. However, Chinese has until now lacked any linguistic
distinction between these two terms and translates both “sex” and “gender” as xingbie 性
别—literally “different natures.”8
Furthermore, while Scott has helped modern Western sociologists reconceptualize gender as a spectrum rather than as a compartmentalized binary,9
Hershatter and Wang point to the Chinese historical dichotomy of nan/nü 男/女
(male/female) and claim that this binary was a “foundational organizing principle of
society,” and that even though Mao and the CCP tried to erase certain aspects of the past,
the nan/nü binary still exerts a strong influence in contemporary ideology.10 Indeed, if
we accept that gender is a socially performed construct, then we also have to accept that a
particular society can construct their conceptions of gender to have a reified binary
essence and that they will perform those genders according to social expectations. If so,
then it is also important for scholars to study the gendered power relationships of that
community as though they were an essentialized binary because that is how they have
been constructed. This is the case with Chinese history. In China, xingbie refers to sexual
differentiation and reproduction, but in order for Western historians to successfully
consider aspects of gender, then, we ought to frame our historical analysis
philosophically within the Daoist paradigm of yin and yang.

8
Hershatter and Wang, “Chinese History,” 1417. See also Howard Chiang, Sexuality in China:
Histories of Power and Pleasure (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2018), 3.
9

Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” 1065.

10

Hershatter and Wang, “Chinese History: A Useful Category of Gender Analysis,” 1412, 1420.

5
In her study of the hierarchical disparity between men and women in propaganda
posters, Harriet Evans attributed the CCP’s patriarchal bias to biological differences
which limited the Party’s liberation of women because they were seen as weaker, less
creative, less astute, and that women were driven by smaller interests and concerns than
men.11 It is certainly possible that biological differentiation exerted a strong influence on
the CCP’s policies, but what Evans stops just short of articulating is that the CCP’s
conception of gender is primarily based in the Daoist philosophical doctrine of yin-yang
(阴-阳) dualism. Essentially, this holds that the universe is composed of two binary
forces, each of which simultaneously supports and contradicts its opposite.
Consequently, both yin and yang are best understood in contradistinction to each other.
Originally, although still opposites, both terms were more neutral and less freighted with
assumptions of value, but by the establishment of the People’s Republic they had become
significantly more Manichean. Yang is generally associated with positivity, energy, heat,
life, light, strength, activity, and masculinity; whereas yin is associated with negativity,
stasis, coldness, death, darkness, weakness, passivity, and femininity. Within this
framework, all things in the universe contain both yin and yang, but in different
measures. For example, every man contains a little bit of yin, but he is mostly composed
of yang—the more yang a man possesses, the manlier he will be.12

11
Harriet Evans, “Comrade Sisters: Gendered Bodies and Spaces,” in Picturing Power in the
People’s Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution, ed. Harriet Evans and Stephanie Donald
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 64; Hershatter and Wang, “Chinese History: A
Useful Category of Gender Analysis,” 1410.

Joseph A. Adler, Chinese Religious Traditions (London: Pearson, 2002), 59-66; Arthur Waley,
Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (repr., New York: Routledge, 2005), 34.
12

6
Beginning in August 1966, just after Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution, the
Party launched a campaign to attack old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas—
referred to as the “Four Olds.” Many scholars dismiss Daoism and Confucianism
because of the Party’s fervid drive to eliminate feudal religion from society, which it saw
as unenlightened superstition. The CCP was only partially successful in doing so since
both of these ideologies shaped—and continue to shape—the modern Chinese
sociopolitical landscape.13 Yin and yang have shaped Chinese social and sexual
relationships for thousands of years. For example, in his treatise on male homosexuality
in ancient China, Bret Hinsch explains that normally when men paired off sexually, the
man who performed the insertive role would have more yang (he would be older and
would have a higher socioeconomic status), and the man who played the submissive role
would be poorer and younger (which made him appear more feminine), and therefore he
was thought to have more yin.14 During the 1930s, a Shanghai newspaper published
stories about Yao Jinping, a woman who claimed to have become a man, and A’nidu, a
woman with androgynous physical features. Twenty years later, Xie Jianshun, an
intersex soldier from Taiwan was likewise built by the press into a figure of public
spectacle. In all three cases, the newspapers framed the discourse around these people in
terms of yin and yang, thereby highlighting their cultural resilience as terms of gender
description.15

13

An example of this this can be seen in the Chinese words for “positive”—yangxing 阳性,
literally “has a yang nature”—and “negative”—yinxing 阴性, “has a yin nature.” Similar philosophical
phenomena are found in the West as well; nobody identifies as a true Platonist, but all of Western society
has been shaped by Plato’s ideas. In his book Anatomy of Chinese, Perry Link provides further examples
of ancient culture that escaped the Communists’ purge of “Four Olds” (pages 4, 5).
14

Bret Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve (Berkeley: UC Press, 1992), 9.

15

Chiang, Sexuality in China, 131-2, 134.

7
The sexual connections to yin and yang are further highlighted by the Chinese
language itself. One of the words for “penis” is yangju 阳具. One literal translation of
this word is “sun instrument,” although “tool of yang” is just as valid. Conversely, one of
the Chinese words for “vagina” is yindao 阴道, literally “shadow road” or “path of yin.”
Even people who fall outside the traditional binary are subject to it. For example, a yinyang person (yinyangren 阴阳人) may be either bisexual or intersex.16
Chen Xiaomei encourages scholars of Chinese history to “explore how
[propaganda] posters present an ambiguous space where different meanings blur and
overlap, without resorting to binary oppositions.”17 On the other hand, while freely
acknowledging that gender and sexuality are spectra, not binary systems, it is still
important to understand that gender norms—as recognized and redefined by the CCP and
by the general public during the Mao era—are in fact largely presented in a yin-yang
binary. This does not deny that there are obvious exceptions. Anchee Min’s Red Azalea
is a prominent example of the twilit shading in the sinuous void between yin and yang,
but understanding this binary reveals that portrayals of women in propaganda do not in
fact liberate women or promote gender equality.18 Feminine yin was still subjected to
masculine yang in Maoist China. As such, it is important to understand that the Party’s

Howard Chiang, After Eunuchs: Science, Medicine, and the Transformation of Sex in Modern
China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 200-1.
16

17
18

Chen Xiaomei, “Growing Up with Posters in the Maoist Era,” in Evans and Donald, 118.

Anchee Min, Red Azalea (New York: Random House, 1994). Min’s memoir recalls her story as
a sent-down youth to Red Fire Farm where she engages in a lesbian relationship with Yan, her Party
Secretary. She also tells the story of a woman who once disguised herself to look like a man in order to
enter a public bathhouse where she would massage the “sun instrument” of strangers (page 229).

8
declaration of gender equality simply meant that all genders were not equal to each other,
but that all sexes were in fact only equally free to be masculine.
The hierarchical power dynamics of yin and yang have persisted through the Mao
era, not just in spite of the CCP’s relentless propaganda, but actually because of it and its
performative nature. Chapter two focuses on portrayals of power in propaganda posters
by considering four main arguments. First, the prominence of the Party’s ideals and the
creation of new class distinctions; second, the deification of Mao and his cult of
personality which elevated Mao and his inner circle thereby creating a pantheon of gods,
but neglecting the creation of a corresponding pantheon of goddesses; third, the
masculinization of women and the absence of feminized men; and fourth, the
feminization of China’s ethnic minorities with special attention on the Tibetans and
Uighurs.
Chapter three focuses on comic books produced after the Party took steps to
nationalize the publishing industry. Because nationalization occurred in phases,
discussions of gender and power evolved in sync with the political events affecting
publishers. This meant that earlier comics melded old and new ideas about gender,
whereas later comics in the 1970s were doctrinaire in their presentation.
Chapter four examines the officially canonized dramatic performances on stage
and in film, commonly referred to as the “model works.” These were especially
important to Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s wife and dean of arts during the Cultural
Revolution, who oversaw all aspects of their creation and distribution. Because they
were so high-profile, their political importance cannot be underestimated. Their
depictions of gender and ideological struggle are emphasized in several ways, specifically

9
in the organization of the film credits, and in the CCP’s depictions of health and sickness,
and in targeted manipulation of the stage lighting.
A common theme throughout this thesis is a policy established by Jiang Qing and
her court of followers during the Cultural Revolution called the Three Prominences. This
required that in any form of propaganda, the most visible character should be the most
politically pure. Because the Party strove to portray itself as strong, men often took
center-stage. The intention was to highlight the new glory of the new Chinese society in
contrast to feudal China’s weak, feminine, and foot-bound past. Although men were
typically the most prominent, women often took the focus. But the model women shown
in propaganda, with their men’s clothing and technical savvy, demonstrated the
masculine yang of the party as “an extension of the new socialist nation and the very
antithesis of old China, often represented as the ‘sick man of East Asia’” when the
government of the Qing dynasty was too weak to defend the Middle Kingdom from the
onslaught of foreign trading concessions, extraterritorial rights, Russian encroachment,
and a series of unequal treaties.19 In other words, the CCP’s propaganda campaigns were
not intended to liberate women from oppression, but to free China from a century of
international humiliation caused by an excess of yin.
The script of the CCP’s propaganda ministry was primarily drawn from Chairman
Mao’s 1942 speech at the Forum on Art and Literature convened at the revolutionary
headquarters in Yan’an.20 Mao declared that artists and writers must not work for the

Daisy Yan Du, “Socialist Modernity in the Wasteland: Changing Representations of the Female
Tractor Driver in China, 1949-1964,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 29, no. 1 (2017): 64. 66.
19

20

John Gittings, “Excess and Enthusiasm,” in Evans and Donald, 29.

10
sake of art itself, but that they must serve the political interests of the people.21 While
this may sound like a promotion of utopian ideals, “serving the people” simply meant that
art and literature followed at the discretion of the Party, which saw itself as the
representative of the people.22 This may sound sinister, but the motives of the
propaganda ministry were not secret. Significant portions of Mao’s 1942 speech were
reprinted in The Little Red Book, which was a compilation of the Great Helmsman’s
speeches between the 1920s and the 1960s. Marshal Lin Biao, Mao’s right-hand deputy
originally assembled the volume in the mid-1960s to be a tract of Mao’s personality cult
within the armed forces, but a few months after its publication it became so universal that
by the late 1960s, the entire populace carried The Little Red Book everywhere,
memorized passages from it, and treated it with the reverence of scripture.23 Included in
Mao’s teachings is the notion that literature and art must be “powerful weapons for
uniting and educating the people” and also for “attacking and exterminating our
enemies,”24 and that Communist art must combine matter and form to be both
revolutionary in content and beautiful in style.25

21
Mao Zedong, Mao Zhuxi Yulu [Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Waiwen
Chubanshe, 1966), 232-3.
22

Stefan R. Landsberger, “The Deification of Mao: Religious Imagery and Practices during the
Cultural Revolution and Beyond,” China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and
Post-Mao Counternarratives, ed. Woei Lien Chong (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2002), 143.
23

Ibid., 146.

24

Mao, Mao Zhuxi Yulu, 233-4.

25

Ibid., 234-5. See also Wm. Theodore De Bary and Richard Lufrano, Sources of Chinese
Tradition, vol. 2, From 1600 to the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 443.

11
Artistic propaganda was omnipresent since the Party’s inception, but it was during
the Cultural Revolution when, with Mao’s wife Jiang Qing as the “standard-bearer” for
the humanities, “politics and art [became] irrevocably intertwined.”26 In her own
speeches to artists and writers, Jiang frequently stressed that the artistic elements of any
given work were secondary to its revolutionary content.27 Artists who failed to comply
with the rigorous standards she set were treated harshly. Jung Chang recalled the story of
a poet named Bian who fought with Chang’s mother against the Guomindang in
Manchuria. He was talented, but was driven to suicide because the Party wanted
“propaganda, not self-expression.”28 The importance of Mao’s directives in 1942
highlight the yin-yang binary of all power relationships in Chinese Communist society,
not merely relationships of gender:
The [Cultural Revolution] used ideology and culture to divide society into two
radically simplified classes of people, friend or foe, new or old, proletarian or
capitalist. During the Cultural Revolution period, art was used as an ideological
weapon by Mao in the process of social redefinition and assertion of totalitarian
control.29
The early years of the Cultural Revolution saw the spontaneous formation of the
Red Guards. Responding to Mao’s calls to “bombard the headquarters” and that “it is
right to rebel,” the Red Guards were essentially roving gangs of uniformed teenagers who
traveled across China purging remnants of traditional society by defacing religious

26

Richard King and Jan Walls, “Introduction: Vibrant Images of a Turbulent Decade,” Art in
Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, ed. Richard King (British Columbia: University of
British Columbia Press, 2010), 5-6.
27

“Jiang Qing’s Discussion with Arts Workers, November 1966,” Art and China’s Revolution, ed.
Melissa Chiu and Zheng Shengtian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 220.
28
Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (repr., New York: Simon & Schuster,
2003): 154.
29

149.

Kuiyi Shen, “Propaganda Posters and Art during the Cultural Revolution,” in Chiu and Zheng,

12
artifacts, burning books, and persecuting families from wealthy or privileged
backgrounds. Mao and the Party only managed to restore order by compelling Red
Guard units to move to the countryside in order to study class struggle directly from the
peasants. Many of them were stranded there for years, and some were never permitted to
return to their homes in the city, simply becoming peasants themselves. But it is
particularly in the rural areas that we see how entrenched traditional Confucian values
were within Chinese society. These Red Guards spent their youth growing up in the
cities where they were taught that “men and women are the same”30 and that “women can
hold up half of the sky.”31 From there, they were sent to the countryside where their
ideas about gender equality ran up against 2500 years of patriarchal tradition.32
Ding Ling was one of the CCP’s early generation of high ranking cadres, although
by the summer of 1957 she “was labeled as the number-one rightist in China.”33 In 1941
she recalled an experience in the rural hamlet of Xiacun. A young woman from the
village had recently returned home after escaping from Japanese captivity where she had
been repeatedly gang raped. Xiacun was in a region held by the Communists, and the
residents had ostensibly received training in communist ideology, but they still treated
this girl with scorn and contempt because she no longer possessed her virtue.34 When
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one female Red Guard was sent into exile thirty years later, contending with the village
elders got her nowhere even if she premised her claims from The Little Red Book. The
leaders “just ignored her and said women had no right to argue with men.”35
Traditional attitudes about women and sex blended easily with Mao’s ideas about
“spiritual pollution” and “Communist morality.”36 Jung Chang, who was a Red Guard
herself during the Cultural Revolution, related how one of her classmates came home
pregnant from a communist pilgrimage to Beijing. Because of this, she was beaten by her
father and subjected to the shame and ridicule of her family. She subsequently hanged
herself. Chang reflected that unfortunately, “this medieval concept of shame” was not
one of the Four Olds presented to the Red Guards for destruction.37
Anchee Min related a similar experience from her own time as a rusticated youth.
While working on the Red Fire Farm, one of her comrades, Little Green, was ambushed
by the entire company while she and her “bookish lover” were in coitus.38 This was a
serious transgression because “a good female comrade was supposed to devote all her
energy, her youth, to the revolution; she was not permitted to think about men” until she
was expected to get married in her late twenties. The penalties for fornication were social
ostracism for the woman and disgrace for her family.39 As for Little Green’s lover, he
was executed for rape.40 Consequently, Little Green herself had a nervous breakdown
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and, like Ophelia, drowned herself in the river.41 This experience and many others taught
Min that immoral women were “worn shoes” and “porcelain with scars.” Afterward, she
resolved to avoid the company of men.42
In considering the “repressive hypothesis,” Michel Foucault claimed that by
repressing sexuality, society will in fact only discourse about sexuality even more.43
Such is the case with Communist China, which required the documentation of sexual
confessions and the creation of big character posters denouncing sexual crimes.44 Simply
by denigrating eroticism as “spiritual pollution,” the CCP empowered people’s erotic
drives by recasting sex as an act of rebellion.45 Much like the Junior Anti-Sex League of
George Orwell’s 1984, the Chinese under Mao were expected to sublimate their sexual
instincts into building the socialist state.46 As such, the very act of expressing sexual
desire became bourgeois, individualist, and counterrevolutionary.47 Because the
panopticon of Chinese society was so invasive, the only “safe” places for lovers and
masturbators to indulge themselves were the dark corners of public parks in the quiet
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moments between patrols.48 Samuel Chotzinoff’s assessment of gay intimacy in New
York City during the first third of the twentieth century is just as apt in describing Maoist
China: “privacy could only be had in public.”49
Mao and the state became the sole object of adoration in the lives of the
population. In the early 1950s, even showing affection for one’s children became a
symptom of “divided loyalties,” although the Party relaxed this attitude by the mid1960s, just prior to the onset of the Cultural Revolution.50 Anything that demonstrated a
sense of individual will was considered bourgeois, and was therefore immoral at best and
criminal at worst. Falling in love from a chance meeting was a sign of depravity.51 After
all, love was selfish, selfishness was individualist, and individualism in a communal
society was bourgeois. Every action was political, and nothing—not even one’s personal
thoughts and emotions—was private.52 Even suicide was criminalized because it put the
individual will over the will of the people.53 What is more, throughout Chinese history,
suicide was a “traditional gesture of [political] protest” and was hence construed as a lack
of faith in Mao and the Communist Party.54
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The placement of yang over yin in Party propaganda is demonstrative of Joan
Scott’s analysis that “emergent rulers have legitimized domination, strength, central
authority, and ruling power as masculine” and that “enemies, outsiders, subversives,
[and] weakness” are depicted as feminine, and that these rulers—including Chairman
Mao Zedong—have upheld laws and customs that “put women in their place.”55 In other
words, it is not that women qua women need to be controlled, but that “control” itself is
socially conceived as masculine. Therefore, to suppress the feminine is to exalt the
masculine and thus assert control. Or, to phrase this in a Chinese context, Mao and the
CCP understood it as their birthright to exercise yang—the masculine force of power,
control, domination, and strength—to wage war on the yin-possessed minorities of the
steppes, the children of landlords, and femininity in general. By proclaiming an end to
the Century of Humiliation, Mao was repudiating China’s tradition of weakness and
submission. His successors have changed tack in economics by opening China to foreign
commerce and intellectual exchange, but they have all maintained Mao’s social policies
by censoring feminist and LGBT activists, and by curtailing the rights of minorities.56
The Chinese Communist Party has, without fail, reaffirmed the ascendancy of yang over
yin.
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CHAPTER II
FROZEN FACES: PROPAGANDIC FOUNDATIONS IN PARTY POSTERS
The posters had a great impact on my life. They taught me to be selfless and to be
loyal to Mao and Communism. To be able to feel closer to Mao, I filled my house
with posters. I looked at Mao before I closed my eyes at night and again when I
woke. When I saved a few pennies, I would go to the bookstores to buy new Mao
posters.
—Anchee Min, Chinese Propaganda Posters

One of the most important sources for our understanding of gender in the Mao era
is the propaganda poster. Each one is a window into the world of Mao’s idealized
conception of a communist utopia, of which gender is an essential component. For the
historian, each poster presents a tableau that helps us to understand the CCP’s vision for
the future. But for the average Chinese person who lived through the Mao era, posters
were a pervasive advertisement that served as a standard of moral rectitude. As Chen
Xiaomei later recalled, “I grew up in a world where posters remembered, talked back,
and also constructed and reconstructed who I was and what was socially expected of
me.”1 Posters hung from every public surface, and their bright colors, heroic subjects,
and stylized political messages were designed for instant comprehension by the public
who were thus inculcated with a sense of the Party’s ideals. What is more, during a time
in which literacy rates were climbing, but were still far below the current standard,
propaganda posters drew more upon the audience’s social and cultural awareness rather
than on any formal education or erudition.2
Xiaomei Chen, “Growing Up with Posters in the Maoist Era,” in Picturing Power in the People’s
Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution, ed. Harriet Evans and Stephanie Donald (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 105.
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At first glance, one can easily see the Party’s efforts to be inclusive of women and
ethnic minorities in their poster campaigns. The Party produced millions of posters
during the Mao era which touched on a wide variety of subject matter including scientific
advancement, military training (figures 1.1 and 1.2) and agricultural production (figures
1.3 and 1.4). Following Mao’s declaration that “women can hold up half the sky,” the
latter years of the Cultural Revolution proliferated numerous posters depicting heroic
young communist women.3
However, posters alone cannot wholly inform our understanding of reality. Each
one captures the Party’s ideal, not the authentic circumstances of real people and their
lived experiences. As such, even though the Party attempted to enforce gender equality
through its portrayals of women, the depictions of the Party ideal actually undermined
their goal of gender, ethnic, and social equality by subtly reinforcing the patriarchal order
in a vast majority of its propaganda posters. This is shown by considering four primary
elements commonly found in posters. The first is the principle of the three prominences.
The second is the deification of Chairman Mao. The third is about the one-way
masculinization of women. The final analysis is the exoticization and eroticization of
China’s ethnic minorities which ultimately served to portray the Han majority with
masculine yang, and the minorities with feminine yin.
The CCP’s portrayals of women in posters are significant for two reasons. First,
they illustrate the phrase that “whatever men can do, women can do too,” which was
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frequently expressed during the Mao era.4 As part of the CCP’s efforts to enforce gender
equality, it was effective to show women performing tasks that have been traditionally
performed by men (figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6). Second, women were widely accepted
as the most oppressed victims of the Chinese feudal order.5 Therefore, by depicting
“liberated” women performing tasks that had previously been denied to them, such as
engaging in scholarship, mining, or fighting in the army, the Party was able to illustrate
its contrast to Old China because it had “modernized” and turned previously suppressed
groups into productive members of society.6
Perhaps the most common example of “modern” women performing
conventionally “masculine” jobs is the female tractor driver (nü tuolajishou 女拖拉机
手). Before the communist takeover in 1949, society expected women to confine
themselves to the private world of the home where they would cook, clean, and weave.
Men, on the other hand, were expected to participate in more public spheres such as
farming and combat. Both were assigned different tasks, and both were associated with
different technologies: society linked women to the loom and men with the plow.7
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Images of women driving tractors were vital to the Party’s endeavor to overthrow the old
paradigm (figures 1.3 and 1.4). Indeed, the female tractor driver was so important to the
Party’s conception of “modernity” that Liang Jun, one of China’s first female tractor
drivers, was depicted on the reverse side of the 1962 one yuan RMB note.8 By
obliterating the boundary between “men’s work” and “women’s work,” the Party tried to
abolish the hierarchical boundaries that kept women oppressed.
The same tactic which allowed the CCP to showcase their technical and social
modernization also gave them the opportunity to highlight their efforts to liberate China’s
ethnic minorities from their “backward” feudal traditions.9 An article published in the
People’s Daily in January 1960 told the story about a Tibetan woman who came to China
to learn tractor driving despite the Tibetans’ supposed superstition that women could not
work the soil without incurring the wrath of the gods who would wreak havoc on the land
by killing yaks, poisoning the harvest, and causing widespread disaster. This woman
learned her craft and heroically went home to Tibet to help liberate her people and to
represent socialist modernity.10
The Three Prominences
Jiang Qing, as head of the Cultural Revolution Group (wenge xiaozu 文革小组),11
mandated that all works of art should be red, bright, and shining (hong, guang, liang 红
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光亮).12 Her intention behind the word “red” was twofold. As a color it is universally
recognized as the symbolic hue of the Marxist proletarian revolution. This meant that
because Mao, Jiang, and the CCP saw themselves as the heirs of Marxism-Leninism
(figure 1.7), their official paintings and works of art would use liberal amounts of
crimson. But it is also important to understand that “red” became an abstract descriptor
for any thought or behavior that harmonized with Party ideology (figure 1.8). Likewise,
“bright” and “shining” had practical implications since the function of propaganda is not
met unless it draws the observer’s attention, but they also have symbolic significance as
well since anything that brightly shines is ontologically full of yang. This meant that a
work of art was not only intended to hit the eye like a vermillion firework, but that its
content also needed to be “red” in the revolutionary sense, depicted in the vibrant style of
Soviet Realism. It should be noted that Chinese traditional culture also saw red as an
auspicious color, using it as a symbol of luck and prosperity during Lunar New Year
celebrations and weddings. On the other hand, the Party artistically used black, the color
of yin, to portray counterrevolutionary intent, and it is used ideologically as an adjective
for undesirable elements within society.13
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Jiang’s second requirement was that all art should adhere to the Three
Prominences (san tuchu 三突出).14 Essentially, this decreed that when multiple subjects
are depicted, the most “positive characters” should be the most apparent. When all
subjects are good communists, then the most prominent individual should be a “heroic
character.” When the artist is depicting a group of heroic communists, then the most
prominent figure should be a legendary hero. “In painting and in theatrical settings, this
meant that the heroic character was placed in the center of the composition or at center
stage and brightly illuminated with a spotlight.”15
One of the most common themes in propaganda posters is what some scholars
have dubbed “the holy triumvirate” because its central figures are the workers, peasants,
and soldiers (gong-nong-bing 工农兵). These three class categories, which had
previously been among the most oppressed under the old feudal order, were now elevated
to the upper “red” classes of Chinese society.16 Each triumvirate poster is different, but
there are similarities that link them all together. When the trio are facing to the right,
their looks usually express feelings of contempt and determination. This is because of
the Party’s disgust for conservative ideology, tradition, and “rightists” (youpai 右派)
(figures 1.9 and 1.10). When the triumvirate faces to the left, their countenances are
commonly transfigured into expressions of hopeful optimism and beatific joy (figures
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1.11 and 1.12). Again, this is reflective of the ideological binary that left is progressive
and good (and full of yang), and right is traditional and bad (and full of yin).
These posters highlight the Party’s apparent inclusivity of both sexes, but in most
examples the trio is comprised of two men and one woman. Moreover, the woman never
occupies the most prominent position. According to Jiang Qing’s instructions regarding
the san tuchu, the implication is that men are the better communists. Or, in familiar
parlance, communism is an ideology of power and strength, which are both full of
masculine yang. As Harriet Evans also highlights, it is interesting to note that “in the
individual or collective representations of the triumvirate, [the woman] is invariably
positioned as the ‘peasant’”17 (figure 1.13 is a rare exception, although here she is further
from prominence than ever). As a member of the triumvirate, and as the largest social
class in China, peasants were central to the new social order. But within Marxism’s
original framework, it was the urban proletariat whom Marx, Lenin, and Stalin held up as
the champions of the oppressed, farmers were an afterthought. As such, it is significant
that women are given an important place in the trio, but they are still only secondary.
The idea of prominence also informs our understanding of class. Although China
was supposed to have become a classless society, the Party recognized ten different class
backgrounds. Furthermore, even though the CCP intended for their system to be a
meritocracy, class in the new order was primarily hereditary.18 These classes determined
what jobs someone was qualified to perform, where they could live, what schools their
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children could attend, and with whom they were permitted to associate.19 While
officially there were ten classes, in practice there were only two. On one side were the
five red classes of workers, poor peasants, soldiers, revolutionary cadres, and the families
of revolutionary martyrs. On the other side were the five black classes of former land
owners, wealthy peasants, rightists, counterrevolutionaries, and the nebulous category of
“bad elements” (huaifenzi 坏分子).20 The former were celebrated because of their role in
strengthening new China; the latter were condemned because it was they who had
weakened old China during the Century of Humiliation.21 The Party’s division of society
into two groups where one was red, strong, and good while the other was black, weak,
and evil, was predicated on yin-yang binarism.
Even if someone had grown up in a celebrated “red” family, it was easy to fall
into the black classes. One could transgress the Party themselves and darken their name,
or the community could condemn them if anyone in their family was accused of
criminality. The doubt and suspicion fostered by the political environment of the
Cultural Revolution encouraged some to settle old scores. Jung Chang related a moment
from her time as a Red Guard when a woman denounced her neighbor as a Guomindang
spy who kept a secret photograph of Chiang Kai-shek in her home. The Red Guards did
not find the nationalist leader’s portrait, but they still humiliated and tortured the woman.
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Any Red Guard who showed signs of pity or restraint were castigated for their weakness
and declared class enemies themselves.22 Even Liu Shaoqi, the nominal president of
China, and his wife Wang Guangmei were seized by the Red Guards and placed under
house arrest, but not before Wang’s captors had dressed her like a prostitute and dragged
her through the streets, thus highlighting the contrast between the degenerate yin of the
reactionary Liu family with the upright yang of the Red Guards. Not even death could
offer relief. If an adult committed suicide, then they could still posthumously become
black and their children as well.23 Anyone, for any reason, could be accused as an agent
of the bourgeoisie or as someone who “walked the capitalist road” (zouzipai 走资派), and
then the permanent dossiers of both they and their family were indelibly reclassified.
There were only three ways for someone to remove the stain of their black class.
First, if a child’s parents were reclassified as blacks, then the child could “draw a line”
between themselves and their families. This meant publicly renouncing their ties of
kinship and severing all contact. In a culture where the Confucian doctrine of filial piety
still held sway, this was a difficult act for the child to contemplate, and a heartbreaking
reality for the parents who became isolated from their progeny.24 Second, before the
Communist takeover, when a woman married, she abandoned her ancestral home and
became a member of her husband’s family. The CCP retained this tradition. If a woman
inherited her father’s black status, she could make herself red again by marrying into a
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red family. However, poor peasants were usually the only “red” class to marry “black”
women, which meant that a woman had to choose between retaining her persecuted status
or spending the rest of her life in the fields.25 The last way to abandon yin for yang was,
if your spouse was accused of counterrevolutionary activity, to unhesitatingly file for
divorce.26
The image in figure 1.14 shows a “struggle session” where a person from a black
background is being confronted by their peers. One must use gender-neutral language
here because even though the condemned is likely male, there is no certainty. A favorite
Red Guard method for humiliating their victims was shaving their heads. Sometimes the
Red Guards would remove all the hair, and sometimes they would give a class enemy a
“yin and yang head” by shaving only half of the scalp. In those cases, the condemned
would finish shaving their heads when they got home.27 In any case, the accusers in the
image all stand erect, their faces bright, and their positions prominent within the frame—
especially the soldier. They are the embodiment of yang. The accused, with their back
toward us, their head down, their clothing dark, and their body in shadow, is the
embodiment of weakness, defeat, and yin.
The Deification Movement
Mao assumed the leadership of the Party in the 1930s, but his personality cult
only matured after 1949 when schools replaced their curriculum of classical literature
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entirely with the teachings of the Chairman.28 Then, at the start of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, Mao abnegated his humanity and became a god. Or, in other words,
“Mao ceased to be merely the unifying symbol of the revolutionary leader, and simply
became” the Communist Party.29 This was only possible because of Mao’s mastery of
propaganda. Zheng Shengtian, a student of painting at the Zhejiang Academy of Fine
Art, recalled that in mid-1967 “the professors and students had little to do, and so they
poured their energy into the fanatical” zaoshen yundong 造神运动, literally “godcreating movement.”30 Zheng and his colleagues took it as their mission to “transform
the whole country into a ‘sea of red,’ in which Mao’s image was ubiquitous.”31
An emperor has presided over the Middle Kingdom for most of its history. One
of the Chinese titles for that office is tianzi 天子, literally “son of heaven.” With the
mandate of the gods and the devotion of his subjects taken for granted, the emperor
exercised complete autonomy and wielded absolute power. Despite his efforts to
eliminate “old culture,” Mao was the gleeful inheritor of this tradition. In fact, one of the
most common phrases during the Mao era was Mao Zhuxi Wansui 毛主席万岁, literally
“ten thousand years to Chairman Mao” although a more colloquial translation would be
“long live Chairman Mao” (figure 1.15). According to Jung Chang, her father, a highranking cadre himself, refused to say this phrase since “ten-thousand years” was
historically only reserved for the emperor, and that as a communist it was inappropriate
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to address Chairman Mao in this way. However, Chang’s father was not representative
of a large number of people in this regard.32
The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two phases.33 The first half (1966 to
1971) focused on deifying Mao’s image and solidifying his cult of personality. The Mao
cult persisted throughout the Cultural Revolution, and even after Mao’s death, but it
began to tone down after the death of Defense Minister Lin Biao and his alleged attempt
at deicide.34 At that time, the artistic deification movement officially ended, but Mao was
still depicted with great veneration.35 The second phase of the Cultural Revolution (1971
to 1976) was presided over by Jiang Qing, who used her new platform to settle old scores
and establish political power in her own right rather than simply exercising the delegated
power of her aging husband.
Nevertheless, by 1965 Mao’s visage was so common that postage stamps were
replaced by miniature copies of Mao’s most famous posters.36 That same year, Jung
Chang recalled that when her father heard her recommit herself to obey her grandmother,
he corrected her to say “I will obey Chairman Mao.”37 Mao’s image was so reverenced
that even throwing away old newspapers with his picture in them was sinful and
counterrevolutionary.38 Violence against Mao’s portrait was nearly as serious as actual
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assaults upon his person. One Tibetan woman languished in prison for twelve years for
the simple peccadillo of swinging a spade into a poster of Mao during a moment of
pique.39
Despite the Party’s ostensible goals of equality and peace, the 2.2 billion posters
of Mao were lessons in power, domination, and the omnipresence of Big Brother.40 In
paintings of the Chairman, not only was he the most prominent figure, but in images
where he appears with others, his divinity is enhanced because he is kept aloof and
untouchable by the common man.41 Even when he is drawn as part of a crowd, he
maintains his godliness through the absence of physical contact.42 Mao was frequently
depicted reaching out to shake someone’s hand, but the handshake itself is rarely, if ever,
portrayed.
Following Jiang Qing’s command that revolutionary art must be “red, bright, and
shining,” Mao’s face is flooded in light from unseen sources and his halo often
illuminates the ecstatic countenances of everyone around him.43 One of the most
common tropes is to depict Mao’s head as the actual sun, which itself is the literal
embodiment of yang (they are in fact the same word. See figure 1.16). But even during
the later years of the Cultural Revolution when Mao’s presence became more indirectly
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observed in posters, the bright red sun always symbolized Mao’s beneficent love for the
people, and the image of the sunflower likewise symbolized the heart of a true
communist since its petals are perpetually oriented toward the light.
One reason that Mao was so successful in building his cult of personality was
because he made use of the religious traditions and iconography that were already in
place. Once he had eliminated all of the old gods and replaced his image with theirs, the
people had no one upon whom to shower their zeal except for Mao himself. He became
the new god of the hearth, the god of the harvest, and the god of fertility. All blessings
and good fortune, no matter how small, were attributed to Mao.44 Every home placed
Mao’s portrait in the most prominent place. Before the Red Guards destroyed the family
alters, that was the primary location for Mao to sit (figure 1.17).45 Afterward, from
whichever surface he looked down, his portrait had to be kept dusted and spotlessly
clean, and even his frame had to be “without blemish.”46 Outside of propaganda posters,
many people practiced ritualized dances and sang hymns to Mao, his quotations became
mantras, and his profile on every Red Guard badge became a talisman to ward off evil.47
Following the Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet in 1959, the Beijing government forbade
residents of Lhasa to display his pictures on the household altars and instead mandated
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that the only images worthy of respect were of the Communist trinity: Chairman Mao,
Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De.48
Between 1966 and 1971, painters understood that Mao Zedong was the only
appropriate subject for their work. The most celebrated of these was Liu Chunhua’s Mao
Zhuxi qu Anyuan 毛主席去安源 (Chairman Mao goes to Anyuan), which was one of the
first paintings proclaimed by Madam Mao to be a “model work” (Figure 1.18).49 The
image depicts a young Mao marching determinedly to the Anyuan coal mine in 1922
where he catalyzed the Chinese Communist movement by inspiring the workers to revolt
against their employers.50 The religious and political symbolism of this painting have
been widely analyzed, but a common point is the similarities between Liu’s depiction of
Mao and the Madonna paintings of Raphael.51
One aspect of the Mao cult was the institutional canonization of revolutionary
martyrs. Many of these heroes were enshrined by the Party in their very own propaganda
posters. Some of these include the peasant Wang Guofu and the child soldier Pan
Dongzi. Most of these martyrs are men, although there are a few women including Liu
Hulan who was executed by the Guomindang in 1947, and Zhao Yiman who was
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executed by the Japanese in 1936. But none are as well-known or as cherished as the
Liberation Army Soldier Lei Feng (figure 1.19). The Party’s late heroes were celebrated,
not simply because of the way they lived their lives, but because of the revolutionary
passion with which they died. Many of them attained communist “sainthood” in the cult
of Mao because they sacrificed their lives for “the revolution, the Party, or Mao.”52 Lei
Feng’s diary, which Lin Biao miraculously procured after Lei’s death in a workplace
accident in 1962, is full of adoration for Chairman Mao and personal exhortations to be a
better soldier for the Great Helmsman.53 The most common theme in Lei’s diary is the
belief that the greatest virtue is blind loyalty to Mao.54 Civilians and students everywhere
where commanded to study and emulate the example of Lei Feng. Teachers taught their
pupils that the “essence of Lei Feng was his boundless love and devotion to Chairman
Mao.”55
Between the Three Prominences and the Mao cult, one begins to see the
disproportionate representation between men and women in CCP artwork. Chen Xiaomei
discussed her experiences growing up with stories about “Uncle Lei Feng,” and implicitly
questioned the Party’s lack of any correspondingly potent female heroes. She also
pointed to other famous works of art like The Founding of the Nation (figure 1.20), where
the only woman in a horde of men is Song Qingling, widow of the late Sun Yat-sen.56 As
a youth, Chen felt inspired by the painting, but it was not until later that she came to
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understand that the one-to-ten gender ratio in The Founding of the Nation was reflective
of “the unequal gender relationship in the CCP hierarchy, which ran counter to its official
claim that it strove for gender equality.”57
The martyred dead, however, where not the only ones to mirror the light from
Mao’s red sun. The highest echelons of Party cadres were frequently depicted either in
their own right or else they are shown alongside the Chairman, staring at him with soppy
expressions of blissful oblivion (figure 1.21). The most common of these were Lin Biao,
the military’s chief-of-staff; Chen Boda, Mao’s former secretary and close associate;
Kang Sheng, Mao’s spy master and chief of the secret police; and Premier Zhou Enlai.58
The implication behind these posters is that the deification movement not only turned
Mao into a god, but it also created a small pantheon of lesser gods.59 From a religious
point of view, what is conspicuous only by its absence is any corresponding pantheon of
goddesses. There were certainly prestigious candidates, not least of which was Deng
Yingchao, the wife of Zhou Enlai. She was a devoted member of the Communist Party
and an active participant in Chinese politics since the May Fourth Movement in 1919; she
was also an unwavering proponent of women’s rights.60 But the point remains that
Mao’s omnipresence highlighted the fact that only Big Brother was watching—“little
sister” could not be found.
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There are occasional posters depicting Jiang Qing (figures 1.16 and 1.21), but
these were rarely produced and infrequently purchased by the public. After all, to display
a poster of Jiang by herself “would indicate adherence to the most radical strand of
Cultural Revolutionary politics.”61 In 1977, one year after Mao’s death and the
subsequent arrest of Jiang Qing, there was a small poster campaign dedicated to Mao’s
first wife Yang Kaihui. She had been tortured and executed by the Guomindang in 1930,
but despite this level of sacrifice for the proletarian cause, any mention of Yang would
have been unthinkable so long as Jiang Qing’s control of the artistic world was
unquestioned.62 Part of the reason why Yang was resurrected almost fifty years after her
death was to remind the people that she had been Mao’s “true wife.” After Mao’s
passing, in order to save his legacy and therefore the legacy of the entire Party, all the
blame for the failures of the Cultural Revolution were laid upon Jiang Qing and her
confederates in the Gang of Four. But following the wider trends of Chinese history, “all
the wisdom is man’s wisdom. The fall of the kingdom is always the fault of the
concubine.”63
Mao’s immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, tried to inherit Mao’s cult of
personality in addition to Mao’s political chair (figure 1.22), but his term in office was
short since Deng Xiaoping effectively sidelined Hua a year into his administration.64 But
the religious fire went out on the ninth of September 1976, when “the reddest sun
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dropped from the sky of the Middle Kingdom.”65 In the face of their overwhelming sense
of relief, neither Anchee Min nor Jung Chang could summon genuine tears for Mao’s
demise. And yet because of the social expectation that they wail and grieve, both buried
their faces and shook with affected sobs.66 This not only evidences Butler’s theory of
performativity, but also William Shakespeare’s declaration that besides gender, “all the
world’s a stage.”67
Manly Women and Womanly Men
Just as there are occupations that are conventionally understood as masculine, so
too are the sartorial styles commonly worn as the uniforms for those occupations.
Clothing, then, also helps us understand gender construction, power relationships, and the
performed social rituals expected of both men and women.68 Following the
understanding that femininity, as a manifestation of yin, is something that promotes
weakness within society, Mao, as early as 1934, encouraged women to engage in
masculine tasks such as agriculture.69 During the 1950’s, Mao proclaimed equal wages
for equal work regardless of sex,70 and with the implementation of collectivized farming,
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women and men were both brought together to work in the public sphere,71 although it
should be noted that even then women were not remunerated at the same rate as men.72
In 1959, Mao wrote a poem encouraging Chinese women to “doff femininity and
don military attire.”73 Overnight, all forms of propaganda began to portray women in
army uniforms and overalls performing the dangerous and physically demanding jobs
that had previously been men’s.74 It became a source of pride to see women clinging to
power lines (figure 1.3 and 1.5), fighting in combat (figures 1.2 and 1.13), working in the
fields (figures 1.3 and 1.4), and repairing or operating heavy machinery (figure 1.6).
While it is said that art imitates reality, in cases of propaganda, reality imitates art. One
interesting result from this is that women became masculinized, but so too did men as
they had to increasingly contended for jobs and status against a wider pool of
competitors.75 Jung Chang remembered the day in 1964 when her mother started wearing
drab masculine clothing and concealing features of her femininity.76 Likewise, Chen
Xiaomei recalled how she tried to emulate the physical, moral, and spiritual strength of
Lei Feng as the ideal Chinese model of heroic manliness. For her, it became a “fashion
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statement” of revolutionary orthodoxy to wear her brother’s hand-me-downs and to strut
around acting tough.77
In addition to men’s baggy garments, women started to take on other masculine
traits.78 Yan Sheng, Anchee Min’s Company Commander at Red Fire Farm, was
celebrated for her muscular stature, especially her shoulders which “swelled like steamed
bread.”79 As a Red Guard, Jung Chang witnessed her peers trying to “talk, walk, and act
like aggressive, crude men.” These same girls would bully and harass other females who
maintained elements of their femininity. Chang acknowledges, however, that it was
difficult to be truly feminine when everyone was required to wear only their “shapeless”
uniforms of blue, gray, or green.80
At the same time, the strong and masculine women in propaganda posters also
introduce a paradox. Each of these model women still maintain obvious feminine
characteristics. Sometimes the characters in propaganda are wearing men’s clothing, but
their faces are still fetchingly made up (figure 1.6). Although quite early, relative to other
posters, figure 1.15 was produced in 1959, the same year in which Mao encouraged
women to “doff femininity.” The woman’s arms are lifted in a standard posture of
strength, but her hair, her jewelry, her daughter, and the sea of flower petals around her
all speak to her obvious femininity and maternalism.
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Despite the testimonies of Chen and Chang that everyone wore the same drab
colors, women in posters were frequently shown sporting floral patterns and garish colors
(figures 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.12).81 Posters during the Cultural Revolution give the
impression that women were expected to be manly while appearing alluring. This
indicates the Party’s intention of promoting masculine strength in every citizen, but it
also signifies the underlying assumption that women are creatures of yin. Liang Jun,
China’s first female tractor driver, was sent by the CCP to attend a conference for model
workers in the Soviet Union. Prior to her departure, she was instructed to purchase a new
wardrobe. Thinking dogmatically rather than politically, Liang purchased a new set of
blue cotton work clothes. Upon seeing this, her Party cadres ordered her to buy a new
qipao, a traditional Chinese form-fitting silk gown—something she would never be
allowed to wear outside of Moscow.82
However, just because the rhetoric of the time stressed that “women can hold up
half the sky,” this must not be confused with the actual state of affairs in the workplace.83
Despite the Party’s efforts to change public attitudes toward women performing
masculine jobs, society failed to create enough occupational opportunities for women,
who frequently slid back into the same traditional tasks from which the Party sought to
liberate them.84 Jung Chang had the opportunity to work as an electrician herself,
although she notes that female electricians were so rare and glamourous that people
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would stop in wonder every time she scaled a pylon.85 Furthermore, the general public
was steeped in attitudes about traditional gender roles. This is illustrated by a 1958
article published in The People’s Daily which argued that women should spend more
time taking care of children rather than tractors.86
While some women tried to wear their clothing with minute “signs of care and
thoughtfulness,” it took great ingenuity for someone to build her outfit in a manner that
helped her stand out in ways subtle enough that no one could accuse her of
individualism.87 This only deepens the paradox around feminine beauty and political
orthodoxy. Especially during the Cultural Revolution, anything that made someone stand
out indicated that that person was too much of a bourgeois individual. This included
women’s efforts to be beautiful or fashionable.88 In her memoir, Rae Yang recalled that
“anything that would make girls look like girls was bourgeois. We covered up our bodies
so completely that I almost forgot that we were boys and girls. We were Red Guards,
and that was it.”89 The new one-size-fits-all uniforms of blue and gray masculinized the
populace, but ideologically they also feminized individualism, fashion, color, and women
in general by affiliating anything with yin with the bourgeoisie.90
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Whether they wanted to or not, most women dressed like men because they did
not want to be ostracized or shunned.91 When Jung Chang joined the Red Guards and
donned her own uniform, she too admitted that she felt uncomfortable displaying so
much masculinity, but she chose to persevere rather than jeopardize her social standing.92
Indeed, in 1964, Chang began sewing erroneous patches onto her garments in order to
enhance her image as someone truly “proletarian.”93 Women who flouted custom were
rare exceptions. In exile at Red Fire Farm, Anchee Min recalled that Little Green always
braided colorful string into her braids and comported herself with grace and delicacy.
Min was simultaneously entranced and repulsed by Little Green since she was “full of
bourgeois allure” and because “her femininity mocked us.”94 Chen Xiaomei’s mother
was an actress for the Party and was therefore permitted to wear stylish dresses and highheeled pumps. Chen remembered a feeling of indignation when she overheard others
denigrating her mother’s femininity and castigating the “foreign origin” of her
fashionable attire.95
The contradiction between the different femininities of women in real life and
women in propaganda is resolved only by the complete elimination of femininity. In the
new order, women could be good communists, all they had to do was “become
indistinguishable from men—that is, to forget that they were women.”96 Even then, one
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might make the argument that the Party had in fact equalized both genders, but this is
incorrect. Under Mao, masculinity and femininity were not made equal to each other.
Instead, everyone, whatever their biological sex, was only equally free to be masculine.
Erasing femininity from the public discourse did not erase women which, as a group,
constituted half of the population. In effect, because women are so numerous, gender
differences are impossible to completely eradicate; consequently, femininity itself is
impossible to eradicate, which meant that in Maoist society, attempts to obliterate
feminine yin only further subjugated it to masculine yang.97
The domination of yang over yin is further highlighted by an analysis of what is
missing from posters.98 There are images of women birthing piglets (figure 1.3), images
of women tending nurseries (figure 1.23), images of women cooking, cleaning, and
spinning wool, but so far as can be discovered, there is not a single propaganda poster
depicting a man doing this kind of nurturing or domestic work, even though actual men
certainly condescended to perform such tasks.99 Mao famously declared that “times have
changed, women can do the same as men,”100 and that “whatever men comrades can
accomplish, women comrades can too.”101 On the surface, these quotations sound
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egalitarian and empowering, but in practice there was still gender inequality since there is
no true inverse inasmuch that men are the same as women or that men comrades can do
the same tasks as women comrades. The idea of “women holding up half of the sky” also
means that women were mining half of the coal, erecting half of the buildings, and
planting half of the rice. But at the same time, men were not bearing and raising half of
the children, cooking half of the food, or sewing half of the clothing. Images of men
feeding babies, operating looms, frying woks, or even sweeping the floor would have
demonstrated an intention to promote gender equality. However, as the natural carriers
of yang energy, images of men performing domestic chores would have represented a
“taming” or “weakening” of yang by showing men doing “women’s work.”
Orientalism and the Feminine “Other”
Edward Said published Orientalism in 1979. This text highlighted the propensity
of Western scholars to portray the diverse civilizations and ethnic cultures between
Hungary and Japan as a homogeneous “other”—something fundamentally alien that
cannot be fully comprehended.102 Having constructed the division between Orient and
Occident, the West granted to itself everything that is familiar and wholesome, while
relegating to the East everything that is exotic, strange, and inferior.103 Having then
identified the Orient with the exotic, it became the task of the Western scholar to create a
new field of study: hence, Orientalism.104 Simply put, Orientalism grows out of
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economic, political, and religious interests; it becomes a rigidly defined academic
discipline which generates a complex discourse; and this discourse in turn is used by the
state to bolster the imperial machine.105 When the Orient or Orientals are written about,
they are never discussed in their own right, but as outsiders that have a secondary role to
play relative to the centers of power.106 In Said’s own words, “Orientalism [is] a Western
style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient,” and “the
relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power [and] domination.”107
For Westerners, Orientals are not residents of a different geography—they are an inferior
group that must be either feared or controlled.108 For the Orientalist, the Orient
represents everything that is erotic, exotic, sexually available, and diseased.109 However,
as a pseudo-scholarly practice, anyone can fall into Orientalism regardless of their
geographical or ethnic background.
China recognizes fifty-six native ethnicities within its borders, although one of
them—the Han—represents 91% of the population. The Party built a unique role in the
CCP’s propaganda campaigns for the remaining 9%. One might applaud the Party’s
efforts to include the minorities at all in their art, literature, and film. However, the
depictions of colorfully dressed steppe peoples ecstatically singing paeans to the
Communist Party are the CCP’s efforts to Orientalize their minority populations (figures
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1.1, 1.19, 1.22, and 1.24). In other words, “the representation of the minorities in such
colorful, romanticized fashion has more to do with constructing a majority discourse,
than it does with the minorities themselves.”110 And indeed, the propaganda ministry
initiated several campaigns where artists were encouraged to paint exciting minority
themes in vivid colors other than the ideal red. As the auspicious color of communist
yang, red was reserved primarily for the Han majority and, by extension, the Party.111
With the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and its Manchu-controlled bureaucracy in
1911, the new republican government and its communist successor both established the
Han as the symbol of new China and progressive modernity.112 While posters during the
Cultural Revolution cultivated a sense of communal unity by depicting men and women
in the drab uniforms of the worker-soldier-peasant triumvirate, representations of China’s
ethnic minorities were the exception.113 In posters, the Han simply wear “clothes,” but
images of minorities are always garbed in “costumes” (figures 1.19, 1.22, and 1.24).114
Figure 1.25 is a good example. Naturally, as the ultimate hero, Chairman Mao occupies
the most prominent position within the image. Of the adoring crowds surrounding his
motorcade, those closest to him are all Han, dressed in their appropriate attire. Visible in
the outer ring, however, are people with skull caps, turbans, and darker skin indicating
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that these pilgrims have travelled from China’s westernmost provinces to pay homage to
the Great Leader. In many posters with the triumvirate in the foreground, the background
is often filled with recognizable minority costumes.115
As a nationality, the word “Chinese” loosely applies to all fifty-six ethnicities.
But there is a clear elevation between the Han and everyone else since “Han” and
“Chinese” are virtually interchangeable in political discourse, and that hanyu (汉语),
literally “language of the Han,” is always translated into English as “Chinese.”116 Yinyang binaries of power are illustrated by the distinct Orientalist dichotomy drawn by the
CCP between the Han and the minority groups. As Dru Gladney says of China’s
ethnicities: “minority is to majority as female is to male.”117
In art, literature, film, and television, the ruling Han depict themselves as the
personification of normality, health, and modernity. Shown in this way, they are the
natural inheritors of leadership in China. On the other hand, the minorities, while
patronizingly celebrated, are depicted as exotic, erotic, and sexually deviant.118 Under
communism, the Han majority adopted an attitude of prudish morality. Prostitution and
pornography were criminalized, and even softcore nudity was heavily restricted. The
primary exception to this was the depictions of minorities who were often shown
naked—sometimes bathing—as though the viewer were voyeuristically spying on
something sexy, but natural, mysterious, and fragile. Images of nude minorities were
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sold in “tourist boutiques and minority crafts shops” as though the Han were pimping the
minorities for popular consumption.119
Before the communist takeover in 1949, the Han lexicon held several derogatory
terms for the ethnic groups on the fringes of society. The Party successfully dropped
these terms, but the attitudes behind the pejorative names persisted.120 This has led to the
“internal Orientalism” of the CCP which portrayed the representations of the various
minority groups as “rural women” whereas the Han majority was portrayed as “male
urban sophisticates.”121 The posters with Han subjects highlights the yang of the CCP by
portraying them as strong, modern, and “normal.” Their yang is further emphasized
when juxtaposed with the yin of the primitive, though exotic, minority groups.122 But the
cheerful, tolerant, even avuncular attitude of the Han for their neighbors, as shown in
propaganda posters, is drastically different from reality. Jung Chang recalled that while
serving in the countryside, members of the Yi minority group were always given the
filthiest and most dangerous jobs while their Han overseers supervised from comfort and
safety.123
The CCP justified their 1950 invasion and annexation of Tibet by pointing to old
imperial maps that showed Tibet as a part of China. Nevertheless, despite the fraught
political history between China and Tibet, the fact remains that both nations are separated
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by different languages, cultures, and religious traditions. The pacifism and deeply rooted
orthopraxy of Tibet’s Vajrayana Buddhist monasteries led the Chinese to think that the
Tibetan peasants were oppressed by the superstitious traditions of the priesthood, and that
Tibetans in general were “stupid and backward” because of the thin Himalayan air.124 In
order to bolster their prejudice, the CCP depicted Tibet’s monastic government as “dark,
feudal, and cruel” by casting the monks as blood-sucking parasites.125 Despite the
Party’s profession as the champions of regional autonomy and religious liberty, by the
early years of the Cultural Revolution, religious practice was officially criminalized in
Tibet and millions disappeared into the archipelago of gulags across Qinghai and
Gansu.126 Many of the imprisoned nuns and laywomen turned to their faith for comfort,
only to be further punished by their Chinese guards who insisted that “religion is poison
for your mind! The gods will not feed you! Stop the religion!”127
Jiang Qing was especially jingoistic in her attitude toward minority groups, which
she labelled as “foreign invaders.”128 One of the central doctrines of the Buddhist
tradition is ahimsa, or nonviolence. However, building out of Mao’s declaration that
“political power comes from the barrel of a gun,”129 Jiang Qing claimed that pacifism
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was a bourgeois vice.130 Consequently, Tibetan children were conscripted into
extermination brigades whose sole purpose was to kill insects and pets as a way of
purging them of nonviolent inhibitions.131 China’s ethnic minorities were given
politically black status and were therefore treated as second class not only because of
their unique cultural traditions, but even for speaking their native languages, which were
branded as inherently counterrevolutionary and reactionary.132
The artificial binary that ascribed yang to Han China and yin to Tibet meant that
anything “good” produced by Tibet had to be appropriately Sinicized, and everything else
had to be cheapened and denigrated. The Potala Palace, Tibet’s most famous landmark in
the heart of Lhasa, was constructed by the fifth Dalai Lama in the mid-17th century.
After China’s invasion, however, the Potala was plastered with large posters of Chairman
Mao.133 Today, tourists are informed that the Potala was built and maintained jointly by
Tibetan and Chinese engineers.134 Mount Everest, the highest natural peak on Earth,
once separated Tibet and Nepal. Now it is claimed by China as a point of national
pride.135 Bilingual building signs in Lhasa prominently feature bold Han characters over
smaller Tibetan script, even if the building was built by Tibetans, used exclusively by
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Tibetans, and was housed in the Tibetan quarter of town.136 When laying the first
railroad that connected Tibet to the rest of China, Tibetan laborers were paid half of the
salary of their Han colleagues,137 and when the Chinese built brothels in Lhasa, a Han
girl’s rates surpassed one hundred yuan whereas a Tibetan girl could be had for “a bowl
of noodles.”138
The “internal orientalism” of China toward its minority groups, painting the Han
as masculine and the Tibetans as feminine, was further displayed during the early 1960s
when the Red Guards, in a similar punishment to that of Wang Guangmei, compelled the
wives of Tibetan officials to parade through the streets of Lhasa wearing all of their
makeup and jewelry, each carrying trays of her toiletries.139 Again, as late as 2006, rather
than highlighting those aspects of their culture which the Tibetans themselves would have
been most proud, the public announcements on that very train to Lhasa which the natives
had built for half wages declared that “the Tibetan People are a ‘hardworking and
hospitable minority group,’ good at singing and dancing.”140 In their fear of the “other,”
the Chinese government diminished the “wildness” of the Tibetans by portraying them as
a friendly tribe of noble savages and nomadic jesters, all the while alluding to the alluring
mysticism of the Tibetans’ anti-Marxist superstitions and primitivism.141
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Part of the CCP’s efforts to Orientalize China’s minority groups meant hyperfeminizing minority women (figures 1.19), but it also meant hyper-masculinizing
minority men (figures 1.1 and 1.22). This is in part because ideal masculinity is socially
constructed differently in China than it is in the West. Physical strength and machismo
are important elements of manhood, but even more manly is the gentleman (junzi, 君子),
the scholar (caizi, 才子), and the man of culture (wenren, 文人).142 Consequently, when
the Party illustrated Mongolian horsemen or Tibetan Khampas, they always have thick
facial hair and bulging muscles. In a way, the CCP claims the virility of the minority
groups for their own while they also maintain a sense of barbaric otherness between the
minorities and the Han. The minority depictions of masculinity are worth celebrating,
but there is a clear preference for the man who stands resolute but calm (figure 1.18), or
so dedicated to the cultivation of his mind that he stays up reading late into the night
(figure 1.26).143
The Chinese treatment of Tibet is not unique among China’s minority groups.
The Mongolians and the Uighurs all received similar torments. In Xinjiang during the
Cultural Revolution, Muslim Uighurs were also condemned as “backward” and “feudal,”
Qur’ans were incinerated, mosques were destroyed, imams were tortured and killed, and
religious customs were condemned and forbidden.144 The primary difference between
Tibet and Xinjiang is the reception of their respective plights in Western media. Tibet
has a charismatic advocate in the person of the Dalai Lama, and Westerners are favorably
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disposed toward Buddhism and its core doctrine of nonviolence. But there is no
corresponding expatriate to speak for the Uighur establishment of East Turkestan, and
neither is Islam as kindly received in the Western media.145
Although the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the problems between the Han
majority and China’s minority groups, most notably the Tibetans and Uighurs, has not
stopped. In 2018, the United Nations recognized that under the government of Xi Jinping
nearly one million Uighurs have been declared carriers of an “ideological virus” and have
been detained in prison camps where they are separated from their families, reeducated,
and compelled to renounce Islam.146 The Mao era laid the foundation for the
conceptualization of the Han as the group with the greatest yang, and the minorities as the
weak and foreign bearers of yin. Just as the Party tried to erase femininity as a way of
promoting masculine strength, the Party has made concerted efforts to erase ethnic
minority cultures as a way of promoting Han dominance.147
Conclusion
The Chinese Communist Party successfully deployed countless propaganda
posters to buttress their agenda. In a world where few could read, posters helped convey
the Party’s message directly to every person. Intentionally or otherwise, the Party built
on the inherited framework of philosophical Daoism’s binary worldview of yin and yang.
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The CCP tried hard to eliminate remnants of feudal culture, including Daoism, but they
paradoxically employed the very paradigm that they sought to undo.
The frozen tableaus in the poster campaigns attempted to construct a world where
men and women were equal to each other, but the project was doomed from the onset
because of Jiang Qing’s doctrine of the Three Prominences. The CCP’s posters were red,
bright, and shining, and they also followed the pattern of featuring most prominently the
characters from Party lore that were the most inspiring. Women occasionally held the
most prominent position in posters, but this was usually only in posters populated entirely
by other women. By and large, the most prominent communist heroes were men. One of
the common themes in posters was the worker-peasant-soldier triumvirate. In most cases,
the formula for these posters is two men and a woman. The woman is usually a peasant,
but whatever her role she is never the most prominent. The triumvirate is always made
up of three members of the Han, and they are frequently positioned prominently before
hordes of China’s ethnic minorities waving The Little Red Book. The underlying
message is that the best heroes of communism are Han men. Men have yang, and women
have yin; the Han have yang, and the minorities have yin.
The most prominent hero is always Chairman Mao Zedong. His eminence in
posters helped expand the power of his personality cult. In every image and wherever he
went, millions of Chinese citizens chanted the hope that Mao, like his imperial
predecessors, would live forever. His posters, badges, statues, and memorabilia were
treated as icons, and his books were reverenced as scripture. By abolishing the old
religions and expelling the old gods, Mao became the sole object of adoration in the
hearts of his subjects. Not only was he exalted as the apex of divinity, but with his
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elevation came a minor pantheon of lesser gods, saints, and beatified martyrs. Though
never quite to his level, the upper echelons of Mao’s closest cadres were treated with
similar degrees of veneration, even though they themselves were always oriented toward
Mao. Beyond that, anyone who sacrificed their life for the Chairman and the Party was
officially canonized in the Mao cult. Some of these saints were women, but a vast
majority of them were men, and none were more reverenced than the soldier Lei Feng.
From a religious perspective, the cult of Mao was nearly complete in that it bore all the
elements one might expect to find in a religious following. However, what is missing is
any corresponding reverence to any pantheon of goddesses. The cult of Mao is a religion
dedicated entirely to the worship of yang.
The Party attempted to enforce gender equality by showing women performing
numerous traditionally masculine tasks such as hanging power lines, mining coal, and
operating heaving machinery. They were encouraged to dress like men, act like men, and
treat everyone else like men. Nevertheless, posters frequently depict women wearing
colors and patterns that would be inappropriately feminine on a man; they are often
shown doing customarily feminine jobs; and poster women often have their makeup done
and their hair in plaits that are simple, yet stylish. In a world where the genders are
ostensibly equal, what is missing is any indication that men were encouraged to wear
clothing or perform tasks beneath the dignity of their sex. Few dispute the patriarchal
oppression of women under imperial Confucianism, but before the collapse of the Qing
dynasty it was not uncommon to see male prostitutes, feminine male actors—sometimes
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with bound feet—and even the occasional male concubine.148 All of this disappeared in
new China.
Just as women were proclaimed equal, even as their yin was subjected to yang, so
too were China’s ethnic minorities proclaimed to be equal in posters, even as they were
subjected to the oppression of the Han. As a way of claiming ownership of the
minorities, the CCP Orientalized their own citizens as a way of justifying the Chinese
occupation of non-Chinese peoples. In other words, the Han claimed yang for
themselves and assigned yin to everyone else, thereby granting themselves permission to
dominate minority communities just as Confucian men traditionally dominated women.
The Chinese occupations became so draconian in some places that just as sex acts
became bourgeois and counterrevolutionary in mainstream society, so too did acts of
kindness and generosity in outer regions like Xinjiang and Tibet.149 Thus, the poster
campaigns of the CCP helped to rewrite social mores and gender norms, all the while
maintaining subtle, though enduring, elements of traditional Chinese culture.
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CHAPTER III
NOT JUST FOR CHILDREN: COMMUNIST COMICS IN BLACK AND WHITE
All through the night we exchanged comic books, without even speaking. I
observed my companions—workers, petty officials, and peasants. No one paid
attention to the cold or to the repeated stops; they were all completely absorbed in
their reading. And if one of them finished his comic book before the others, he
looked around him with restrained impatience, and then, when he got the next
one, plunged into it without delay. Several times the stewardess came into the
compartment with more hot water for the tea, but no one noticed, and the
conductor had to knock his ticket puncher against the metal rim of the baggage
rack, as if to arouse sleepers, in order to get any attention.
—Gino Nebiolo1

The Liezi, one of the canonical texts of religious Daoism, tells the story of a
nonagenarian known only as the “foolish old man.”2 He was discouraged that the two
mountains Taihang and Wangwu impeded the road to his home, and so he called together
his children and explained to them that it was his wish to remove the mountains. Another
old gentleman, referred to in the Liezi as the “wise old man,” tried to explain to the
foolish old man how futile his project was because the foolish old man and his sons
would never live long enough to remove the mountains. Undaunted, the foolish old man
said that when he died, his sons would carry on with the work and so would his
grandsons after them. The mountains were not getting any taller, but his descendants
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would be endless. How then could they fail to level the mountains? The wise old man
had no response.3 The gods were so moved by the determination of the foolish old man
that they magically removed the mountains in a single night. The story of the foolish old
man became a proverb: yu gong yi shan 愚公移山 (literally “the foolish old man moves
the mountains”). In colloquial English, this phrase might be understood that in any
quixotic endeavor, “where there’s a will there’s a way.”4 The Chinese language contains
many hundreds of these idiomatic proverbs called chengyu 成语. Each is precisely four
characters, and each is meant to remind listeners of the story behind the proverb and the
wisdom encapsulated within it.5
This chapter is about popular stories circulated in China between the years of the
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the death of Mao Zedong. Like
all stories, they were intended to entertain, but they were also meant to educate
individuals in order to guide their behavior. In that regard, these stories are no different
than any other form of propaganda such as the posters discussed in the previous chapter.
But stories are different from posters and paintings because they are not a static snapshot
of a single moment—they can present a complex idea and develop it over time, thereby
allowing the propagandist to develop plot and character depth in a way that a poster
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cannot.6 This chapter will center on a specific manifestation of Chinese print culture
called lianhuanhua 连环画, loosely translated hereafter as “comic books,” although there
is nothing comedic about them. Comic books are an important source for understanding
yin-yang cosmology and the reconceptualization of gender in modern China because they
show themes that were popularly received by the public, as well as what the Party
bureaucracy wanted people to internalize. Moreover, like posters, comic books were
useful tools in fostering both political orthodoxy and literacy in a world that generally
could not read.7
Stories and legends, whether they are in religious texts like the Liezi or in casual
ephemera like comic books, are not only important to the civilizations that tell them, but
they are also important to the historians that study those civilizations. Salman Rushdie
described cultural myths as “the family album or storehouse of a culture’s childhood.”8
By examining the stories of a society, historians are effectively studying the
“storehouses” and “family albums” of that society. In attempting to psychoanalyze the
mentalité of French society during the overthrow of the ancien regime, historian Robert
Darnton turned to a comparative analysis of folktales in order to approximate the
worldview of the average French commoner.9 In other words, “folktales are historical
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documents,” and the best way to understand the mindset of a historical community is to
understand the stories they tell themselves.10
What follows is a brief explanation of the history and political deployment of
Chinese comic books, specifically as it relates to the CCP’s efforts to equalize both sexes.
Despite the Party’s intentions, however, this chapter will show that their treatment of
gender draws a line between the “inferior” yin of femininity and the powerful yang of
masculinity. This is done in five ways, three of which will be considered discretely, and
two more which are relevant throughout this examination. The first is how gender is
represented in comic books published during the transitional phase between 1949 and
1965. This was the period where traditional values were blended with newly articulated
communist ideals. These comics most clearly demonstrate the evolution of established
ideas that women should be demure, and radical new ideas that women should be
valiantly hard workers.
Second, as both politics and the comic book industry refined their processes
through the 1960s and 1970s, even though the women in Chinese comic books were
strong and courageous, they were frequently given a handicap against which they had to
struggle. These handicaps were either triggered by the physicality of their sex, or they
were caused by the social prejudice against women. In either case, the successes of the
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various heroines carries an undertone of surprise as though the narrator was thrilled with
the success of these women—even though they were not men.
Third, not only is gender cast in terms of a yin-yang binary, so too is age. The
heroes in communist novels and comic books are young and energetic, most of them are
in their teens and twenties, and virtually no heroes are over forty. Furthermore, the
antagonistic class enemies in comics are generally old and lethargic. This is a further
repudiation of tradition since Confucian ethics requires filial respect for one’s elders. In
old China, age represented venerability and wisdom, as expressed in the word for
“teacher”—laoshi (老师)—which literally means “old master.” In new China, however,
it was the young who gave their instructions to the old.
The final two ways in which the Party employs the yin-yang binary to undermine
their enforcement of gender equality are visible in the juxtaposition between good and
evil. Many of the comics under consideration feature flawless heroes and sinister
villains. The heroes always stand erect and are described in warm and energetic terms.
The villains, on the other hand, are always hunched, usually scowling, are described as
cold and lazy, and frequently have harsh-sounding names. Much like the yin-yang
differentiations of class discussed in the previous chapter, the heroes and villains inhabit
a world of black and white—literally as well as figuratively in the case of comic books.
This difference is even more noticeable in comics published during the Cultural
Revolution which were subject to the requirements of the Three Prominences. In those
cases, the heroes usually wear white (or red, as described in the text), and they are
positioned high in the center of the frame. Class enemies usually wear black, and, if they
appear in the same panel, are typically drawn below the hero and near the edge.
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Furthermore, the “enemy” need not always be a person. Especially in comics produced
during the Cultural Revolution, most actions were described in martial language.
Quotidian chores like driving a bus through a snow storm,11 painting a group of
peasants,12 or repairing a leaky roof, were all described as battles to be won.13 In this
way, the entire world was transformed into a total war of the righteous versus the wicked.
In these cases, the effect is to associate all things with yin as undesirable. This
includes the unintended consequence of implicitly linking women with class enemies and
the enfeebled. In addition to the divisions mentioned above, the last characteristic of
gender imbalance is that in all comic books identified by the author, the villains and class
enemies are always men. Female characters may innocently exhibit ignorance or myopia,
but their occasional flaws are minimal and endearing. So far as can be determined, there
is not a single female character in CCP comic books capable of overt selfishness or
intentional evil. Conversely, women frequently take on the hero’s role although in most
comic books the hero is generally a male. All the comic books selected for inclusion
within this chapter have female heroes, but in most instances, they draw comfort and
encouragement from an older, wiser male in the chain of command above them. Also, in
most cases, each story contains a disproportionate ratio of male to female characters. For
example, in The Young Sentry of the East China Sea and Haiying, the teenage heroines
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Xiaohong and Haiying are the protagonists of their stories, but they are also the only
females in their entire eighty-two and one-hundred-sixteen-page publications.
A Brief History of Comic Books in China
In order to understand the scope of how deeply comic books shaped politics and
the reconstruction of gender, it is important to understand the history of the Chinese
comic book industry because the vicissitudes of the Mao era played an equally important
role in the government, gender norms, and comic publishers. The word “lianhuanhua”
literally means “a chain of pictures” or “serial images,” and was first used in 1927 as an
umbrella term for any publication that contained a series of drawings linked together to
tell a story. Prior to this, these publications were generally referred to as “picture books,”
“little person books,” “children’s books,” or “small books.”14 Despite the relatively
recent coinage of the word, some scholars trace the origins of Chinese comic books to
serial woodcut images in texts from the Yuan (1279 to 1368 CE) and Ming dynasties
(1368 to 1644 CE),15 although some point to examples from the Wei dynasty (220 to 264
CE),16 or even the Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE).17 Nevertheless, it was not until the
conclusion of the Opium Wars (1839 to 1860 CE) that commercial publication of comic
books in China became practical, following the British importation of lithographic
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printing for English-language newspapers. The widespread implementation of
lithography drastically affected the cost efficiency and speed of publication.18 Even so,
the comic book industry did not truly begin until 1920 when Shanghai opera companies
realized that most civilians could not afford the price of admission, but they could afford
to read the story and look at the pictures if the plots of the operas were published in
small, cheaply bound books.19
The opera companies catalyzed the lianhuanhua industry, but comics quickly
morphed into adaptations of popular literature.20 The ones that recreated classic tales
were especially marketed to children because they made up the largest readership, but
this was with the understanding that comic books were read and enjoyed by audiences of
all ages.21 In fact, comic books were often a child’s first teacher, or in many cases, their
only teacher. What is more, comic books were frequently used by urban adults as a way
of acquiring literacy.22
Despite their popularity, few people chose (or could afford) to purchase comic
books for themselves. The “small person books” were considered vulgar by the upper
classes and bookstore proprietors. Consequently, several small businesses purchased
comic books directly from the publishers and began to rent them in corner bookstalls
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where customers would pay the fee and then read their rented books right there in the
shop.23 There were several benefits of renting comic books instead of selling them. First,
rented copies were quickly disseminated to a much wider audience than they would if
customers purchased them. For example, if a single title had a printing of one hundred
thousand copies, and if only thirty different people rented each copy, then that comic
book could reach an audience of thirty million.24 Second, the rental fees were cheap. Jili Jiang recalled that during her childhood, she and the neighborhood children would
spend hours at Grandpa Hong’s corner bookstall. For a fen,25 each child could rent two
comic books. Jiang estimated that she spent about thirty fen every week, and after
reading her allotment of sixty comic books, Grandpa Hong would let her read another
one for free. She reflected that her favorites were always the retellings of classic Chinese
masterpieces like Wu Cheng-en’s Journey to the West, and foreign stories like Snow
White and Aladdin.26
Most of China’s elites had negative opinions of comic books, but a few of the
most influential authors and social agitators defended the fledgling industry, including
Mao Dun (1896-1981) and Lu Xun (1881-1936). Mao Dun recalled that starting in the
late 1920s, comic-renting bookstalls were omnipresent and extremely popular.
According to him, comic books were the most effective tool for educating the masses,
and the combination of simple phrases and images improved literacy rates.27 However,
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he also explained that before 1949, comic book stalls were usually only patronized by
men and boys since literacy was still actively denied to most women.28 Lu Xun also
advocated on behalf of lianhuanhua as a worthy addition to the “temple of art” because
they combined literature and illustration in a way that was accessible to the common
man.29
In the 1920s and 1930s, both the Communist Party and the Guomintang observed
the popularity of comic books and how effective they were at spreading new ideas to the
lower classes.30 Like Mao Dun and Lu Xun, Chairman Mao and the other Party leaders
at Yan’an promoted comic books as a way to promote literacy and to “occupy the
consciousness of the youth.”31 While the CCP and the Guomindang simultaneously
waged war against each other and the Japanese, both parties used comic books to inspire
a sense of patriotism in their fighters and feelings of anti-Japanese resistance among the
populace.32 Even though both parties had weaponized lianhuanhua, the Communists
used it to greater effect since not only did they employ it to mobilize the citizenry against
the Japanese, but they also drew popular support away from the Guomindang by
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promulgating ideas about how communist ideology was more beneficial to the common
man than Chiang Kai-shek’s brand of nationalism.33
By the time the Communist Party consolidated its administration of the mainland
in 1949, there were roughly eight hundred bookstalls renting comics in Shanghai—nearly
one on every street corner.34 Three years later, this number had reportedly ballooned to
350,000—although it should be noted that this number seems implausibly high and may
be including the greater Shanghai area and surrounding cities. Nevertheless, daily
consumers of comic books were estimated to be between two and four hundred thousand
(with each person reading multiple comic books per visit), whereas daily cinema
audiences only totaled one hundred thousand.35
The 1949 “Liberation” marked the stark division between old China and new
China.36 Once the Japanese and the Guomindang had both been pushed out, the Party
recognized that the popularity of comic books was so ubiquitous that one of the first
priorities after the founding of the PRC was nationalizing the publishing industry under
the authority of the Ministry of Culture.37 Bian Chunguang, the head of the Publishing
Bureau, declared that “the priority should be given to those [pictorial books] which aim at
propagating the socialist spiritual civilization, promoting revolutionary heroes, excellent
communities, and individuals.”38 Shortly thereafter, recognizing that “lianhuanhua is
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read by children as well as adults, illiterates as well as educated,” Mao ordered Zhou
Yang, the vice-minister of the Publicity Department, to found a state-run lianhuanhua
publishing house as a way of shoring up popular support through political education.39
The transition to a nationalized publishing industry took seven years. The
primary step was censoring and purging all the pro-Guomindang and
counterrevolutionary comics that had been published on the free market before 1949.40
During the first few years of the PRC, comic producers tried to follow Party doctrine, but
without clear guidelines, many of them made political mistakes such as showing positive
depictions of the Guomindang and American contributions during WWII; sometimes they
referred to Communism as the “new democracy;” and sometimes they transgressed
acceptable norms of class struggle such as telling a story about a kind landlord or a cruel
peasant.41
Furthermore, the system of renting comics from alleyway bookstalls—itself a
holdover from the Republican era—made it difficult for state censors to control what
people were reading. Many shops carried books that had been criminalized but were still
popular, and other book renters had no permanent location for censors to monitor because
the proprietors operated from their bicycles.42 A 1951 survey of comic books on
Shanghai’s streets estimated that only thirty percent of the books in circulation were
passable, and the public was not cooperating with removing the offending titles because
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they still preferred the traditional “feudal” tales about magic and demons—things which
the Party determined were “poisonous.”43 Likewise, a similar survey conducted in
Beijing determined that only twenty to twenty-five percent of the comic books in
circulation qualified as “revolutionary.”44
Like all works of art and literature, comic books fell under the purview of Mao’s
1942 Talks in Yan’an where he declared that art was not to be produced for its own sake
but should serve the function of bolstering the influence of the Party. This meant that
while the illustrations in comic books should be qualitative and entertaining, their
revolutionary content was far more valuable to the propaganda machine.45 Part of the
value behind the new comic books lay in the fact that even though they were read by all
age groups, they were particularly effective in shaping the literacy and political
understanding of children and young adults.46 The Party used this by identifying the key
slogans that they wanted young people to internalize, and then repeating them ad
nauseum.47
Despite the new controls placed on the publishing industry after nationalization,
publishers still maintained a relatively high degree of autonomy. Profanity and sexuality
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were strictly taboo, but scenes of graphic violence were encouraged.48 In 1951, just over
1,800 different titles were published in more than 19 million copies. By 1957 those
numbers had climbed to as high as 2,300 titles and over 100 million copies.49 Publishers,
however, found certain titles to be so profitable that they simply rewrote older versions of
comic books that were already in circulation and rereleased them. For example, by the
end of 1952, there were, on the market, more than twenty different versions of the classic
revolutionary story of The White-Haired Girl.50
In 1952, the New China Bookstore became the main distributor of roughly eighty
percent of the industry’s new comic books.51 The following year, the Central
Government announced the First Five Year Plan which called for greater economic
controls all the way to the village level. This allowed the party to maintain a tighter grasp
on new publications entering circulation. The effect on the market was notable by 1955
when new stories started to emphasize class struggle and the sharp contrasts between
“oppressed versus oppressors.”52 Finally, by 1956, the PRC completed its nationalization
of the publishing and distribution industries including newspapers, periodicals, novels,
textbooks, and lianhuanhua.53 Despite the CCP’s newly totalized controls, the most
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popular comic books among readers remained the illegal copies of classical Chinese
folktales.54
The end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s were the high-water mark
for comic books in China.55 The CCP gave copies to factories and school libraries as a
way of entertaining the masses and instructing them in Party doctrine.56 Indeed, most
people lacked the means to own a television or to pursue entertainments beyond reading
comic books.57 In recalling her own experiences growing up during this period, Chen
Xiaomei discussed the cultural significance of comic books: “With more than ten
thousand lianhuanhua produced, and seven hundred million copies published by 1963,
one can easily imagine the psychological, ideological, and cultural impact they had on the
lives of millions of children in Maoist China.”58 Comic books continued to play an
important role in Chinese politics throughout the twentieth century, but the turmoil of the
Cultural Revolution and the shifting political landscape meant that there was little
stability in the comic book industry starting from the latter half of the 1960s.59
One of the changes that affected comic books was the doctrine of the Three
Prominences which was first articulated in 1969 by Yao Wenyuan, a literary critic and
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one of Jiang Qing’s confederates in the Gang of Four.60 This meant that like all posters,
operas, ballets, and films produced during the Cultural Revolution, each frame needed to
give prominence to good communists over class enemies, great communists over good
communists, and ultimate heroes over everyone.61 This meant that if he appeared at all,
prominence was always given to Mao, even if his image was only a picture on the wall
looking down on the drama unfolding below him.
The greatest shakeup to impact the publishing industry—and indeed, all of
China—came in 1966 when Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Jiang Qing’s criticism of the arts provoked Mao into claiming that elements of feudalism
had remained prevalent in most art and literature published between 1949 and 1965. In
an effort to clear the slate and start over, Mao condemned most of the existing
publications as “revisionist black art.”62 One contributor wrote an article in the Workers
Daily on 18 May 1965 relating his horror and shame when he came home one day to find
that his children were happily sketching images from comic books of “emperors,
generals, scholars, beauties and the like,” instead of the revolutionary worker-peasantsoldier triumvirate.63
This backlash against “feudal art” instigated a witch hunt against authors,
illustrators, and publishers, many of whom were arrested, tortured, and sent to the
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countryside for reeducation. As a result, the Red Guards executed some while others
committed suicide, died prematurely from health complications, or spent years
performing hard labor.64 This culture of fear and uncertainty meant that from 1966 to
1971, the comic book industry ground to a complete halt.65 In an analysis of 383
scholarly articles on lianhuanhua published in China between 1949 and the 1990s, fiftyfive were published between 1949 and 1965; only two were published during the decade
of the Cultural Revolution.66 The purges of intellectuals and the closure of art schools
and publishing houses meant that control of the artistic world fell even more tightly into
the hands of Jiang Qing.67 Afterward, the few cartoonists who remained never deviated
from the Party’s accepted story formulae.68 Even book renters were affected. Grandpa
Hong, the alleyway bookstall proprietor who had rented Aladdin and The Tale of Two
Cities to Ji-li Jiang, found his business closed by the Red Guards who plastered his shop
with big-character posters accusing him of “propagating feudal, capitalistic, and
revisionist ideals” that had poisoned the minds of the youth.69
The comic book industry only revitalized with the direct encouragement of Zhou
Enlai, although few people were eager to participate at first.70 Moreover, the comic
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books of the latter half of the Cultural Revolution were never as popular as they were
from 1949 to the mid-1960s. This was because all new artistic creations were intended to
be purely proletarian and revolutionary. Consequently, most titles focused on building
the Mao cult, class struggle, the joys of collectivization, or the supremacy of the Party.71
Jiang Qing also voiced support for resurrecting the publication of comic books, but as a
former actress, her attention was primarily focused on developing the revolutionary
model operas. Therefore, the first comic books published in the 1970s simply retold the
stories of the revolutionary stage productions.72
Once the new genre of revolutionary comic books was established, besides the
retellings of the model operas, many titles simply repeated the plots of lesser known
plays and novels that had already received the approval of Jiang Qing and the Cultural
Revolution Group. As a result, the comic books of the 1970s were formulaic repetitions
of what the government wanted the people to have rather than the stories that the people
wanted for themselves.73
The history of the comic book industry in China helps us understand the changing
social conceptions of gender. Before complete nationalization, the earliest comics dealt
with sex in ways that clearly demonstrated traditional gender roles, and yet they also tried
very hard to promote ideas of gender equality. As politics became more sharply divided,
so too did portrayals of gender reveal the greater binary distinctions of yin and yang. 74
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Although yin and yang have clear manifestations in early comic books, the divisions
between good and evil were more ambiguous. Early writers were encouraged to create
“backward” characters and heroes who suffered from self-doubt. However, as time
progressed, comic book topics (including gender) became more polarized such that there
were only three types of characters: class enemies, perfect communists, and ordinary
“good” communists who demonstrated how special the heroes were.75
It is also worth mentioning again that women in CCP comic books were further
“de-fanged” insofar as they were never allowed to play the villain. In traditional Chinese
literature, there are two main motifs for women, and, as Susan Mann pointed out, both
themes supported the Confucian patriarchy by relying on yin-yang cosmology.76 One is
the female warrior who is celebrated in her own right but who also personifies the yin
which drives her husband’s (or father’s) yang to a position of greater influence.
The other trope is the seductress that saps a powerful man of his energy and
wisdom. In either case, there cannot be yang without yin; but again, in either case,
women hold a secondary position. Just as the universe is driven forward by the interplay
of yin and yang, the cycle of dynastic transition is driven forward by the interplay of men
and women. One of the most famous examples of the seductress is the last of China’s
Four Great Beauties, the Tang dynasty concubine Yang Guifei. Although her story has
been embellished over the past millennium, she is generally credited with distracting
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Emperor Xuanzong to the point that she is blamed for the An Lushan Rebellion.77 It
should be noted, however, that it is not simply women that have the power to end
dynasties, but feminine yin which has that power. After all, the fall of the Western Han is
blamed on the male consort of Emperor Ai who, despite his sex, played the same
seductress role as Yang Guifei.78 Furthermore, although the Dowager Empress Cixi is
largely credited with the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the entire imperial system, it
was the excessive yin of the court eunuchs and “womanly” Mandarins that were blamed
for the Century of Humiliation which only the yang of the CCP could ameliorate.
The Heroines of Early CCP Comics
Despite the negative roles given to women in traditional Chinese history and
literature, there are many stories of celebrated women who pretend to be men in order to
go to war to fight for the country, or to receive an education.79 In China, the most famous
example of the female warrior is Hua Mulan. The earliest record of Mulan is from a
poem written during the Northern Wei dynasty in the sixth century CE.80 The irony is
that Mulan herself might not have even been Chinese. The Northern Wei was ruled by
Xianbei nomads who conquered northern China in 386 CE and ruled the native Han
population.81 Nevertheless, the original story was embellished over the centuries with
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four main revisions between the Tang and Qing dynasties which transformed Mulan into
a Confucian Han girl surnamed Hua who fought to protect both her father’s honor and the
Emperor’s life.82
There were many different comic book versions of the Mulan story circulating in
China’s metropolises during the 1950s. The following is an analytic summary of one
such that was published by the New China Bookstore in 1950, one year after the founding
of the PRC and the Party’s efforts to nationalize the publishing industry. In this version,
there are many elements of the traditional story, but this is blended with the publisher’s
attempt to satisfy the expectations of the Party. For example, in the comic, Mulan was
raised in a small village near Yan’an.83 This is significant because Yan’an served as the
Communist Party Headquarters from 1935 until 1949. It was the crucible where Mao and
the top echelon of Party leaders articulated the central doctrines of Chinese Communism,
including Mao’s 1942 Talks on Art and Literature. It was in Yan’an that the Party found
sanctuary after the Long March from Jiangxi in 1935, and it was there that they led their
forces against both the Japanese and the Guomindang. By placing Mulan in this location,
it implies a clear statement about the closeness between Mulan and the Party.
Mulan is celebrated as a woman with a great deal of yang, but in this version, she
is also held up as an exemplary vessel of yin. In addition to her unusual prowess as a
martial artist, Mulan is skilled in the domestic arts of cooking, weaving, and obeying her
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father, Hua Hu.84 The enemy against whom Mulan must fight changes from version to
version, but in this instance, China was invaded by the king of the Turks who
commanded his soldiers to “rape and pillage as you wish. Burn every house. If you see a
person, then kill them.”85 This is a curious choice for the publisher to make. China has
fought many different tribes and nationalities along its shifting borders over the centuries,
but the main Turkic groups have come from the Taklamakan Desert in the Tarim Basin.
Today this region is China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang. At the time this comic
was published, the PLA was in the process of occupying the region and pacifying the
Turkic Uighurs who live there. In the comic, the king of the Turks occupied Jiayuguan,
the first major city along the Silk Road between Urumqi (the capital of Xinjiang) and
Xi’an (China’s ancient capital).
When the call came for Hua Hu to go to war, he was too ill to leave his bed, and
his son, Hua Mudi, was too young to take his place. Distressed, Mulan reflected that she
wanted to help, but no one would allow a woman to join the army (see figure 2.1).86
When her sister, Muhui, saw that Mulan was troubled, she assumed that Mulan’s anguish
was caused by a man and thoughts of marriage.87 When Mulan finally determined to
dress as a man to take her father’s place in her brother’s name, she remained a filial
daughter and resolved not to do anything without her father’s permission. Although he
granted his assent eventually, his initial response was that “women belong in the home—
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they should not have this kind of courage.”88 Her mother was also afraid that as a
woman, her daughter would be incapable of killing a man. To allay her parents’ fears,
Mulan reassured them by performing the sword dance (see figure 2.2).89
When Mulan finally joined the army, she made friends with three other new
recruits who also happened to come from another village near Yan’an. But as they
trained and traveled together, another soldier complained that “women at home sure have
a happy and carefree life” while “all the hardships are born by men.” Mulan replied that
“the women remain behind producing the food and clothing for the front along with
everything else” that the army needs.90 This exchange is new to the Mulan story, but it
exemplifies the Party’s efforts to promote gender equality as defined in the Marriage Law
passed the same year this comic was published.
Despite her sex, Mulan had more yang than the average soldier. While training,
she beat all her comrades in hand-to-hand combat, and during her first battle, she drove
away the king of the Turks and saved the Grand Marshal He Tingyu. Then, while
Marshal He was recovering from his wounds, Mulan rallied the Chinese army and led
them into battle by calling on them to “avenge the humiliation of our country.”91 This
battle cry would have struck a chord with the audience of this comic since it was only the
year before that Chairman Mao had ascended Tiananmen Gate and proclaimed an end to
the Century of Humiliation.
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According to the comic, Mulan spent twelve years becoming a seasoned veteran
as the second-in-command to Marshal He.92 This illustrated the idea that women can do
anything that a man can do—but there still needed to be a man in charge. During the
final battle outside the gates of Jiayuguan, she was wounded by three arrows in her left
arm, but she still managed to unhorse the Turkic king and capture him alive.93 When her
victorious army retook the city, she ordered the soldiers to “closely observe our military
discipline. In all respects, cherish and respect the general public. Do not be course
among the people.”94 This command is strikingly similar to Chairman Mao’s 1947
“Three Disciplines and Eight Attentions,” which, among other things, commands the
PLA not to take anything from the people without paying for it, to be polite, to not
damage anything that is not theirs, and not to abuse the people.95
During the first century CE, Ban Zhao, China’s first female historian, wrote a
book entitled Admonitions for Women. This text codifies the rules of female submission
that became the standard of behavior for women and girls for the next two thousand
years. In it, women were commanded to be humble, to refuse all honors, to work
diligently, and to behave properly in the home.96 When the war was finally over,
Mulan’s only desire was to return home to resume her traditional roles as outlined by Ban
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Zhao. When Marshal He tried to reward his lieutenant by showering Mulan with gifts
and marriage to his daughter, Mulan demurred and begged leave to go home so her arrow
wounds could heal.97 The commander reluctantly agreed, but after formally ending his
commission before the emperor, Marshal He went to Mulan’s home with the intention of
forcing the marriage. When Hua Hu finally presented Mulan to the general as a model of
Confucian womanhood, Marshal He “didn’t know what to do. It was as though he had
woken from a dream.”98 The comic ends with the marshal’s bewildered stupefaction,
which is a perfect culmination for a 1950 publication about gender. Masculinity in a
woman was something that should be praised, but beyond that, no one was yet sure how
to respond (see figure 2.3).
The celebrated paradigm of the nü ban nan zhuang 女扮男装 (“woman disguised
as a man”) found a modern analog in Guo Junqing, a woman who, as a fourteen-year-old
girl pretended to be a sixteen-year-old boy in order to join the PLA in 1945. When her
secret was discovered after five years in the military, the Party was so impressed that they
made her the subject of numerous propaganda campaigns in posters and comic books
which declared that she was a “modern Mulan.” When she was thirteen, her father was
killed by the local landlord. Homeless with her mother and younger brother, Guo
discovered that she was safer if she cut her hair like a boy. When the PLA liberated her
hometown, she was so awestruck by the soldiers and their determination to defend China,
that she made up her mind to enlist for herself. It took two attempts, but she finally
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joined by saying that she was two years older than she was and that she was a boy named
Guo Fu. When she first donned her uniform, she looked small, but “formidable.”99
The following year, even though she was only a fifteen-year-old “maturing young
woman,” she not only received army training for shooting, use a bayoneting, and
throwing grenades, but she excelled at each.100 A year later, in 1947, Guo was granted
membership in the CCP and taught that “there is no hardship that a member of the
Chinese Communist Party cannot overcome!” As a way of expressing her affection for
the other soldiers in her platoon, she stayed up late repairing the holes in their shoes and
socks. Her comrades were so impressed that her class love for them was greater than
their familial love for their own brothers.101
She continued to excel in every responsibility that she was given, and was
therefore promoted to command her own platoon and lead men into battle. During a
charge against the enemy, however, she was betrayed by her own womanhood when she
experienced a menstrual cramp and passed out on the battlefield (see figure 2.4). As she
regained consciousness, she reminded herself that “there is no hardship that a communist
cannot endure,” even if that hardship is her female biology.102 It is at this point in the
comic that the narrator makes the editorial declaration that “women today have countless
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heroic examples, proving that women can do all kinds of work.”103 Because of Guo’s
health problems, she eventually contracted a gynecological illness (funü bing 妇女病,
literally “women’s disease”), which worsened because she could not divulge her sex to
anybody. When she finally revealed her secret to the doctor, and her comrades
discovered that they were being led by a nineteen-year-old girl rather than a twenty-oneyear-old man, they were all deeply impressed.104
Because of Guo Junqing’s years of service, and because of the rarity of her
situation, she had the honor of meeting Chairman Mao and receiving a medal from him.
Furthermore, because she was considered a model soldier, she was granted the honor of
touring the Soviet Union. Her deeds were known to the Russians, and many
congratulated her on her successes. However, as one might expect from a Chinese
woman of the early 1950s who exhibited both yin and yang, she always modestly replied
that “we must study well from the Soviet Union.”105
Communist women did not all need to dress as men in order to serve their
country. When Chengdu106 was “liberated” in late 1949, nineteen-year-old Ding Youjun
decided to join the revolution. Out of all the women in Chengdu, only Ding Youjun
tested into the People’s Revolutionary Cadre School. This was a great honor, but it was
also a daunting prospect. Implying the traditional attitude that physical hardships were
best endured by men, Ding’s family and friends all asked her “why would a woman
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endure such hardships?” Her response was that the purpose of “joining the revolution is
to create a happy life for the people.”107
In the course of her duties, Ding was transferred to Ya’an in Xikang County, a
newly occupied region that had formerly been western Kham in Tibet. The weather was
cold, but she cared for her sick comrades and offered them continual encouragement.108
She was also constantly trying to improve herself. Even so, she was denied entry into the
Communist Party and the Youth League, although the latter admitted her on her second
application.109
On another transfer in southern Sichuan, Ding was captured by a gang of
Guomindang bandits that had remained behind when the main army fled to Taiwan. The
enemy tried to extract information from her by bribing her, threatening her, and even
torturing her, but comrade Ding Youjun had a “will of iron” and revealed nothing. In
frustration, they violated one of a traditional Chinese woman’s most important qualities
by stripping her naked and parading her through the streets of Jade Dragon Village.
However, the townspeople were respectful of her virtue, and each of them averted their
eyes rather than peep at her shame.110
In a final attempt to discover any information from comrade Ding, the
Guomindang bandits asked her if she was a communist. She proudly replied that even
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though she was not a member of the Party, she was “a member of the Chinese New
Democracy Youth League.”111 The Communist Youth League changed its name to the
New Democracy Youth League for a brief window between 1949 and 1956. Although
this was the official name of the organization, any reference to “New Democracy”
became a political mistake worthy of censorship after 1960.112 Because of Ding’s
affiliation with the Party, the bandits made a final attempt to make use of her. Eight
Party cadres had barricaded themselves in a nearby blockhouse. The bandits instructed
Ding to convince her comrades to surrender or they would kill her. Instead of obeying
them, Ding shouted to her comrades that they must be brave, that the bandits were few,
and that reinforcements were on the way. In the final moment before the bandit leader
shot her, Ding roared “ten thousand years to Chairman Mao, and ten thousand years to
the Chinese Communist Party!” The bandits felt compelled to shoot her, but as Ding fell
into a “pool of blood,” her final words were a call for her comrades not to fear because
“the revolution requires bloodshed, my death counts for little, numberless millions will
avenge me.”113
When the PLA arrived, the villagers indeed avenged Ding’s murder by
exterminating the Guomindang bandits and joining the revolution.114 The local Party
branch voted to honor Ding Youjun by granting her posthumous membership in the CCP.
The comic book ends with a solemn exhortation that “we must all study the spirit of
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comrade Ding Youjun; we must thoroughly eradicate bandits and spies; we must be firm
in our resolve to suppress counterrevolutionaries; and we must strengthen the dictatorship
of the people’s democracy.”115 One cannot help but wonder, given the fact that Ding
Youjun was a real person who exhibited unswerving loyalty to Mao and the Party,
exemplified Party ideals, and died a heroic death for the people’s sake, why is it that Lei
Feng is always held up as the archetypal revolutionary martyr when his own death was so
mundane? Are there greater differences between Ding Youjun and Lei Feng than merely
the yin and yang of their sexes? It is the author’s opinion that to whichever degree
Ding’s sacrifice was more inspiring than Lei’s, it was Lei’s masculine yang which gave
him greater cachet as a political prop for mobilizing young communists of both sexes.
Young boys would likely have found it difficult to pattern themselves after a woman,
regardless of how impressive she was.
Comics of the Cultural Revolution: The Handicap of Yin
After the five-year gap from 1966 to 1971 when all comic book production
ceased, the publishing industry resumed, but the plot themes and overall presentation had
entirely changed. Not just comics, but all official Cultural Revolution literature was
politically sanitized. There were no works of science-fiction, no fantasy, and no
romance. The only stories approved for release were tales of heroism, nationalism, class
struggle, party unity, collectivization, and obedient self-sacrifice.116 Despite these
uplifting themes, women in comic books often needed to struggle against obstacles that
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male characters did not. Sometimes these impediments were physical, like Guo
Junqing’s menstrual cramp in the heat of battle, or Aunt Yao who successfully managed
to chase down a Guomindang spy despite her previously bound feet.117 And sometimes
these obstructions are entirely abstract. The next four comic books illustrate the deeply
rooted social barriers that women had to face. Their inclusion is significant because they
highlight the Party’s efforts to recognize and overcome these barriers, but they also
perpetuate the problem by continuing to rely on the traditional mode of casting gender in
a yin-yang dichotomy.
The first comic tells the story of the female workers in the March Eighth Machine
Station. Their work involved great dangers and heavy labor as they travelled around the
country performing industrial projects for the peasantry. The nature of their work was
already quite empowering, but the name of their organization, which is a reference to
International Women’s Day, further highlights their assertions of gender equality. In the
case of this particular story, the workers in the unit were tasked with building a derrick to
drill a freshwater well for a rural village.118 “As soon as they started drilling,” a watching
peasant was heard to make the disparaging comment that “leaving the kitchen to operate
drilling technology, this is a mockery of the blood and sweat of the commune members.”
The women were so incensed that they redoubled their efforts to fight class struggle by
finishing the well. During their group political study that night, they read the words of
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Chairman Mao that “times have changed, men and women are the same. What men
comrades can accomplish, women comrades can also accomplish.” They finished by
criticizing Liu Shaoqi and his supposed counterrevolutionary lie that “women are
useless” (see figure 2.5).119
In addition to the backward attitudes of some of the peasants, the women had to
contend with the rocks that obstructed their drill bits and the icy winds that threatened to
blow down the derrick. During a desperate nighttime battle against an icy gale, one girl
named Xiuying tried to race up the ladder to cut loose a tarpaulin that was catching the
wind like a sail. When another girl tried to hold her back from doing something so
reckless, Xiuying revealed her strength by proclaiming that “the more dangerous, the
more must a communist rise up.”120 When the women finished digging the well, the
peasants all marveled at how sweet the water was and thanked the women with profound
gratitude. But remembering the source of all goodness, the female construction crew
reminded the peasants that Mao Zedong Thought was the true source of sweet
freshwater.121
A similar comic tells the story of a group of friends in a rural village whom
everyone referred to as “the twelve sisters of Wafang Tai.” Following Chairman Mao’s
call to control the environment, the villagers all decided to build a reservoir, but it was
the twelve sisters that took the initiative to start carrying stones.122 To backfill the base
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of the dam, it was the sisters who proactively started pushing barrows of dirt. However,
the narrator betrays the traditional attitude that women are not ideally suited to physical
labor by saying that when the sisters first started pushing their carts, they looked like they
were dancing the yangge 秧歌, a rural folk dance which evokes an air of delicacy and
grace. But the more dirt they moved, the hardier they became and the more they
encouraged other women to participate.123 When the men could not pack the soil fast
enough, the sisters volunteered to help. Tamping the earth required the repetitive lifting
of heavy rocks and logs, but they said “if [the boys] can do it, so can we!”124 Still,
despite the demonstration of their grit and determination, one lazy class enemy (the only
person wearing all dark clothing) tried to discourage everyone by remarking that “this
kind of work is hard enough for tough men, you ladies…” He barely finished his thought
before the sisters and the commune members all united in criticizing him and his crimes
(figures 2.6 and 2.7).125 Finally, after five years of continuous battle, the villagers and the
twelve sisters completed the dam.126
Some comics combine class hatred with superstition to oppose discrimination. In
Driving the Horses Forward, miss Tian Yun found a class enemy named Han Yingzhao
(鹰爪 “hawk’s talon”) savagely beating a communal plow horse. She commanded him to
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stop and rebuked him for abusing the animal. Han cowered away and insisted that he
was only trying to improve the team’s production rates, but Tian was not deceived and
became even angrier with him. Snatching his whip, she declared that people like him
should not be entrusted with those kinds of tools.127 However, Tian Yun lacked the
training to finish plowing the field herself, so she asked wise old Geng Zhong to teach
her as a way of counterattacking their class enemies.128 Meanwhile, Han Yingzhao and a
“small handful of evil fellows” asked themselves if anyone had ever has seen a girl
plowing the fields. They recalled that Geng Zhong’s daughters had attempted it, and that
their cow had died shortly thereafter (although it was Han himself who had poisoned it).
Consequently, Han began spreading the rumor that it was bad luck for a woman to plow
because “it will enrage the local harvest god!”129 Even so, Geng and Tian continued to
train other women to master the plow.130
Early one morning, while it was still dark, Tian Yun was preparing her horses,
and failed to notice the “black shadow” that crept up and spooked one of the animals.131
The panicked beast charged toward the canal, dragging the cart behind it. Geng Zhong
happened to be out and noticed a “black shadow” watching from the trees which he soon
realized was Han Yingzhao.132 Just as the horse and cart were about to plunge into the
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canal, Tian Yun courageously leapt in front of the charging steed and grabbed its
harness.133 Before the observing commune members could start celebrating, Geng Zhong
unmasked the crimes of Han Yingzhao and the masses joyfully criticized him right there
on the spot.134
Chinese society had to adjust its thinking about sex and gender, but it also had to
alter its understanding of marriage rituals. Ailing, the main character of The New Sisterin-Law, narrates the story of her elder brother’s wedding day. Traditional Chinese
weddings were expensive affairs with specific rituals that required a great deal of time
and attention.135 Ailing’s new sister (who is not given a name) had a very untraditional
wedding. At twenty-five she was older than a customary bride, but she was also a
member of the Party, so the couple wanted a revolutionary wedding with neither guests
nor gifts.136 Instead of the large procession to the groom’s home, Ailing went to find her
new sister and escort her to the house. Along the way, Ailing carried a heavy bag which
she assumed was her sister’s trousseau.137
Ailing was a member of the commune’s cotton production team, so after eating
breakfast together, the bride suggested that she and Ailing go to the cotton fields to spray
for aphids. Only Ailing’s mother was surprised that a bride would do that on her own
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wedding day (see figure 2.8).138 When they arrived at the cotton fields, Ailing was
thrilled to find that her new sister was an expert at spraying pesticide. When Xiaofang, a
new girl on the cotton team, was discovered to have been spraying improperly, the new
sister-in-law patiently stopped and explained to Xiaofang that “cotton aphids are just like
class enemies, they are always hiding in the shadows and gloom. It is unacceptable not to
aim at them properly.”139
This comic also highlights the preferred utilitarianism of the Mao era to the
perceived decadence of the past. After one of the spray canisters broke, the new bride
took it home for repair. When Ailing returned later and found that her new sister had
mended it better than new, she wondered where her sister had found all the tools. When
her new sister was about to put her greasy tools into her trousseau bag, Ailing shouted
“sister-in-law, how can you put those tools in your trousseau bag?” Momentarily
confused, her sister chuckled and said “Ailing, these tools are my trousseau!” Looking
inside the sack, Ailing did not see a single garment, just hammers and nails, wrenches,
screws, and a few books with titles like Planting Cotton for the Revolution and
Discussions on Practice.140
Comics of the Cultural Revolution: Youth and Yang
As previously established, strength is one of the greatest qualities of yang. Part of
the reason why men have been historically understood as creatures of yang is because of
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their musculature. One of the ways that the Party portrays itself as a strong and healthy
organization is by presenting the heroes in comic books as youthful, energetic, and
robust. The inclusion of children and teenagers in Party propaganda serves the dual
function of instructing young people in the duties and behaviors that are socially expected
of them, but it also plays upon the nostalgic fantasies of adults.141 Images of healthy
children symbolize the idea of rich abundance, and as the next generation, they also
represent hopeful innocence and a bright future.142 In traditional Chinese society where
the Confucian doctrine of filial piety was a foundational principle of social ethics,
children represented the continuation of familial prosperity.143 With the Cultural
Revolution’s efforts to obliterate Confucian influence, children ceased to be emblematic
of the family legacy and became symbols of continuity for the Party as the successors of
the communist revolution.144
Glorious Youth was one comic that praised the energy of young communists. The
hero, Zheng Jiayuan, was never afraid to get dirty or carry heavy burdens when she
worked in the fields. After she took the peasants as her ideological masters and
constantly studied the works of Mao, “her heart scorched like a fire.”145 She never lost
the correct perspective of seeing everything in terms of “class analysis.” Consequently,
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she was able to discover a bad element who was sowing dissension in the village, so the
commune all waged a “fierce class struggle” against the man until he was eliminated (he
is also the only person in the illustration wearing black; see figure 2.9).146
Because of her youthful vigor, Zheng had the strength to withstand her injuries as
she fought a wildfire in her bare feet.147 Then, during a thunderstorm in 1971, a mudslide
caused a breach in the local reservoir. Heedless of danger, Zheng charged into the
opening and did her best to contain the water.148 The cold temperatures and tumbling
rocks took their toll, however, and her wounds became infected with tetanus. Before she
died, she encouraged her comrades to “live your life to risk everything for the revolution
and die in a way that offers all your loyalty to it.”149 Because she sacrificed her glorious
youth to the Party, Zheng was made an honorary member of the Communist Youth
League.150
A young person need not die to be recognized as a symbol of political strength.
In The Young Sentry of the East China Sea, fourteen-year-old Wu Xiaohong (小红 “little
red”) single-handedly captured three Guomindang spies who were dispatched from the
“Chiang gang” on Taiwan who were still “unwilling to accept their own defeat.”151 The
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PLA and the People’s Militia killed or captured the detachment of spies except for the
commander Wang Jiao (王蛟, he is named after a mythical flood dragon; essentially his
name indicates that he is a harbinger of disaster), and his two companions Jiang Yibiao
and Zhou Dehai.152 The three of them escaped into the mountains where Xiaohong and
her little brother were grazing the communal ox.153 Even though the spies were wearing
false PLA uniforms,154 Xiaohong’s father had “often taught them to remember their class
hatred, to always be vigilant, and to be on strict guard against spies,” which helped
Xiaohong uncover the truth.155
In conversation with them, Xiaohong observed that the three special agents were
cruel and arrogant, not kind like the real PLA. Neither did they recognize that her red
scarf identified her as a member of the Young Pioneers, or that the cow belonged to the
collective and not her family.156 As the spies crept away, she instructed her brother to go
home and report to the militia while she went to track the enemy.157 When the spies left
the path to climb Rams Horn Point, Xiaohong hung her red scarf on a branch pointing
east to alert the following militia which way to go. She reflected that “the red scarf was
like a corner of the red flag, dyed in the blood of the revolutionary martyrs.”158
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With the strength and nimbleness of youth, Xiaohong raced to the top of the
mountain ahead of the spies and trapped them there by hurling rocks down on their
heads.159 When Xiaohong saw the PLA and the militia rushing up the valley, she pulled a
conch shell from her pouch and blew it with all of her might to alert the soldiers of her
position. Despite the spies’ continual displays of weakness and cowardice, Wang Jiao
nearly succeeded in stabbing Xiaohong before he was shot through the wrist by the
oncoming soldiers.160 Once the spies were securely captured, Platoon Leader Zhang
returned the red scarf to Xiaohong and “everyone praised [her] as someone that was truly
worthy to be called a good child of Chairman Mao’s instruction, a red successor to the
revolution, and a heroic young sentry of the East China Sea!” (see figure 2.10).161
One final example of youth and yang is the story of Jiang Haiying (海英 “ocean
hero”) working on a fishing boat in the Taiwan Strait, and how she discovered a class
enemy on board named Chen Wulao (乌佬, “black crow scoundrel,” incidentally his
costume is entirely black).162 When she first came aboard, Haiying was encouraged by
the wise old captain who reminded her that “when we fish, it isn’t for the sake of a single
family, it is to support the building of socialism and the world revolution.”163 Even so,
Haiying’s seasickness soon overcame her and she took to her berth. As a way of helping
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her overcome her condition, the captain taught her the words of Chairman Mao that
“there is nothing to fear from the waves and the wind. Human society is developed from
the storm.”164 Although Haiying continued to feel ill, the words of the Great Helmsman
helped her to endure. This quote attributed to Mao is similar to another one made by him
in 1964, requoted from the Little Red Book: “the successors to the proletarian
revolutionary enterprise will be produced in the midst of mass struggle and they will
grow up in the training of the great winds and waves of the revolution.”165
As Haiying became more comfortable at sea over the course of a year, she noticed
the suspicious behaviors of Chen Wulao, who it turns out was actually a powerful fish
baron before liberation and had escaped punishment by changing his name and moving to
a new port. Because he had lost his wealth and privilege, his heart was full of hate and
all he wanted was to destroy new China.166 When Haiying brought her thoughts to the
captain, the two of them crafted a plan to expose Chen as a class enemy before the entire
crew.167 When their plan succeeded, Chen jammed the ship’s propeller with an old
fishing net and then jumped into the sea, presumably to swim to Taiwan (see figure
2.11).168 Haiying was determined that Chen should not escape, so she jumped in after
him, and because she was a younger and more powerful swimmer than the bald old
villain, she succeeded in capturing him and subduing him in the water (see figure 2.12).
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When the other sailors brought him back to the boat, they tied him up and took him back
to port, demonstrating the mighty yang of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s
Republic of China.169
Conclusion
In 1945, Chairman Mao wrote an essay reinterpreting the story of the foolish old
man who moved the mountains. From the Daoist perspective, the old man was foolish
because he did not practice wuwei 无为, the doctrine of non-action whereby the wisest
course is to follow nature. In other words, he was foolish because he chose to undertake
the impossible task of moving the mountains rather than simply walking around them.
Chairman Mao, however, praised the old man’s spirit by recasting the two mountains as
evils that needed to be removed. “Today, two great mountains are oppressing the
Chinese people, one is called ‘imperialism,’ and one is called ‘feudalism,’” if the entire
great family of the Chinese nation all contributed in levelling those two mountains, then
they would not even need the help of supernatural gods. And what did it matter how
much time it would take?170 From then on, all good communists, including the characters
in lianhuanhua, did their best to move the mountains.171 Comic books were useful tools
in fighting imperialism and feudalism, but this was only because of the unique history of
Chinese lianhuanhua.
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Starting in the 1920s, because they were so cheap to produce and to rent, comic
books became the most popular entertainment for the lower classes. Both parties
weaponized comic books during the civil war and the Sino-Japanese War, but it was the
Communist Party who utilized them most effectively. When the CCP won the civil war
in 1949, they identified the comic book as one of the highest priorities for propaganda
because they were such useful tools in disseminating literacy and political indoctrination
to a wide audience. When the Party succeeded in nationalizing the publishing industry in
1956, comic books entered their “golden age.” But with the start of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, all publication ground to a halt until 1971. The new comic books
were pure propaganda, so their set patterns and themes meant that they were never as
popular as the lianhuanhua of the 1950s and 1960s.
The golden age of comic books became a transitional period where classic
Chinese literature melded with Party ideology to create hybrid stories that were both
customary and revolutionary by reinterpreting contemporary issues through the lens of an
ancient tradition. Mulan was one of the most recognizable characters because she
typified the Confucian woman while championing the Party’s interpretation of the valiant
heroine. Guo Junqing embodied the same ideals, but although she was not as well-known
as Mulan, as a member of the Party her example became even more relevant. Ding
Youjun was an outstanding example of an early communist warrior who fought and died
for her ideals without the need to pretend she was anything but a woman.
Female characters had to face impediments that males did not. Sometimes these
were physical, and sometimes they were the discriminatory attitudes of class enemies.
This was the case for the women of the March Eighth Machine Station, the “twelve
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sisters of Wafang Tai,” and Tian Yun in her attempts to learn the plow. At other times,
as in the case of The New Sister-in-Law, the barriers to women’s success were the
inherited ideas about marriage that would have kept the young bride at home on her
wedding day rather than spraying for aphids or repairing broken equipment.
The divide between yin and yang is found in age as well as sex. Yang is the
power of the universe that is hot, energetic, and strong; yin, as its opposite, is cold, lazy,
and feeble. After the weakness of the Century of Humiliation, the CCP bolstered its
image of strength by portraying comic book heroes as energetic youths while class
enemies are usually older, frequently cowardly, and always lazy. This is demonstrated by
Zheng Jiayuan who died giving herself to the rural peasants by leaping into icy water, and
by fourteen-year-old Wu Xiaohong who bravely tracked three cowardly spies, beat them
in a race to the top of a mountain, and trapped them there until help arrived. Finally,
Jiang Haiying personified the strength of the Party by exposing the crimes of Chen
Wulao and by overpowering him in the water.
But yin and yang are not just categories of power, they are also categories of
value. Traditional Chinese society assigned to men the power of yang, and to women the
weakness of yin. The Party tried to impose gender equality, but by failing to decouple
yin and yang from women and men, the project was fundamentally flawed from the
beginning because comic books drew a parallel line between yang and yin, and good and
evil. The names of heroes have positive meanings while the names of villains are harsh
and pejorative; the villains usually wear all black (the color of yin) and the heroes usually
wear all white or red (auspicious colors of yang). The line between good and evil is
further deepened by the martial language of class struggle. By framing everything in
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soldierly terms, the conflict is not just political, it becomes a trial of hot versus cold,
selfless versus selfish, and energetic versus lazy. In other words, all of these are divisions
of yin and yang, and by associating everything that is undesirable with yin, there is an
implied connection between all the negative imagery and women in general.
Finally, the women in Chinese comic books are relegated to limbo insofar as they
are never permitted to perform either extremes. In other words, all the villains in
lianhuanhua are men; female characters were never permitted to be the class enemy even
though women in real life were accused of crimes just as often as men. Nor could
women be the ultimate heroes in their own stories. Mulan was an officer, but she was
first subjected to the rule of her father before she became subjected to the rule of Marshal
He. Tian Yun took the initiative to learn the plow, but she was always under the guiding
hand of Geng Zhong. Xiaohong tracked the three Guomindang spies all by herself but
only until Platoon Leader Zhang of the PLA arrived to help. Haiying captured Chen
Wulao in the Taiwan Strait, but each of her actions was under the authority and the
training of the old captain.
Stories are vital primary sources for historians because they are the “storehouses”
and “family albums” of a national childhood. As such, the albums of the People’s
Republic of China reveal a disguised prejudice against femininity, even when it hides
under a masculine facade.
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CHAPTER IV
SETTING THE STAGE: THE MODEL WORKS OF MADAM MAO
I was raised on the teachings of Mao and on the operas of Madam Mao, Comrade
Jiang Ching. The word “entertainment” was considered a dirty bourgeois word.
The opera was something else. To love or not love the operas was a serious
political attitude. It meant to be or not to be a revolutionary. The operas were
taught on radio and in school, and were promoted by the neighborhood
organizations. For ten years. The same operas.
—Anchee Min, Red Azalea1

Of all the weapons in the CCP’s propaganda arsenal, nothing was more impactful
than the model stage productions. In Chinese, these performances are referred to as
yangbanxi (样板戏) which is sometimes translated as “model operas” although “model
theatrical performances” would be closer to the mark since, of the seventeen yangbanxi
that were ultimately produced by the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, only nine of
them were true operas. The other eight productions consisted of four ballets, two
symphonies, and two scores composed for piano with vocal accompaniment.2 However,
the Party did not create most of these until the mid-1970s, which did not give the later
shows much time to influence society as effectively as the forerunners. The first eight
yangbanxi were based on popular revolutionary stories which had already circulated for
nearly twenty years before the announcement of their ascension to model status came
during the second year of the Cultural Revolution.3
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Nevertheless, despite the actual number, a common saying during the 1970s and
1980s was that there were “eight hundred million people watching only eight shows”
(bayi renmin [kan] batai xi 八亿人民[看]八台戏). The saying is humorous, but
inaccurate, since there were more films and plays than even the seventeen yangbanxi,
though it does express the idea that people felt artistically frustrated during the final
decade of the Mao era.4 This chapter will briefly examine the history of yangbanxi and
their influence on gender and politics. Although these productions were primarily
performed live on stage, Jiang Qing and the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG) launched
a campaign to cinematize the model works in the late 1960s.5 These films became the
canonical versions of the yangbanxi.6 Of these films, the author has identified five of the
most influential and popularly well-received to analyze their content in terms of gender
dynamics and yin-yang binarism: The White-Haired Girl (ballet), The Red Detachment of
Women (ballet), The Red Lantern, Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, and Azalea
Mountain.
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As illustrated during the previous chapters, the Party made apparently impressive
strides in its campaign to promote gender equality which, in the model works, is shown in
the creation of strong female leads. However, the yangbanxi also betray subtle markers
of sex discrimination by scripting a greater number of male roles than female roles; by
creating powerful female characters that still must report to higher ranking men; by
writing scenes where good communists frequently challenge the decisions of their female
superiors, while male cadres are not challenged; and by perpetuating the traditional
stereotypes that women are best suited to domesticity and emotionality.
Besides these phenomena, gender hierarchies were reinforced by the yin-yang
dichotomies discussed in previous chapters with four main differences that are unique to
the theatre. The first of these is found in the opening credits of each opera, which draws
a sharp political divide between the red heroes and the black antagonists. Second,
proletarian heroes are all generally depicted in the bloom of health while the villains are
pallid, obese, and weak. Third, in their most basic conception, yang and yin can be
understood as light and darkness. As such, the film production teams employed clever
techniques to imbue the stage lighting with political significance in a way that cannot be
fully developed in posters or comic books. Finally, playing on the idea that yang is
metaphysically represented by heat, each yangbanxi deploys fire—as a prop and through
dialogue or soliloquy—as a further representation of the communist revolution.
There is one other significant factor which distinguishes the yangbanxi from
propaganda posters and comic books: the composition and performance of the musical
scores. Below is some analysis of the music, but greater musicological research is
required to fully understand the political significance of the songs and their influence on
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gender, politics, and yin-yang cosmology, particularly in the yangbanxi symphonies and
concertos. This is a promising field of inquiry, given composer Yu Huiyong’s synthesis
of Eastern music theory with Western instrumentation, and with the implementation of
traditional Beijing-operatic techniques with modern themes.
The Party created the yangbanxi for four main reasons. The first was to show
audiences how harsh life was under the feudal government of old China and that anyone
who wanted to return to the past was an enemy of the proletarian triumvirate.7 In a July
1964 speech to the “Forum of Theatrical Workers Participating in the Festival of Peking
Opera on Contemporary Themes,” Jiang Qing laid the groundwork for the yangbanxi by
announcing that feudal themes were henceforth unacceptable in stage productions except
as foils to contrast past miseries with present happiness.8 Second, in that same 1964
address, Jiang declared that one of the purposes “in producing operas on revolutionary
contemporary themes is mainly to exalt the positive characters,” thereby giving the
average citizen a model of behavior for emulation.9 Third, because many of the workers
and peasants endured hunger and hardship during the Mao years, the “Hollywood magic”
of the operas allowed the citizenry to fantasize that their sufferings were for the sake of
building an egalitarian paradise for the future where everyone was happy and well-fed.10
Fourth, once a production was canonized as a yangbanxi, it served as a template for
future works, hence it was a “model” opera.11
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Like other propaganda, the yangbanxi adhered to the doctrines expounded by Mao
in his 1942 Talks in Yan’an that art and literature were not to be enjoyed for their own
sake, but that their purpose was to fortify the revolution.12 The operas and ballets were
certainly artistic, but the true creativity of the yangbanxi lies in how the acting, dancing,
and singing were all been subsumed into the political purposes of the CCP. The stage
productions also follow the doctrine of the Three Prominences by keeping the audience’s
attention trained on the protagonists through artful choreography, cinematography,
costuming, and spotlighting.13
The doctrine of the Three Prominences applied specifically to art, but the driving
theory behind it influenced reality as well. The best characters were given prominence
on stage, and in real life only the best communists were permitted to participate in the
best theatres. When Anchee Min was cast as the title role in the opera Red Azalea,14 one
of her supervisors proclaimed that great acting was “not a matter of acting technique. It
is a matter of who has more feelings for Chairman Mao. We need a real Communist to
play a Communist.”15 Because sensual pleasure was bourgeois, sexual purity and
political purity became the same thing. Min and the other girls hired by the studio were
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subjected to a medical examination to verify their virginity.16 In 1971, just before Li
Cunxin turned eleven, talent scouts from the May Seventh Performing Arts University
came to his village in Shandong. They selected Li because he had the flexibility of a
danseur, but even more important was the political investigation into his family
background to determine his peasant lineage.17 Even the name of Li’s new school
pointed to the Three Prominences since it was named for a speech delivered by Jiang
Qing on 7 May 1970 when she instructed artists and academics to keep all focus on the
worker-peasant-soldier triumvirate.18
Some of the stories which became yangbanxi, such as The White-Haired Girl and
The Red Lantern, had already been popular since the 1940s although they underwent
significant revisions until the films were released in 1970. One such revision was the
erasure of romance. The CCP championed class feeling as greater than sexual love,
especially since sexual love was individualistic.19 Familial love is present in the operas,
but this is usually between a single parent and child. None of the main characters have
living spouses.20 In some cases, the death of a spouse only accentuates the intended
grandeur of class devotion. It is revealed near the end of Azalea Mountain that the
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husband of the heroine, Ke Xiang, was killed shortly before the drama begins although
Ke does not allow her grief to overcome her duty to fight for the peasants.21
Although the yangbanxi were written for the stage, it was the films that left the
widest impression. This is because mobile projection teams with electric generators
travelled to all corners of China showing compulsorily attended screenings all the way to
the remotest villages.22 Even during the social upheavals and factional battles of the
Cultural Revolution, the dissemination of the yangbanxi continued unabated.23 From his
own rural commune in the mountains above Qingdao,24 Li Cunxin recalled the powerful
excitement in the village during the day before the monthly screening. He would weep
from the emotions conveyed in the movies, and because of the lessons he learned from
the films. He recalled that after each show, “my devotion to Mao and his ideology was
greatly intensified. I wanted to be a revolutionary hero! Another child of Mao!”25
Li was given his chance to be a revolutionary hero as a principal ballet danseur.
Ballet started in France and later found patronage in the Russian court during the
nineteenth-century. After the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet Union continued to
support the Bolshoi and its unique style.26 After the CCP won the civil war in 1949, the
21

Dujuan Shan [Azalea Mountain], directed by Xie Tieli (Beijing Dianying Zhipianchang, 1974),
1:26:35 to 1:27:20, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CScPKnl3DOA. Of all the revolutionary operatic
musical scores, Azalea Mountain is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest. See Ludden, “The
Transformation of Beijing Opera,” 153.
22

Clark, “Model Theatrical Works,” 184; Roberts, Maoist Model Theatre, 2; Yang Ban Xi, 0:54:40

to 0:55:20.
23

Clark, “Model Theatrical Works,” 179.

24

The capital city of Shandong province.

25

Li, Mao’s Last Dancer, 102.

26

Ibid., 134; Roberts, Maoist Model Theatre, 120-1.

107
Party selected several dancers to train in Moscow and to bring ballet with them back to
China. Following Mao’s command to “make foreign things serve China,” it was Zhou
Enlai who first proposed a new Chinese style instead of the traditional balletic stories of
fairies and princesses.27 The Beijing Ballet School responded by choreographing The
Red Detachment of Women based on the 1961 film, which they performed in 1964.28
That same year, The White-Haired Girl was also turned into a ballet, although neither
were granted “model” status until 1966.29
There is no speaking in the Chinese ballets and there are only a few choral songs.
For the two ballets in the original eight yangbanxi, audiences would have already been
familiar with the characters and plot, but Jiang Qing specifically directed the major dance
companies to incorporate elements of Beijing Opera movement into the choreography
although many dancers found it difficult to incorporate the crisp movements of the operas
into the graceful movements of the ballets—of course, no one challenged her.30 Adding
the opera movements to the ballet served the dual purpose of inventing a Chinese style,
but the various poses, steps, and arm movements of the Beijing opera are each endowed
with a specific statement about that character’s traits and intentions. By using this coded
body language, Chinese audiences were able to interpret deeper meaning from the
ballets.31 Despite an ignorance of the meaning in Beijing opera movements, The Red
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Detachment of Women found acclaim among receptive international audiences, including
a competitive festival in Venice.32 During his historic visit to Beijing, Richard Nixon
was given a live performance in February 1972. A month afterward, the ballet was
broadcast on national television in the United States, and critics enjoyed the dancing
despite the political messages.33
Rosemary Roberts considers another unique aspect of Chinese ballet.
Traditionally, the ballerina and danseur both perform feats of agility and strength, but it is
the danseur’s responsibility to augment the beauty of the ballerina and to provide support
through various lifts and holds. Ballerinas do not lift danseurs or other ballerinas, and
danseurs do not lift or hold other men. In yangbanxi, however, “both male and female
dancers support, lift, push, propel and fight other dancers.” Even so, Roberts explains
that there is still a gendered component to the kinesics of Chinese ballet because the lifts,
pushes, and holds are all contingent on the class status of the characters. For example,
any man can lift a woman, any woman can lift another woman, and women can lift a
villainous man, but nobody lifts or holds a righteous man. In this way, “the yangbanxi
implicitly link the female with the counterrevolutionary while conversely, the negative
characters are feminized by being choreographed with steps and movements otherwise
performed only by women and never by revolutionary men.”34
The Chinese politics of the Cultural Revolution present another gendered problem
with ballet. By its nature, ballet movement is about aesthetics and grace, displayed most

32

Yang Ban Xi, 0:9:00.

33

Ebon, Five Chinese Communist Plays, 128.

34

Roberts, Maoist Model Theatre, 131-3.

109
prominently in the pas de deux. In a society where beauty and sensuality were
criminalized, the Party needed to find a way for men and women to dance together in a
way that conveyed class love sans romance. They did this by increasing the number of
solos and ensemble numbers while keeping pas de deux to a minimum, and, during the
few duets in yangbanxi, the dancers literally keep their partners at arm’s length.35
While Western dancers typically wear some costume variation over a leotard, the
CRG tried to desexualize the yangbanxi ballets by removing the leotard entirely, and
replacing it with baggier peasant clothing and army uniforms. Even so, the costumes
were not entirely shapeless and still accentuated the body’s curves and angles, thereby
introducing an erotic element.36 Indeed, Xu Yihui recalled that The Red Detachment of
Women was his favorite show because, as a pubescent boy in a sexually starved nation,
he enjoyed seeing the female soldiers wearing knee-high socks and tight uniforms.37 Xu
was not alone. As part of the CCP’s poster campaigns, the government sold still
photographs from the yangbanxi, and many young men kept images near their bedsides
of Wu Qinghua or Xi’er striking operatic poses, thereby creating a sexual fantasy
masquerading as orthodoxy.38
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Despite their celebrity, the life of a government performer was not easy. A
dancer’s training schedule included excruciating stretching exercises, classes in opera
movement, acrobatics, and folk dancing. Moreover, because aspiring performers were
expected to use their art as a weapon in service to the revolution, they were required to
study the writings and artistic philosophies of Mao and Jiang Qing more than “all other
subjects combined.” And even though Li Cunxin and his fellow performers were
selected as children to live away from home, they were expected not to cry—especially
the boys—since “crying was a sign of weakness,” and weakness in a boy is offensive to
his yang.39
One of the friendships Li made at the May Seventh school was a boy selected to
study music. When Li asked him what instrument he played, the boy responded that his
teachers had not yet assigned him one. He had had no previous experience, but he was
chosen to study music because of his long fingers and peasant background.40 Four of the
yangbanxi (two symphonies and two piano compositions) were purely musical, and
music played a central role in all seventeen productions. The most famous symphony
was first performed on National Day in 1965 and was based on the earlier revolutionary
opera Shajiabang, but the symphonies were soon upstaged by the operas and ballets
which were more popular.41 Old Beijing opera uses traditional Chinese music theory,
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which employs a pentatonic scale.42 During the final revisions of the libretto for The Red
Lantern, Jiang Qing insisted that L’Internationale43 played during the death scene for Li
Yuhe and Grandma Li even though the pentatonic instruments of the Beijing opera were
unequipped to produce the required sounds. In the end, composer Yu Huiyong solved the
problem by adding Western instruments to the orchestra and increasing the number of
Chinese instruments to keep from drowning them out and thus losing their distinctive
sound.44
In light of the fact that the ballet, the symphony, and the piano are all imports to
China, it is important to consider why the Party selected Beijing opera for inclusion
within the yangbanxi. The simple answer is that contemporary Beijing opera has been a
popular entertainment in China for the past two centuries.45 Since it was already liked by
the masses, it was an easy step for the party to transform the opera into an enjoyable
delivery system for state propaganda.46 Even though the CCP adopted the opera, they did
restructure it in several ways. First, traditional Beijing operas had neither librettists nor
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composers. Instead, each opera troupe collectively innovated the libretto and the score
during rehearsals. Because the CRG required strict adherence to the Party line,
innovation was discouraged and all aspects of the performance were polished to Jiang
Qing’s satisfaction, which required an approved script.47
The second major change to the operas was the reconstruction of the basic
character roles.48 In traditional Beijing opera, there are four main character types, each
with specific rules about movement, singing, the use of stage properties, and costumes.49
Each of the four roles has a variety of subcategories, but generally they are as follows.
First is the sheng (生). These are the “dignified” male characters who fulfil a role in
either the military or the state bureaucracy. Second are the dan (旦). These are the
female roles. Sometimes women in Beijing opera are warriors, but most often they are
the silly young beauty or the aging shrew.50 Third are the jing (净). These are the
“larger-than-life male roles” like emperors, generals, Daoist wizards, demons, or gods.
The final role is the chou (丑). This is the white-faced trickster who japes around the
stage for comic relief.51
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The CCP made four main adjustments to character roles in the yangbanxi operas.
First, like their European counterparts, female stage roles were most often played by men.
The CCP halted this by giving female parts to female actors.52 Second, one of the dan
rules for movement was the suibu (碎步) which were the short quick steps that made a
woman appear to walk with bound feet. Not only did the Party eliminate the practice of
foot binding in real life, they also abolished it from the stage so women could move with
the same powerful steps as men.53 Third, because of the Party’s distaste for religious
superstition and the idolization of feudal culture, all jing characters were eliminated.54
Finally, the character depth explored by traditional characters as they retold historical
events and grappled with the human condition were all discarded for the political
binarism of yin and yang. The chou remained, but he became the white-faced villains in
black who elicited the amused derision of the audience, while the sheng and dan
characters metamorphosed into heroic communist models.55 Despite these radical
changes, the operas of the yangbanxi were still popular with the citizenry.
The operas were not only popular with the masses but with China’s ruling
couple.56 Mao and Jiang were both balletomanes and opera lovers, although Mao loved
the performers more than the performances themselves since many of the young women
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in his harem were chosen from the stage.57 Indeed, Mao not only met his lovers through
the opera, but his wife as well. Before the Japanese invaded Shanghai in 1937, Jiang
Qing, who had been training as an actress, fled the city to Yan’an. While she was there,
she starred in On Songhua River, China’s first revolutionary opera. Ostensibly, Mao
attended every performance just to see her, and, against the wishes of the other Party
leadership, Mao married Jiang in 1938 after a two-month courtship.58 Ironically, it was
also through the opera that Jiang Qing met some of her lovers, sometimes referred to as
her “male concubines.” Allegedly, these included a famous dancer, an actor, a ping-pong
champion, and Qian Haoliang—the opera singer starring as Li Yuhe in The Red
Lantern.59
Jiang Qing’s Role in Yangbanxi
Not only were stage performances central to the propagation of the Cultural
Revolution, but it was in fact a play that started all the problems in the first place. In
1961, Wu Han, the Vice Mayor of Beijing, wrote a play entitled Hai Rui Dismissed from
Office, which told the story of a Ming court Mandarin named Hai Rui who fell from
grace after protesting the emperor’s unjust policies. Four years later, Jiang Qing
interpreted the play as an allegorical attack against Mao who, during the 1959 Lushan
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Conference, sacked Defense Minister Peng Dehuai after he confronted Mao for his
policies during the Great Leap Forward. It was precisely this use of dramatic art which
Jiang Qing interpreted as a glorification of the feudal past and as an attack against the
Maoist regime.60 Hence, the ten-year period from 1966 to 1976 was named because it
was the Party’s attempt to overthrow China’s ancient culture through revolution.
Before Jiang Qing officially took the reins of the artistic world in 1964, both Mao
and Jiang had indicated frustration that the opera stage was still dominated by “emperors,
princes, generals, ministers, scholars and beauties” rather than the proletarian
triumvirate.61 When Jiang finally managed to exert her authority in purging the stage of
feudalism, not even Mulan, the great symbol of gender equality herself, was spared. In
the original 1961 film version of The Red Detachment of Women, the soldiers sing a
marching tune with the words “forward, forward! The soldier’s burdens are heavy (or
‘crucial’). The women’s hatred runs deep. Anciently there was Hua Mulan to join the
army for her father. Today the women’s detachment bears rifles for the people’s sake.”62
The movie and marching tune were both popular, but the 1970 film version of the ballet
cut the reference to Mulan from the women’s march because she was a feudal concept. 63
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Prior to 1964, Jiang Qing had been relatively unknown in China’s political
circles.64 However, given her background as an actress and her ferocious political zeal,
she edged her way into government by pushing for the establishment of the first eight
model works in time for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Mao’s 1942 Yan’an Talks.65 The
announcement of the first eight stage productions judged worthy to be yangbanxi came in
the People’s Daily on 6 December 1966.66 Following the actualization of the model
works, Jiang Qing was no longer just the first lady of China, she became the “godmother”
of the yangbanxi with the final say over all aspects of state propaganda. Yangbanxi and
Jiang Qing—after 1967, to speak of one was to speak of the other.67
The Defense Minister Lin Biao had been Mao’s right-hand until his death in 1971,
but after that, Jiang Qing used her proximity to the Chairman to establish herself and her
confederates as the highest level of state power after Mao himself. One of the ways Jiang
exercised her new authority was to create model operas that featured women in more
prominent roles—Azalea Mountain is a good example.68 Some scholars have applauded
Jiang Qing for giving women greater prominence in the yangbanxi, and, by extension, a
more equal footing in society. However, others have argued that the heroines in Jiang’s
later work were simply her preemptive attempts to counter the main arguments that her
competitors would inevitably raise should she attempt to seize control of the government
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after Mao died.69 It is certainly feasible that both hypotheses are true and that Jiang may
have inadvertently helped the cause of Chinese feminism even though her motives were
probably selfish. In any case, many women at the time expressed admiration for the
strong heroines in yangbanxi and strove to imitate them.70
One of Jiang’s greatest assets in generating the model works was the composer
Yu Huiyong.71 Yu joined a musical troupe of the PLA during the Sino-Japanese War and
eventually became a professor of Chinese folk music and music theory at the Shanghai
Conservatory. Unfortunately, from the onset of the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1956,
Yu was accused of being a bourgeois academic capitalist and spent most of the next
decade facing imprisonment and degradation, and his suffering intensified during the first
few years of the Cultural Revolution.72 He first met Jiang Qing in June 1965 in Shanghai
after she read several of his articles and sought him out, although she did not elevate him
until several years later.73 Jiang became his savior. Not only did she free him from his
imprisonment in the “cowshed,” but under her patronage, Yu rose to become the Minister
of Culture in 1975.74 Until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the two of them were the
guiding genii of the yangbanxi. Jiang was the political engine driving the creation of new
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works with the final say on artistic input, and Yu was the musical virtuoso who applied
his knowledge of theory and stagecraft to fashion the minute details of each show.75
During the Cultural Revolution, Jiang was praised for creating the yangbanxi,
which were, within China, universally acclaimed as the greatest works of art ever created.
When Mao died, however, both Jiang and her operas were criticized together. Within a
month of Mao’s passing, Jiang was arrested and her operas disappeared.76 Not only
Jiang, but anyone whom she had favored became a target of retribution for the Cultural
Revolution, including Xue Jinghua, the prima ballerina in The Red Detachment of
Women, and Yu Huiyong.77 Yu was arrested at nearly the same time as Jiang, and, rather
than reliving his experiences during the Great Leap Forward, killed himself the following
year by drinking sulfuric acid.78 Jiang survived until 1991 before she too committed
suicide in prison.79
Female Roles in Yangbanxi
As leading characters and as extras, women and men sing, dance, and fight side
by side. By freeing women from the traditional attitude that women belonged solely in
the home, and by blurring the Confucian lines between men and women, an argument
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could be made that the model productions were steps forward in the promotion of gender
equality.80 Xi’er and Wu Qinghua, the heroines in the first two ballets, both escape from
the homes of brutal landlords and return home to take their revenge after enduring
considerable hardships. As her hair turned white, Xi’er demonstrated great strength by
surviving alone in the wilderness, and Wu Qinghua became a fearsome warrior under the
Party’s training. Li Tiemei of The Red Lantern witnessed the execution of her family and
then successfully delivered important codes to the Communist guerrillas despite great
danger from the Japanese. Chang Bao of Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy was
compelled to live as a boy in order to protect her virtue from the Guomindang, but with
the PLA she was free to fight the bandits without the need to disguise herself. One of the
most impressive heroines is Azalea Mountain’s Ke Xiang (figure 3.1). Ke not only
managed to lead a successful attack against the Guomindang, but she snuck into their
stronghold to free captured comrades. Furthermore, Ke had to continually strive against
her own subordinates who doubted her decisions because she was not only an outlander
but a woman as well.81
A deeper analysis, however, reveals that many variations of yin and yang were at
play in differentiating men and women. First, as discussed in previous chapters, the Party
tried to erase gender, but all they did was politicize it by linking femininity and the
bourgeoisie with yin, while masculinity and the proletariat enjoyed the strength of yang.82
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Anchee Min was cast as the title character in Red Azalea, the yangbanxi intended to show
the strongest female comrade yet, but even so, the studio management instructed her that
“Red Azalea (the character) must not be too poignant. Her screen time must yield;
meaning the male hero must appear dominant.”83 She was the strongest political
character in the film, and yet she was expected to keep from overbalancing his yang with
her yin. Another example is the unpopular 1972 opera version of The Red Detachment of
Women. The actress cast to play Wu Qinghua looked older than the “baby-faced” actor
who played Hong Changqing. One commentator explained that the backwards pairing
made “audiences feel uncomfortable” as though “yin and yang had been turned upside
down.”84
There are four key examples in yangbanxi that show how women remained
secondary in Maoist society.85 First, there is a disproportionate ratio of males to females.
This critique is difficult to catch, especially since it was progressive of the CCP to
include women at all in an artform from which they had been customarily excluded. But
the gender ratio needs to be considered first in terms of extras and then in terms of
speaking roles. There are female extras in every film version, and, in every case, they
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side with the communists. There is one particular scene in The Red Detachment of
Women where a troupe of captive serving girls dance for the scopophilic pleasure of the
Landlord Nanbatian (as well as the audience).86 Their dance is followed by another
troupe of women in native costume who perform a traditional—and exotic—dance of the
Li ethnic group, which is further evidence of the “internal orientalism” discussed in
chapter two.87 These two groups of women are part of the villain’s camp, but it is clear
that they are there against their will. The balance of female to male extras appears to be
nearly even in the communist groups, although the overall balance tips in favor of men
since the extras on the capitalist side are all males.
As for the primary leading characters, the balance appears split nearly down the
middle with only a slight preference for males. Nevertheless, there is a much greater
number of secondary males with speaking parts in each film—not counting the villains.
In general, each film only has two strong females while the remaining communist
characters with speaking roles are all men. In ballets, none of the characters have
speaking roles (except for the prayer that Mao will live for ten-thousand years), but Wu
Qinghua and the detachment commander (who is not given a name) are the only two
ballerinas with major dancing parts in The Red Detachment of Women, while Xi’er and
Aunt Zhang are the two main females in The White-Haired Girl; all the other female
dancers are extras. Ke Xiang and Grandma Du are the only two females in Azalea
Mountain, while in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, Chang Bao, the strongest female
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character, only plays a minor role herself, and Mother Li is even lesser. The Red Lantern,
with four speaking female characters has the largest number, but two of them are minor
roles leaving only Tiemei and Grandma Li with significant time on stage. All other
characters are men.
The second example of how women are secondary in yangbanxi is the fact that
they are very seldom granted complete authority since there is usually a man in the chain
of command above them. In The Red Detachment of Women, Wu Qinghua and the
detachment commander both take their orders from Hong Changqing.88 This is best
illustrated during the fourth scene which opens to Hong teaching a political class to the
women’s detachment (including the commander). This implies that the women receive
their training and their orders from a man, and that they are not granted the power of their
own decision making.89 In Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, when the time comes for
the PLA and the peasants to attack the Guomindang stronghold, only Chang Bao is
required to ask permission from the Chief of Staff, which he initially denies because she
is “too small,” before ultimately relenting.90 Ke Xiang was arguably the most powerful
heroine in yangbanxi, but her husband was supposed to have been in charge had he not
been killed on his way to Azalea Mountain.
Even when Jiang Qing tried to create powerful women in positions of authority
over men, social attitudes resisted the change. Despite Mulan’s absence from the
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Cultural Revolution, audiences did not fail to draw connections between her and the
strong characters in yangbanxi. However, there is a crucial difference between Mulan
and the communist heroines. In most versions, Mulan is depicted as a model of
Confucian virtue.91 She pretended to be a man, thus violating her feminine
responsibilities, but only for the sake of fulfilling the higher obligations of filial piety;
when the war was over, she returned to a traditional feminine role. In other words, in the
Chinese literary tradition, it is appropriate for a woman to suspend her femininity to
fulfill a man’s role, but only when it is impossible for a man to fulfill that role in the first
place, only if that woman conceals her true sex, and only if her masculine role is
temporary.92
Scholars have argued that the strong women in Jiang Qing’s later operas were her
attempts to pave the way for a power grab. If that was true, then the deep-rooted tradition
of yin and yang had doomed her from the onset because she tried to place women in
positions of authority over men.93 While on an official delegation in Africa, a Party
official named Li Guotang viewed Azalea Mountain for the first time and complained
that “all the heroes in Jiang Qing’s yangbanxi are women.” This was untrue since just
under half of the heroes were women, but it reveals the attitude that yangbanxi heroines
violated their expected roles, and that some men viewed this as a threat to their
masculinity. Still other men complained that yangbanxi women were “too aggressive”
and that they “lacked natural feminine charm.” In any case, although many women were
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inspired by the later heroines, characters like Ke Xiang and Fang Haizhen from On the
Docks were met with hostility by some audiences because they dared to trespass in a
man’s world without concealing their “shameful” yin.94
The third example of how women rank second in yangbanxi is how they are
questioned and chastised even though males are not. When Ke Xiang arrives at Azalea
Mountain, she faces the dual challenge from her subordinates of being an outsider and a
woman.95 In scene three, shortly after Ke arrives in the guerrilla camp, one drunken
peasant complains that the Party’s representative is a woman. After asking his comrades
why any of them should listen to her, they resolve to ignore her.96 Even Lei Gang, the
male protagonist who serves under Ke Xiang, sings a soliloquy questioning whether or
not he can trust the leadership of woman although he ultimately decides that he can: “Is
the Party representative watching the fire from the other side of the river without risking
herself? Is her heart frozen and buried in snow? Will she be frightened senseless at the
sound of artillery fire? No!” Then, as though deciding whether or not to trust a woman
were harder than combat, Lei muses “why is revolution this difficult.”97 Later, when the
guerrillas learn that the Guomindang has captured Grandma Du, Ke tries to convince the
camp not to run down the mountain to save her, thus springing the bandits’ trap. She
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convinces most, but Lei Gang disregards her orders and is indeed abducted. In their cell,
Grandma Du rebukes him for disobeying a direct order.98
The fourth reason why women are secondary in model works also explains why
communist women are challenged. This is because the yangbanxi perpetuate the
traditional stereotypes that women are most comfortable in domestic work and that they
are ruled by emotion.99 In The Red Detachment of Women, while scouting Nanbatian’s
manor in preparation for a night assault, Wu Qinghua, overcome with rage for the abuses
she suffered from Nanbatian, breaks discipline by shooting at him prematurely, thus
giving the attack signal too soon, then, as a consequence for her selfishness, the
commander takes Wu’s pistol from her.100 Historically, Chinese society has understood a
woman’s place as the inner world of the home while a man’s place was the outer world of
the pastures and battlefields. In that light, the confiscation of Wu’s gun is an
emasculating reminder that until she is worthy of more yang, she is still only a woman.
Wu eventually learns that the interests of the group outweigh personal vendettas, and by
internalizing this lesson, she demonstrates to Hong Changqing and the commander that
she is again worthy to carry a weapon.101 However, as though to remind the audience
that a woman can never have as much yang as a man, within less than a minute of Wu’s
rearmament, a male soldier gives his torn uniform to a female soldier who cheerfully sits
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down on the stage to mend it while he teaches another female comrade how to shoot
better.102
Yin and Yang as Good and Evil in Yangbanxi Credits
Like femininity and masculinity, yin and yang also represent the polarization of
good and evil in Jiang Qing’s revolutionary model works and in Chinese society in
general. Quoting a passage from Chairman Mao’s Little Red Book, Ke Xiang asks her
comrades: “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is the primary question of
the revolution.”103 In other words, the CCP divided the entire world into two camps with
no middle ground. This attitude was not exclusive to China during the Cold War since
Senator Joseph McCarthy did the same thing. What makes China unique is how the Party
used yin and yang to demarcate the political and moral binaries which added a gendered
component to the discourse. So far as can be determined, Rosemary Roberts is the only
other Chinese historian to make the connection between the yin of femininity and the yin
of bourgeois evil. However, Roberts’s analysis focuses on the villains in yangbanxi
ballet while this thesis argues that the yin-yang paradigm is found in all aspects of
propaganda and therefore reflects a widespread prejudice held by the government and
citizenry of the PRC. Moreover, Roberts’s argument focuses on the feminizing effect of
the yangbanxi on its villains, while this thesis argues that the villainous elements of
propaganda actively harmed the gender parity of femininity. Finally, Roberts makes no
attempt to explain why the Party chose to link gender to politics through yin and yang.
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This thesis argues that it was the Party’s effort to recast China as a strong nation after the
Century of Humiliation, which they did by claiming the strength of yang for themselves
while assigning the weakness of yin to former governments.104
One yangbanxi scriptwriter remarked that “people come in two varieties: the
beautiful, true, and honest; and the ugly, the mean, and nasty.”105 The political
dichotomy is observed in four prominent ways. The first is visible in each yangbanxi’s
opening film credits. Since the doctrine of the Three Prominences applies here as well,
rather than listing the characters alphabetically or in order of appearance, the credits rank
the dramatis personae by order of their political orthodoxy. This analysis is even more
fruitful if we consider each character as ranked according to their level of yang. Each
model works begins by scrolling through the names of the heroes followed by the extras,
then, in each case, there is a gap between the good communists and the villains.
Additionally, as was found in Chinese comic books, the character names themselves
reveal something about their personal traits.
In the credits for The White-Haired Girl, as the title character, Xi’er (喜儿,
“happy child”) is given top billing. She is followed by her male counterpart Wang
Dachun (王大春, “Grand Springtime”). After Wang are the wise old peasant Uncle Zhao
(赵大叔), and Yang Bailao (杨白劳 “One Hundred Labors”), Xi’er’s father who is
murdered in scene one. The last hero included in the credits is Aunt Zhang (张二婶),
who helps Xi’er escape from the landlord’s manor. As the credits keep rolling, there is a
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gap between Aunt Zhang and the landlord Huang Shiren (黄世仁 “World of Virtue”) and
his manservant Mu Renzhi (穆仁智 “Virtue and Wisdom”). Their names may sound
righteous, but “ren” and “zhi” are both two of the five Confucian ethics, as such, their
monikers explicitly connect them to the oppression of feudal China. The final character
is not even given a name. She is only called dizhupo (地主婆 “the landlord’s old wife”).
So far as can be determined, she is the only female villain in Chinese propaganda. The
fact that Huang comes before Mu implies that the CCP recognized that a grand villain is
stronger than his lackey, even if the strength of his yang is only a perverse corruption.
But what is most interesting is the landlady.106 As the only character in yangbanxi who
embodies the wickedness of both femininity and bourgeois decadence, she is the only
character wholly devoid of yang, thus placing her last in the credits.107
In The Red Detachment of Women, the first name to appear is not the heroine, but
her male counterpart and PLA supervisor Hong Changqing (洪常青 “Evergreen”). The
protagonist Wu Qinghua (吴清华 “Outstanding and Beautiful”) is only second. This is
telling since, even though she is the main character, she is not a flawless communist like
Hong until her firearm is returned an hour into the ballet. The unnamed female
commander of the women’s detachment follows Wu, and the concluding hero is Xiao
Pang (小庞 “Little Tremendous”), Hong’s aide-de-camp. Following precedent, there is a
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large gap between Xiao Pang and the landlord villain Nanbatian (南霸天 “The Heavenly
Southern Tyrant”) and his manservant Ou Guangsi (区广四 “Wide Number Four”).108
The same pattern in the ballets is observed in the model operas. The Red Lantern
begins with Li Yuhe (李玉和 “Jade Peace”), a strong railroad switchman fighting
secretly against the Japanese. His adoptive mother Grandma Li is next, followed by his
adopted teenage daughter Tiemei (铁梅 “Iron Plum”). All three of them perform great
acts of courage and sacrifice, even to martyrdom, but since Li is a man of incredible
strength in the height of his prime, his yang outweighs the women in his family. Next is
the “knife-sharpener” (磨刀人). Even though he is a man and therefore more naturally
possessive of yang, he follows Grandma Li and Tiemei since, though he shows courage,
he risks little and sacrifices nothing. Hui Lian (慧莲 “Intelligent Lotus”) and Aunt Tian
(田大婶) are similar to the knife-sharpener, but they follow since they are both women.
Again, there is break between the heroes and villains who are led by Hatoyama (鸠山),
the Japanese regional commander. The final name is Wang Lianju (王连举).109 Wang is
an interesting case since his placement at the end of the credits indicates that he is worse
than Hatoyama, even though he is a loyal communist to the point of shooting himself in
the hand so he can misdirect the Japanese police, although he cracks under torture in
scene four.110 His placement at the tail indicates that the only thing worse than a
Japanese invader is a Chinese collaborator. This is made explicit during Li’s arrest when
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he confronts Wang and accuses him of being a “shameless traitor” and a “pathetic insect,
fearing death.”111
The credits for Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy open with Yang Zirong (杨子
荣 “Son of Honor”), the PLA soldier who courageously infiltrates the Guomindang. He
is followed by his own commanding officer, the regional chief-of-staff (参谋长), and Li
Yongqi (李勇奇 “Extremely Brave”), a courageous peasant who converts to communism
and joins the militia. The first woman in the credits is Chang Bao (常宝 “Treasure”).
Though she is young, she insists on joining the People’s Militia and therefore precedes
her father Chang Liehu (常猎户 “Hunter”) and Mother Li. The standard gap separates
the heroes from the Guomindang warlord Zuo Shandiao (座山雕 “Vulture”) who, as with
The Red Lantern, precedes the turncoat Luan Ping (栾平 “Average”).112
The credits for Azalea Mountain follow the same pattern, though there are two
minor variations. As the highest-ranking communist with the purest background and
attitude, Ke Xiang (柯湘 “Xiang River”113) appears first. She is followed by Lei Gang
(雷刚 “Strong”) and Li Shijian (李石坚 “Solid as a Rock”), two implacable peasants who
are eager to learn despite their illiteracy and doubting natures. Next is Mother Du (杜妈
妈), a kind and wise grandmother who flawlessly adheres to the Party—even sacrificing
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her son to the revolution. She follows Lei and Li only because her age and sex give her
less yang than they. She is followed by three minor, but generally good-hearted peasant
men: Tian Dajiang (田大江 “Great River”), Zheng Laowan (郑老万 “Old/Wise and
Vast”), and Luo Chenghu (罗成虎 “Becomes a Tiger”). The final hero is Du Xiaoshan
(杜小山 “Little Mountain”), Mother Du’s impetuous fifteen-year-old grandson whose
youth gives him a high feminine voice and demeanor.
The gap between heroes and villains is absent from the credits, but there is still a
distinction since the names of the villains are indented to the right. This may be an
implied declaration that the two are “rightists,” but in any case, it functions to show that
they are distinct from the heroes. The second difference is that Wen Qijiu (温其久) is a
secret traitor who continually tries to sabotage the guerrilla base, yet he is an aberration
from the previous operas since he precedes the primary villain in the credits. This is
Dushe Dan (毒蛇胆 “Viper”), a martial landlord of the Guomindang.114 Regardless of
which of the two the CCP regarded as the greater villain, the point remains that the
communist heroes, ranked in the credits according to their political orthodoxy, are
separate and prominent over their bourgeois foes.
Health and Sickness
In her 1964 address to theatrical workers, Jiang Qing expressed her irritation that
in the original version of Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, the communist heroes all
seemed ill while the Guomindang bandits looked like strapping warriors.115 Since then,
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the situation reversed itself so that good communists looked healthy and beautiful, while
the villains became ugly, fat, bald, old, sickly, and hunched.116 To improve the
appearance of fitness and strength, actors and dancers were generally tall. When Jin Xing
joined her PLA dance troupe, she was granted a waiver for her short stature because her
dancing was so good, but she was a rare exception.117 There were four main techniques
for giving the heroes an air of health. First, camera angles were kept low. This served
the dual function of providing a forced perspective of height, thus making the heroes
appear more imposing, and it caused the actors’ faces to appear fuller. Since Chinese
peasants were historically the first to starve, it was a pleasant fantasy to portray farmers
with round cheeks.118
The second method of indicating the health of individual communists, and, by
extension, the Party, was by having the heroes cow their enemies by performing feats of
strength. In The Red Lantern, once Hatoyama has Li Yuhe in custody, he orders his
minions to take Li to the dungeon for questioning. As two guards step forward to seize
him, Li hurls them backward with the command to “step away.” His intention is not to
fight them, but once they have been repelled, he calmly straightens his coat and walks to
the dungeon on his own terms. After he is taken away, an unwillingly impressed
Hatoyama muses to himself “how amazing! Why are communists so much harder than
steel?” When Li is brought back into Hatoyama’s study, he has been roughed up, but
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mentally and physically he is still stronger than his captors.119 Shortly thereafter, as the
guards are leading the Li family to their execution, Hatoyama offers Li Yuhe one last
opportunity to save their lives in exchange for the secret codes. Spinning around to glare
down at Hatoyama, Li’s voice becomes thunderous and echoey as he shouts “Hatoyama!
The Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party are too many for you to ever kill!
I exhort you to carefully consider your own dire fate!” In response, Hatoyama murmurs
“how intimidating!”120
Li’s muscular stature makes him appear threatening, but even despite Ke Xiang’s
slender build, her self-assured manner frightens an entire troop of villains. When she
makes her first appearance in the village market, she is draped in chains and surrounded
by the Viper’s guards. They have superior numbers and bayonets, but they continually
shy away from her, giving the impression that it is she who is in control.121 Likewise,
when the PLA is training in the snowy mountains of Manchuria, with no impression that
they are feeling the chill, the chief-of-staff asks his men if they are tired, to which they
emphatically respond in the negative.122 By contrast, the Vulture and his men first appear
clutching fur cloaks and shivering with the cold.123 The implication is that the villains
cling to the cold yin of the sick past while the Party looks forward to the warm yang of a
healthy future.
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The third method of conveying the health of the Party was through laughter. The
villains’ faces are generally frozen into scowls and sneers, and on the rare occasion that
they do laugh, it is a dark chuckle at someone else’s expense. On the other hand, the
heroes frequently smile or throw their heads back and guffaw for the joy of belonging to
the revolution. For the first half of the film, the peasant Li Yongqi seldom smiles
because he has been under the thumb of the Guomindang. However, when the PLA
chief-of-staff sings to him about the glories of the revolution, Li’s face becomes
transfigured at the first mention of “Chairman Mao.” From then on, except for the
moments of confrontation with the Guomindang when all the heroes’ faces become stern,
Li and his comrades are continually grinning.124
Despite their happiness, however, none of the heroes have deep laugh-lines. In
fact, none of them have any wrinkles whatsoever. Although Grandma Li was supposed
to be into her sixties, her face is young and smooth. Her gray hair conveys a feeling of
age and wisdom, but her taut skin gives the sense that she is young, strong, and healthy
despite her age (figure 3.2).125 Indeed, Gao Yuqian, the actress who plays Grandma Li,
was only thirty-seven when she was cast.126 The same holds true for Mother Du and
Mother Li, although Mother Li is the exception to the rule about good communist
wellness since her first scene shows her sick and dying.127 However, she actually
underscores the point that the Party symbolizes the yang of good health since it is the
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PLA who, upon meeting her, send for the medic to treat her enough to make an
immediate recovery.128 This demonstrates that not only are the Party and physical health
representative of each other, but it is the Party itself which supplies the people with the
yang of wellbeing.
In contrast to the heroes, the villains represent the nadir of illness. Despite the
fact that the villains are the personification of political yin, they do represent a kind of
strength, but that strength is tainted by their other proclivities for selfishness, shortsightedness, cowardice, and sloth.129 After all, the Guomindang on Tiger Mountain were
too strong for a frontal assault, so they could only be taken by strategy.130 Like the
creatures for whom they are named, the Viper and the Vulture are both strong animals
despite the fact that they are full of venom and feast on decay. There are two main ways
that yangbanxi identify the bourgeoisie with sickness.
First, they are fat, old, and bald, which makes them appear lazy, decadent and
impotent. The portliest is Hatoyama. Beside his rotundity, he is also short and hairless
except for his toothbrush mustache.131 Nanbatian is prosperously plump, especially in his
peach colored Mandarin skirt and panama hat.132 The Vulture is not fat, but he still looks
unhealthy, even resembling his namesake with his bald head, bent neck, baggy jowls and
flared black cloak with puffy fur collar.133 Huang Shiren is not bald, but his hair is
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greasy and longer than the sharp haircuts of the PLA. Since men at this time often had
similar haircuts regardless of whichever side they fought for, this stylistic choice is based
on artistry, not history, which “creates a visual link between the female yin of the
revolutionary model women and the evil yin of the landlords.”134
The second symbol of illness is the villains’ pale complexions. While the heroes
all have rosy cheeks, the villains have sickly pallid faces, almost like they stuck their
heads in a sack of flour (figures 3.3 and 3.4). This is the case for every villain except for
spies and traitors—although they still usually wear the standard black of an enemy.
There are two examples that best demonstrate this. The first is the landlady in The WhiteHaired Girl. A serving woman massages the old lady, but when the servant falls asleep,
her mistress stabs her cruelly with a hairpin. The servant’s countenance is sad in her
bondage, but her skin has a ruddy glow. The landlady, on the other hand, is not only
extremely white, but hers is also the only face in yangbanxi crisscrossed by wrinkles.135
The second example is from The Red Lantern, just before the Japanese torture Wang
Lianju, when Hatoyama and three of his underlings are questioning Wang to discover
where the secret codes are. Wang, who has not yet turned traitor at this point, does not
have a healthy glow, but nor is he as pale as the other four men who all have ghastly
white faces and crimson lips which makes them look like demons.136
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In traditional Chinese opera, the two traits of the clownish chou character are that
he always has a white face and he very rarely speaks or sings.137 The enemies in model
operas do a great deal of speaking, but only two brief arias in the five identified
yangbanxi are sung by villains. The first, sung in Hatoyama’s raspy croak is a threat
against Wang Lianju.138 The other is the traitor Wen Qijiu’s attempt to trick Lei Gang
into thinking that Ke Xiang, as a woman, is a poor leader for the rebels on Azalea
Mountain.139 Whether this is intentional or not, audiences familiar with the customary
rules of Beijing opera would have noticed a connection between the white-faced jesters
of the past and the fools of the present who fought against the Party.
Lighting and Shadows
Boiled down to their most simple forms, yang and yin represent “light” and
“darkness.” The film studios and lighting technicians used the brightness of the stage to
make political statements about the actions in the drama. There are different lighting
scenarios in yangbanxi and each one illuminates the scene and its connection to moral yin
and yang. The first are acts in which all the players are righteous proletarians. In every
case, the scene is brilliantly lit. The second are scenes where all the players except for
one or two are good communists. Usually this is a scene where the one villain on stage is
a traitor or spy. In these cases, the stage is still illuminated—though perhaps slightly
dimmer—but the villain’s costume is generally black. This identifies him with the
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counterrevolution and it distinguishes him from the heroes. The third are scenes where all
the players are enemies. In these, the stage lighting is extremely dim. In some cases,
were it not for their white faces, the black costumes of the villains would make them
completely disappear. The fourth are scenes where everyone is a villain except for one or
two valiant communists who are there either as spies or prisoners. In these cases, the
stage is still gloomy, but, following the Three Prominences, the heroes are all under a
bright spotlight. The final category of stage lighting are the transitional phases. Usually
these take place at dawn or dusk. If the action take place at dawn, then it is either a scene
where the villains exeunt and are followed onstage by the heroes, or the action takes
place during a battle. In the latter case, the rising sun symbolizes the rising Communist
Party. If the action occurs at dusk, then the stage generally falls from the communists to
the capitalists, although this is rare. Below are analyzed examples from the five included
yangbanxi.
In the opening scene of The White-Haired Girl, even though the stage is full of
peasants, they are each draped in chains and carrying heavy burdens for Huang Shiren.
As such, the lighting is dark to indicate Huang’s control over their lives. The home of
Xi’er and her father is well-lit, but it is dark and snowing outside since it is during this
scene that Huang kidnaps Xi’er and murders Yang Bailao.140 After Huang and his men
take Xi’er away, one of the older male dancers stops Wang Dachun from grabbing a
hatchet and chasing after them. He directs him to the Eighth Route Army, indicated by
holding up a red cloth with balujun (八路军) written in golden characters. At this
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moment, the morning sky begins to lighten while the cloth is passed around to each of the
dancers who treat it with great reverence, but none more so than Wang.141
The next two scenes take place in the shadows. The first is set in the Huang
family manor and the second takes place after Xi’er escapes and is chased into the
mountains. Wherever she is, she is brightly illuminated, especially when her clothing and
hair both turn ragged and white.142 The very first scene where the stage is brightly
illuminated takes place as Wang Dachun and his PLA unit come home to liberate Yangge
village. The peasants and soldiers all train and dance together, although there is a
moment of sadness when Aunt Zhao, believing that Xi’er is dead, gives Wang the sad
news.143
Except for Xi’er, the stage goes dark again as the happy scene gives way to her
sneaking food from two of Huang’s men in a Buddhist temple. When Wang enters and
chases the bandits away, he recognizes her and follows her into a nearby cave. As Wang
and the peasants enter the cave to save her, the morning sunlight begins to stream inside
and the peasants joyfully sing that “the sun is a symbol of the Communist Party.”144 This
is significant since the word for “sun” (taiyang 太阳) literally means “the ultimate yang.”
In other words, they are making an explicit connection between metaphysical yang and
the CCP. The final scene takes place on a bright stage. The peasants march in carrying
banners that read “punish the evil traitor Huang Shiren,” who is himself slapped by Xi’er
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and dragged offstage for execution (figure 3.5). At the sound of gunfire, the peasants all
jubilantly shout “ten-thousand years to Chairman Mao! Ten-thousand years to the
Communist Party! Ten-thousand years to Chairman Mao! Ten and again ten-thousand
years!” At this point, the stage is its brightest yet, and all prominence is given to the red
sun rising slowly in the distance (figure 3.6).145
The Red Detachment of Women opens in darkness save for Wu Qinghua who,
under a spotlight, is chained to a post in the home of Nanbatian. She manages to escape
from the manor and flees into a palm grove. Nanbatian’s lackeys chase her carrying
paper lanterns, but as if to demonstrate their wicked yin, the lanterns provide no
substantial light. She is eventually saved by Hong Changqing and Xiao Pang who give
her directions to the women’s encampment.146 Scene two opens on a bright scene in the
communist base. The joyful peasants dance and train under trees with red leaves and
everyone is happy. When Wu Qinghua staggers into camp, she is welcomed with open
arms. When she places her face against the fabric of the red flag, she weeps with joy.147
When scene three opens in the “bandits lair,” the stage lighting returns to black. The
villains are enjoying a feast, but the only people under the spotlight are Hong Changqing,
who enters the party disguised as a business man, and Wu Qinghua who remains in the
courtyard to spy. When Wu prematurely fires at Nanbatian, the women’s detachment
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rushes on stage to secure the mansion, but the landlord escapes. Even so, throughout the
battle, as more heroes enter, the brighter the lights get until dawn tinges the horizon.148
Scene four opens at dawn in the communist camp. Hong leads the women in a
political seminar before they break for military training. By the time Wu proves that she
is again worthy to carry a pistol, the day is fully bright.149 The next scene is a battle
between the women’s detachment and the Guomindang, so it takes place that night in
semi-darkness. The backdrop is black, but a red light shines on the heroes as they fight.
The communists win the battle, but Hong Changqing is captured in near-total darkness
except for the flickering lightning on his face.150 Scene six begins in darkness at the
Guomindang’s last bastion (figure 3.7). When Hong Changqing is brought in under
guard, a spotlight shines on him alone. Nanbatian gives Hong the chance to sign a pledge
disavowing the revolution, but Hong refuses and is executed by burning alive.151 The
final scene takes place a few hours later as dawn turns the sky a light pink. The women’s
detachment runs onto the stage and fights the enemy while all throughout the battle, the
sky gradually brightens into day.
The lighting for The Red Lantern is even more simple since it does not use
transitional illumination. The action takes place primarily in the Li home, which is
always well-lit;152 outside in Longtan Village, where it is daytime, but overcast because
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of the Japanese occupation;153 or in the Japanese compound and prison yard, where it is
usually dark and gloomy.154 The final scene is the brightest, and this is because it is the
final battle which takes place in the guerrilla mountain base.155 The lantern itself is an
important symbol of the party. Not only is it the means by which the guerrillas are able
to recognize each other, but Grandma Li teaches Tiemei that “this red lantern has
illuminated the path for us poor people these past few years. It shines upon the way that
us workers must tread!” In other words, the light of the lantern symbolizes the yang of
the CCP.156
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy follows the same pattern. What is most
interesting are the transitional scenes and the moments when Yang Zirong is undercover
with the Guomindang. Whenever Yang is with the Vulture and his men in their cave,
they are always in darkness, but he is brightly spotlighted (figure 3.8).157 In scene eight,
the Vulture is plotting with one of his men on the mountainside in the middle of the night.
As they walk offstage, however, dawn begins to brighten the sky as Yang Zirong enters
and sings that “the light of Mao Zedong Thought will shine forever.”158 The last
transitions occur after Yang has laid the groundwork for the army to attack. As the PLA
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skis toward Tiger Mountain, the sky gradually grows slightly dimmer, but when they
charge into the Vulture’s lair, which had previously been gloomy, the cave glows with a
red light until the army defeats the bandits and captures Zuo Shandiao.159
Azalea Mountain follows the same template, but there is one moment where the
transitional lighting occurs at twilight instead of sunrise. Scene five begins in the early
evening but grows steadily darker as the traitor Wen Qijiu enters and tries to poison Lei
Gang against Ke Xiang. In this case, the interplay of light and dark is both literal and
metaphorical as Lei struggles to make up his own mind.160 Furthermore, there are several
metaphorical references linking the yang of light to the yang of the Party. In the opening
scene, Lei Gang sings that “the Party is the brilliant lamp which points the way.”161
Later, while Tian Dajiang lays dying from a gunshot wound, a choir sings “[your]
radiance illuminates the land,” thus demonstrating that yang comes from the
revolutionary martyrs and the Communist Party.162
Fire and Ice
The yangbanxi use fire and ice in ways similar to how they use light and darkness.
After all, hot and cold are two other characteristics of yang and yin, but fire has certain
qualities that light does not. The model works use fire in three ways, either
metaphorically or literally, as a beacon, a weapon, and as a purifier. As a beacon, the
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yang of fire functions the same as for light. It demonstrates the power of the Party, but it
also summons the global proletariat to join the revolution. Grandma Li wonders “how
long can heaven and earth be shrouded in darkness? Surely the revolution’s fire must
break forth!”163 Later, from his confinement in the prison yard, Li Yuhe echoes that
sentiment by proclaiming a vision that “the red flag of the revolution has been raised
high” and “the fires of anti-Japanese resistance will set the prairies ablaze… New China
shines upon the human race with the glory of the sun.”164
For the Party, fire is also a potent weapon used in pushing the revolution forward.
While singing about his responsibility to capture Tiger Mountain, Yang Zirong proclaims
that in “making a goal to be like the foolish old man who moved the mountains, [I] can
overcome unconquerable barriers; with a red heart like fire, [I] can become the sharpest
sword!”165 Yang’s chief-of-staff also ponders how “the revolution is like a raging fire
that cannot be stopped” no matter how much the enemy fights against them.166 After the
peasants and the Eighth Route Army kill Huang Shiren, they celebrate by building a fire
and consigning to it the remnants of their feudal past such as a placard from the “Hall of
Good Karma” (jishan tang 积善堂) and a sign reading “Peace Preservation Association”
(weichi hui 维持会).167 The last thing to burn is the “human purchasing contract” Huang
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Shiren used in act one to buy Xi’er (mai shen qi 卖身契).168 Yang, then, is not just a
source of light and heat, it is also the broom that sweeps away the fragments of feudalism
and imperialism.
If the communists can use fire as a weapon, however, then it can also be used
against them. As a trick to lure the guerrillas from the mountain, the Viper ignites a
bonfire visible for miles, captures Mother Du, and threatens to burn her alive.169 Ke
Xiang and her militia successfully rescue Mother Du, but even if they had not, the
characters in yangbanxi display a strange eagerness to pass through fire. Thus, for a
communist, fire is not something to actively seek, but should it come, it represents
purification. After suffering interrogation without revealing the secret codes, Li Yuhe
sings to Hatoyama that “even if you torture me to death, what fear does gold have for the
smelter’s fire? You want me to lower my head, but I will never submit!170 While telling
her comrades about the horrors of old China, Ke Xiang reveals that her entire family,
who had all worked as miners for a cruel capitalist, were all killed in a conflagration.171
The most dramatic example is Hong Changqing, who, after refusing Nanbatian’s offer to
disavow the revolution in exchange for freedom, climbs willingly onto his funeral pyre.
While L’Internationale plays in the background, the stage and its occupants darken
except for Hong standing erect in the center of the flames.172 In other words, death by
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fire is not a tragedy, it is a purification through yang—a cherished martyr sacrificing
himself on the altar of the revolution (figure 3.9).
The majesty of fire is even further emphasized in the yangbanxi by references to
ice, which is itself closely connected to sickness. Singing metaphorically about the
severe cold of the Manchurian winter (the Guomindang), Yang Zirong asserts that he
resists the chill because his heart is oriented toward the sun (the ultimate yang, or the
Party).173 When Tian Dajiang joins Ke Xiang’s rebels, she gives him a gift of money and
clothes to keep him from hunger and cold. He is amazed because he has worked and
suffered for so many years, but no one had ever before cared if he was hungry or cold.174
Shortly thereafter, Li Shijian sings that “even though the snows are melting and the
spring thunders are sounding, the only thing to fear is the spring chill and heavy
frost.”175 In other words, the coming of spring is inevitable, but there may still be some
moments of intense cold. In all cases of hot and cold, the connection to yin and yang is
not accidental. Yang, as heat and light, always represents the strength of the revolution,
even when that power is directed against the communists themselves. Yet even then, that
yang is always preferable to the icy yin of feudalism and the Guomindang.
Conclusion
The CCP created the model stage productions during the Cultural Revolution with
the intention that they would be the sharpest tool for honing the minds and the behaviors
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of the people. These Beijing operas, ballets, and musical compositions were created for
four main purposes. First, they served to “remind” the population how miserable life was
for the workers and peasants under the imperial system. Second, they offered exemplary
models of behavior for people to follow. Third, they offered a glimpse into a perfect
world that the people could hope for if they only endured. And fourth, the yangbanxi
functioned as templates for additional works to come.
No one was more influential on the model works than Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing.
Jiang entered the political world of propaganda in 1964 after her husband commissioned
her to purge the stage of persisting feudal elements, which she set to with a passion. As a
former actress herself, and as the head of the CRG, Jiang had total control over all aspects
of the artistic world, including the private lives of her actors, singers, dancers, writers,
and musicians. And yet despite her cleverness, Jiang lacked the theoretical knowledge to
bring her visions to fruition. As a result, she conscripted master composer Yu Huiyong.
Jiang turned out to be Yu’s salvation and his doom by freeing him from the torment of
the Red Guards, although both were arrested after the Cultural Revolution, and both of
them killed themselves in prison.
At the time, Jiang and Yu’s creations were appreciated as propaganda, but also for
their artistic value. However, despite Jiang’s intention to create more and more powerful
roles for women, thereby giving them a more equal footing in Chinese society, the
yangbanxi helped to cement old prejudices by building upon the foundation of yin-yang
binarism in terms of gender and as politics. True, women were more powerful, but they
were also outnumbered by the males on the stage. Furthermore, even the strongest
females frequently served under the stewardship of a more powerful man. When they did
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not, they were doubted, questioned, and patronized by their subordinates, which should
have been unusual since men of corresponding rank in other yangbanxi never faced the
same level of internal division. The struggles faced by the female characters in the model
works were caused by the reinforcement of the traditional stereotypes that women—
despite their strength—were more subject to emotion and domesticity than males.
The political binaries of yin and yang are also highlighted in yangbanxi in four
main ways. First, the credits are listed according to political orthodoxy so that characters
with the most yang are named first while those with the most yin are named last. Second,
the communists all appear in top shape while the villains are all sickly, bald, old, and
overweight. Third, in nearly every scene, the stage lighting reflected the political nature
of the characters on stage. In other words, the more communists there were, then the
brighter the lights; the more villains there were, then the dimmer the set. Finally, the
yangbanxi each employ strategic literal and metaphorical references to fire and ice which
underscore the dichotomies between the yang of dogmatic virtue and the yin of political
malevolence.
After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the model works all disappeared
until a growing sense of nostalgia brought them back in the 1990s and they are still
popular in China today.176 It is true that Jiang Qing was a severe woman, and that
crossing her could get someone arrested or killed.177 However, it should be recognized
that her creations did in fact generate some benefits. Contemporary Chinese composers
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all recognize Yu Huiyong’s innovations which exerted a powerful influence on the
trajectory of successive generations of musicians.178 Deng Xiaoping referred to the
yangbanxi as “a single flower blossoming,” but were it not for Jiang Qing, China may
have spent many years without even that.179 Performed live or viewed as films, the
model works were seen in factories, schools, and rural villages. Disregarding Jiang
Qing’s many shortcomings and the otherwise cultural famine that she created, it was still
she who took art, in some form, to all corners of China.180 Some, including Jin Xing,
have expressed a deep admiration for her as a spurned wife who sublimated her energy
into the creation of something beautiful.181
Darkness is generally understood as the absence of light. However, the yangbanxi
demonstrate that the Party understood yin not simply as an absence, but as a reified
concept that exercises a corrupted power of its own which must yield to yang. As light
drives away the darkness, the political struggle between the “strong” Communist Party
and the “weak” counterrevolution was played out on the theatrical stage. Even in
examples where gender is not directly apparent, the yin-yang cosmology in the model
works reinforced a sexual hierarchy by implicitly linking femininity with evil since both
traits are qualities of yin. By contrast, the yangbanxi each exalt masculinity as the sexual
apex by equating the male yang with perfect political correctness.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE BINARY

Ever since Chairman Mao declared the founding of the People’s Republic of
China in 1949, it has become the tradition for his successors to commemorate National
Day on 1 October with a military parade past Tiananmen. As the president inspects the
troops, he shouts to them “tongzhimen hao!” and “tongzhimen xinkule!” which mean
respectively “greetings comrades” and “comrades, you have suffered so much.”
However, the Chinese word for “comrade” (tongzhi 同志) has changed its meaning since
the end of the Cold War. Considering each syllable in turn, tong-zhi literally means
“same goal” or, if rendered more colloquially, “someone with the same ideals as myself.”
However, beginning at a 1989 LGBT film festival in Hong Kong, the word tongzhi
became associated with the Chinese gay community.1 The transformation came so rapidly
that many Western students of Mandarin learn that tongzhi means “gay” before they learn
that it also means “comrade.” During the Mao years, anyone caught participating in
homosexual behavior was punished for the crime of “hooliganism” (liumang zui 流氓罪)
and relegated to the black social classes under the category of “bad elements” (huai fenzi
坏分子).2 This final chapter will recapitulate the arguments made in this thesis by
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examining the social roles of China’s modern “comrades” in the decades after Mao.
People who practice homosexual behavior fall outside of the CCP’s yin-yang binary, but
it is precisely because homosexuality and other non-binary sexual groups fall outside of
the dichotomy that their inclusion in this study demonstrates the cultural resilience of yin
and yang as sexual descriptors. Furthermore, because gender during the Mao era was
constructed as a binary, the Chinese response to the gay community provides further
demonstration that the Party reinterpreted yin and yang as categories of power and not
merely of sexuality.
In the Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Medicine,3 the Yellow Emperor declared that
“the principle of Yin and Yang is the foundation of the entire universe. It underlies
everything in creation.”4 This has been a guiding philosophical truism for at least the
past two millennia. However, many Western scholars generally tend to treat yin-yang
cosmology in one of two ways. Either they dismiss it entirely as a “Four Olds” casualty
of the Cultural Revolution, or else they treat it like an ontological oddity that somehow
survived the Mao era, but whose importance is minimal. I argue that yin-yang
cosmology did not only survive despite the CCP, but that they actually propagated it, and
that as a cosmological paradigm, yin and yang represent both gender norms and political
values. Were this not the case, then we would not expect to find contemporary ideas of
sexuality framed in these terms.5 And yet we do.
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Chairman Mao himself, thinking that absorbing the yin of vaginal secretions
would be the medicine to recalibrate his waning yang, gave copies of the Daoist text
Classic of the Plain Girl’s Secret Way to the women in his harem so they would know
how to perform.6 In 2013, many men, regardless of their sexual orientation, admitted that
even though using condoms prevented the spread of disease, they preferred not to use
prophylactics because they also barred the sharing of yang and yin energies.7 These
examples illustrate the potency of yin and yang as modern concepts, but an analysis of
gay communities in China is necessary to see how yin and yang also function as
denominations of power.
While Li Cunxin was studying ballet at the May Seventh School during the
Cultural Revolution, his Chinese folk-dance instructor was a lively and enthusiastic man
named Teacher Chen. Then, one day, Chen’s demeanor became taciturn and disconsolate
until, a short time later, he disappeared entirely. Li later learned that Teacher Chen had
been discovered engaging in homosexuality and was subsequently moved to a swine farm
for hard labor and reeducation. When he eventually returned to the school a year later, he
was forbidden to teach, so he worked by scrubbing the communal toilets.8
Throughout China’s history, there have been many documented cases of men
practicing homosexuality, which the ancient Chinese saw as a pattern of behavior—like a
hobby—rather than as a category of identity.9 However, following the collapse of the
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Qing Dynasty, the New Culture Movement of the early twentieth century sought to
incorporate Western scientific thinking as a way of strengthening China and countering
the weaknesses and errors of the past. Unfortunately, this included the West’s medical
pathologization of homosexuality.10 Once Chinese society recast same-sex behavior as a
sickness, it was an easy step for the Maoist regime to reclassify it as the “opposite of
manliness” and as a remnant of bourgeois imperialism needing political correction.11
Today, as nearly thirty nations have sanctioned same-sex unions, the subject of
gay marriage has become a lively debate in Chinese-language academic circles. Zhang
Xianglong, a philosophy professor at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangdong, published an
essay entitled “How Should Confucianism View the Legalization of Same-sex
Marriage?” His findings were that Chinese native philosophy has never praised
homosexuality as the Greeks did, nor has China actively persecuted homosexuals as the
Christians have. Instead, he argues, Confucianism and contemporary Chinese society
should take a tolerant stance toward gay people without recognizing gay marriages.
Zhang offers four reasons for his conclusion. First, gay marriages will be harmful to the
couples’ parents since they cannot expect grandchildren. He quotes Mencius’ teaching
that there are three ways to be unfilial and that not producing offspring is the worst.12
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Incidentally, this is happening to many straight men since the One Child Policy has
resulted in a smaller population of women than men who, unable to find a partner, are
classified as guanggun (光棍 “bare branches”). Second, Zhang argues that adopted
children of gay couples will be harmed by their parents’ influence which will prohibit the
child from integrating into society.13 Third, by legalizing gay marriage, Zhang claims
that society is making it easier to lure people into gay relationships who otherwise would
not.14 His last argument is the most compelling. Paraphrasing a quote from the Classic
of Changes, Zhang states that “yin and yang are the complementary forces driving the
creation of new life. Therefore, matrimony is best if reserved for the naturally ordered
structure of heterosexual relationships.”15 Professor Wu Fei of Peking University’s
Philosophy Department published another article in the same issue with Professor Zhang
wherein he paraphrased Zhang’s argument before adding his own amen.16
Professor Chen Zhiwei of Xi’an University did not disagree with Zhang’s
conclusion, but he did counter several of Zhang’s premises, such as the fact that in a
modern world, even if every human couple were gay, children could still be born in
laboratories.17 Chen also counters Zhang’s theory of yin and yang by arguing that each
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essence contains within itself a small measure of its opposite. As such, even same-sex
couples (which Chen describes as yin-yin and yang-yang) will participate in both natural
forces. Chen’s argument is encouraging, but he does not advocate for gay marriage,
rather, by playing devil’s advocate, he is arguing the futility of employing ancient
metaethics for contemporary problems.18
Outside of academic circles, the debate over homosexuality becomes a
referendum on masculine identity. In imperial China, regardless of personal taste, the
dominant insertive male was the one with the higher rank and he was generally the
elder.19 Considering sex as a system of power, this further demonstrates that yin-yang
cosmology is the hierarchical network for determining the structure of that power. Many
twenty-first century Chinese still think of homosexuality as a social immorality that
imperils national security. Because women are expected to be passive and submissive,
many Chinese men see contemporary tongzhi as “fake women” who forsake their yang in
favor of yin. Should China become too overbalanced with too much yin, then the whole
country is at risk since a strong nation “requires building a strong manhood and
sharpening male gender roles.”20 However, because the familial pressure to produce
heirs is so great, especially for people who grew up as single children, many gay people
claim that even if marriage equality were legalized, they would still choose to hide their
orientation and sire children.21
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Further examples of enforced masculinity have found their way into the Western
media. In April 2018, the popular Chinese social media platform Weibo announced a ban
on “offensive” content like pornography, violence, and homosexual themes. The
resultant uproar caused them to partially reverse the ban, which some saw as a signal of
positive change in China, but others remain less optimistic.22 In January 2019, Chinese
media censors began blurring the earlobes of male celebrities if they appeared for
interviews with pierced ears. Grace Leung, a professor of communications in Hong
Kong commented that “China is still a strong patriarchal society” that has “a distinctive
male and female hierarchy in many local communities. Seeing men wearing earrings, in
many traditional men’s point of view, is a deteriorating of their social status and
respect.”23
Finally, in March 2019, Chinese movie fans expressed disappointment that the
state media censors cut three minutes worth of crucial scenes from Bohemian Rhapsody,
a film about the British rock band Queen, whose lead singer, Freddie Mercury, came out
as gay, and died in 1991 from complications arising from HIV/AIDS. Censors cut the
scenes when Freddie comes out to his fiancée, when he meets his lover, Jim Hutton, and
when the band records a music video dressed as drag queens. Censors did not cut the
scene when Freddie confesses to his bandmates that he has contracted AIDS, but they did
silence the audio and cut the subtitles. Moreover, when Rami Malek, the actor who
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played Freddie Mercury, gave his acceptance speech at the Academy Awards for Best
Actor, he said “we made a film about a gay man, an immigrant, who lived his life just
unapologetically himself,” but when his speech was rebroadcast in China, censors
replaced “gay man” with “special group.”24 China declassified homosexuality as a
mental illness in 2001, but each of these cases demonstrates that there is still a clear
attack on the gay community, which I argue is generated as a strike in favor of traditional
yang masculinity.
The intense struggle for some individuals who find themselves outside of the yinyang binary is further demonstrated by intersex and transgender individuals. When
transgender celebrity Jin Xing was nine, she was selected to join a PLA dance troupe
despite her mother’s protestations that “he will be neither a singer nor a dancer. It is no
career for a boy.”25 Jin became a nationally renowned dancer, even attaining the rank of
colonel in the PLA.26 However, although getting a sex-change operation was more taboo
than homosexuality, Jin came out as a woman in the early 1990s. Her family and friends
tried to dissuade her. Her mother first insisted that she would rather have a gay child than
a transgender child.27 And before Jin underwent sexual reassignment surgery in 1995,
her friends insisted that no man would want her because men want a “natural woman,”
not a “fake woman.”28
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The state also tried to discourage her. Before allowing her to receive the surgery,
Jin was required to take a psychological evaluation. If the test indicated that she was
only 60% feminine, then she was still a man. If only 75%, then she would be expected to
participate in “re-masculinization” therapy. Only someone who was at least 80%
feminine, according to the evaluation, would be allowed to change their sex.29 After
breast augmentation and facial electrolysis, Jin’s doctor asked her again if she had truly
made up her mind about proceeding with the final operation to remove the penis. Jin’s
response was that “I would be neither a man nor a woman. It’s all or nothing.”30 Jin
Xing is an example of someone who falls outside of the yin-yang binary while trying to
articulate a place for herself within it.
Howard Chiang has documented a number of people who appeared in the
Taiwanese media in the decades immediately after the civil war such as Xie Jianshun,
discussed in chapter one.31 Some of them were intersex (described as yin-yang people 阴
阳人), one was a women with two uteri, and one was a male farmer who found himself
pregnant.32 Although the Taiwanese press approached these individuals with the same
paradigm as did the PRC, the openness of the Chinese media allowed for a discussion of
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sexual phenomena which facilitated the understanding that the lines between yin and
yang were less rigid than first thought.33
Initially, however, the idea of yang in a woman or yin in a man caused significant
bewilderment and disdain. One nineteen-year-old man named Lü Jinde enjoyed crossdressing (nanban nüzuang 男扮女装), but the newspapers described him as “an immoral,
confusing, and gender ambiguous persona that provokes disgust.”34 Twenty-three-yearold Ding Bengde endured similar excoriation when the papers discussed her dressing in
men’s clothes as a “male impersonating freak” and as a “female cross-dressing freak.”35
The PRC tried to encourage women to take on yang, but this ran into the literary tradition
which held that a woman could only pretend to be a man if duty required. These
Taiwanese examples evince the underlying attitude that any directional movement
between yang and yin was undesirable.
As we have shown, the gender hierarchies and structures of power in China are
generally based on conceptions of yin-yang cosmology, the structures of which are
visible in state propaganda. In chapter two we showed how posters provide the
theoretical framework in the doctrine of the Three Prominences. This required that if
multiple characters are pictured, then communists should be given prominence; if all the
characters pictured are communists, then only the best communists should be the most
visible; if all the characters depicted are great communists, then the most prominent
should be the ultimate hero. The intention behind the Three Prominences was to
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highlight political orthodoxy, but it also served to deepen class differences and gender
inequalities. This is observed most clearly in posters that glorify the worker-peasantsoldier triumvirate. Not only do the men outnumber the women, the most prominent
character is not the woman, who is usually drawn as a peasant—the least important group
in Marx’s articulation of the proletarian revolution.
The ultimate hero given greatest prominence in CCP posters was always
Chairman Mao. Not only was he shown as the exemplary model of communism, but by
the Cultural Revolution, the Party was actively promoting Mao’s personality cult, thereby
transforming him from a man into a god. Wherever he went, the crowds shouted the
traditional imperial prayer that their leader would live for ten-thousand years. In his
posters, Mao’s haloed personage is radiant and untouchable. There were also propaganda
posters that glorified the tier of Party cadres just under Mao, though never to the same
extent as the Chairman, and there were posters that praised the revolutionary martyrs like
Lei Feng. These men were held up as examples of right behavior and were esteemed as
saints in the Mao cult. In terms of Western religious structure, the Chinese Communist
religion had scriptures, hymns, prayers, talismans, and an omnipotent deity presiding
over a fraternity of lesser gods and martyred saints. The only thing missing was a
pantheon of corresponding goddesses. The implication is that women, as the bearers of
yin, regardless of their individual qualities, were fundamentally unworthy to assume
leadership in the Maoist priesthood or to be worshipped in the cult of yang.
Propaganda posters also illustrate the erasure of yin from the public sphere.
Women were encouraged to “doff femininity” and take up the strength of yang. To
accomplish this, women began wearing men’s clothing, performing men’s traditional
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occupations, and behaving like uncouth men. Some argue that this made men and
women equal, and to some degree this is true; but in trying to free women from the
weakness of yin, the Party only made yin itself—and therefore women in general—even
more subjected to yang. This is further highlighted by what is missing from CCP posters.
There are accounts of men cooking, sewing, and tending children, but there are no images
of men performing these tasks. I argue that this is because there were social expectations
that women customarily tended to the domestic chores which made those tasks “women’s
work.” By showing a man performing a duty beneath the dignity of his yang, that poster
would have constituted an attack on Chinese masculinity and the Communist Party.
The final example of yin-yang cosmology in posters is observed in the Party’s
Orientalizing treatment of China’s ethnic and religious minorities. There are fifty-six
recognized ethnicities in China, but only one of them, the Han, wields significant political
power. As such, CCP posters depict the Han as a calm embodiment of masculine yang;
while the other fifty-five minorities are shown to varying degrees as an exotic “feminine”
other. This is done by rarely giving prominence to minority characters except in images
with only other minorities; by dressing minority peoples in colors other than the ideal red,
thus symbolizing that they do not directly partake in the Party’s yang; by depicting them
as slaves to religious superstitions; and by depicting the women as hyperfeminine sexobjects and the men as hypermasculine barbarians. All these practices combine to
illustrate the minorities with a feminine yin that wants and needs the Party’s guiding
masculine hand to tame them and lead the way to civilization. Even today, the PRC is
incarcerating millions of Uighurs and cataloging their DNA, irises, facial scans, finger
prints, and voices, all under the guise of a “free health check,” although many human
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rights groups say that this is the PRC’s way of making the Uighurs more subservient to
Beijing.36
Chapter three explored the history of comic book printing in China during the late
nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Because comic books were difficult to buy but
inexpensive and easy to rent, the CCP and the Guomindang both recognized their
effectiveness at increasing literacy rates and propagating new ideas. As such, when the
CCP won the war in 1949, the comic book industry was selected as one of the first targets
for nationalization. Because nationalization was a process that took nearly ten years to
complete, the comic books published during this time represented an ideological
hybridity of traditional and revolutionary concepts, especially in terms of gender. By the
start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, comic publishers were all forced to close their
doors until 1971. After that, comics followed the same political formula and did not
display much imagination.
Nevertheless, regardless of whenever a comic book was published, it still clung to
the yin-yang paradigm as the expression of sexuality and political correctness. Of the
early comics, none is more recognizable than Hua Mulan. Mulan eventually faced
literary banishment as a feudal remnant, but during the initial years after 1949, she
simultaneously embodied the pinnacle of Confucian femininity and Communist
masculinity.
Comic books also reinforced the idea that the yin of femininity was a handicap.
Sometimes this was physical, as demonstrated by Guo Junqing when she contracted
“women’s disease,” and Aunt Yao, who caught a spy despite her bound feet. Sometimes
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the handicap was the social stigma against women. This was encountered by the heroines
of the March Eighth Machine Station who confronted a man that thought they were too
weak to dig a well; by the “twelve sisters” of Wafang Tai who criticized a man that
thought they were too weak to build a dam; by Tian Yun, who decided to learn how to
use a plow despite a class enemy’s superstitious belief that if a woman worked the field
she would invite calamity; and by the title character in The New Sister-in-Law, who chose
to work in the fields on her wedding day rather than perpetuate feudal traditions.
Comic books also reveal how youth can be a quality of yang while age can be a
quality of yin. Age is certainly respected in Chinese culture as a sign of wisdom and
experience, but, for the CCP, it is generally preferable for age to yield to the strength of
youth. The youthful heroes in comic books are not only stronger and more agile than the
old enfeebled villains, they also symbolize the rising generation of successors to the
revolution. All of China’s leaders since Deng Xiaoping have elected to dye their gray
hair black. This promotes a sense of uniformity, but it also projects the combined
benefits of aged wisdom with the yang of youthful vigor.37
Furthermore, women in comic books can be righteous enough to merit the
greatest prominence, but they are still never granted ultimate status. All the villains in
comic books are men and all the heroines remain under the authority of a more powerful
man. This indicates that while women are fundamentally good, they are also thought
incapable of demonstrating the yang of great strength in either direction. A villain can be
capable of some strength even if their yang is corrupted by selfishness and laziness. But
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since women are creatures of yin, the comics of the CCP imply that women are not
capable of outstanding strength for good or ill.
Finally, chapter four explored the history of Chinese stage performances and the
creation of the “model” status. After a discussion of Jiang Qing and her role in creating
the yangbanxi, the chapter identified two ballets and three Beijing operas for deeper
analysis regarding gender and yin-yang cosmology. Although the operas did much in
promoting gender equality, such as creating strong female roles, there were four main
examples in yangbanxi that determine the lesser status of women. These are the
imbalanced ratios between the sexes; the fact that women are recurrently under the
control of a stronger man; the common questioning and chastisement of female
characters; and the perpetuation of domestic stereotypes.
There are also four predominant phenomena which validate the political
differentiation of yin and yang in yangbanxi. The first is found in the credits which list
the cast by order of political orthodoxy: main heroes first, then lesser heroes, then
villains. Second, the heroes are all in excellent health and are generally happy whereas
the villains are sickly, weak, and scowling. Third, the lighting defines the politics for
each scene and for each character. If the scene is full of heroes, then the stage is brightly
lit; if the stage is full of villains, then the stage is gloomy and dark; if a hero is
surrounded by villains, then the stage is dark, but he is under a spotlight. Finally, the
yangbanxi make strategic use of fire as either a beacon, a weapon, or as a purifier. As a
beacon, whether as a prop or as a spoken metaphor, fire serves in the same capacity as the
stage lighting to distinguish communism from capitalism. As a weapon, fire is a tool for
fighting the bourgeoisie and for destroying feudal remnants. Finally, as a purifying
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agent, fire represents the idea that even if someone must die for the revolution, their death
is like the steel that is tempered in flame, or the burning altar whereby someone offers
their life to Mao and the Party.
In discussing why certain jobs in the United States, such as nursing, are
considered “feminine,” psychologist Jennifer Bosson argues that stereotypical attitudes
about gendered employment are driven not by misogyny or homophobia, but by a man’s
fear that his masculinity—so hard to establish, so easy to lose—is under attack.38 If this
is true, then American and Chinese conceptions of femininity and masculinity are similar
to each other inasmuch as no one can be robbed of their femininity; on the other hand,
masculinity is like a delicate flower that shrinks from direct sunlight and withers in the
frost. Despite the Party’s projection of strength, each of the propaganda platforms in this
thesis were tools for establishing norms of proper behavior, and the state’s efforts to
protect the Party’s fragile yang from the “insidious” yin energy of foreigners, capitalists,
imperialists, individualists, landlords, artists, intellectuals, homosexuals, women, and any
other element deemed to belong to the bourgeoisie. It was for these reasons why
sexuality was criminalized and why sensuality became a way for individuals to resist
state totalitarianism.39
It was from Tiananmen that Mao announced the ascendant yang of the Chinese
Communist Party by declaring that the Chinese people had “stood up” and ended the
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Century of Humiliation. China blamed its humiliation at the hands of foreigners on the
presence of too much yin. However, since 1949, China’s humiliations have been selfinflicted by the presence of too much yang. Forty years later, in 1989, it was from
Tiananmen that Deng Xiaoping and the CCP told their enemies in the student democracy
protests to “sit down.” Mao’s successors have continually upheld his dichotomous
policies, both in terms of gender and in terms of politics, although—as Joan Scott
explained—gender and political power are bound up together too tightly to distinguish
them.40 The Party’s binary expression of good and evil, male and female, yang and yin,
does not cohere with the new Western model of gender as a spectrum, and that sexuality
holds no fixed universal meaning.41
The Party, however, would not need to redefine its socially constructed gender
differentiation if it would recognize that yin and yang both contain a portion of the other.
Yin and yang do not need to stand as binaries, but as the ends of a spectrum whereby
someone may have more yin than another of the same sex. However, if the Party were to
do this without decoupling yin and yang from wickedness and orthodoxy, it would
require a public recognition that the party is not wholly blameless since “the line dividing
good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to
destroy a piece of his own heart?”42
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ILLUSTRATIONS 1

Posters

Figure 1.1 Minority group practices military tactics. Published 1975.
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.2 Mobilized general population.
Caption: Published by the Beijing Military District Headquarters, 1972.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.3 Four women performing “modern” jobs: an electrician, a barefoot doctor,
a tractor driver, a woman birthing piglets.
Caption: Wide open land (where we can accomplish much). Anci County. Artist Lei
Jinchi.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and Art
Education Materials, 1950s-1970s Box 5, Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial
1972 issue 9.
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Figure 1.4 A female tractor driver gives a demonstration to rural peasants.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and Art
Education Materials, 1950s-1970s Box 1, Yan’an Pictorial 1974 issue 3.
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Figure 1.5 A female electrician. Note the Mao badge on her left shoulder.
Title: Lofty aspirations reach the sky, 1973.
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.6 Four hanging scrolls depicting female laborers.
Source: Chinese Propaganda Posters, Taschen, pages 551-2.
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Figure 1.7 Mao stands beside Stalin, Lenin, Engels, and Marx. Beneath them are
the Forbidden City and the words “ten thousand years to Chairman Mao.” Artist:
Wang Zhao Da.
Caption: Mao Zedong Thought is the modern pinnacle of Marxism-Leninism.
Source: Art and China’s Revolution, page 21.
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Figure 1.8 Man holding the works Mao Zedong. Mushroom cloud in the
background. Published 1971.
Caption: Let philosophy become the sharpest weapon in the hands of the masses.
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.9 Triumvirate poster. Worker, soldier, barefoot doctor.
Caption: People’s air defense chart.
Sub-caption: Published by the office of the leadership of capital city people’s air
defense. 1970.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Collections, posters.
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Figure 1.10 Triumvirate poster. The peasant holds The Selected Works of Mao
Zedong.
Caption: We must liberate Taiwan!

Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.

177

Figure 1.11 Triumvirate poster. The peasant holds The Quotations of Chairman
Mao. The worker holds The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. The
Soldier holds The Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Published 1971.
Caption: The Party organization should be composed of proletarian advanced
elements. They should be the vanguard leading the proletariat and the revolutionary
masses with youthful vigor in the struggle against our class enemies.
Source: Chinese Propaganda Posters, Taschen, page 454.
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Figure 1.12 Triumvirate poster. The peasant holds The Selected Works of Mao
Zedong.
Caption: Unite for a greater victory!

Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and Art
Education Materials, 1950s-1970s Box 1, Yan’an Pictorial 1974 issue 12.
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Figure 1.13 Triumvirate poster. The worker holds The Selected Works of Mao
Zedong. The woman is a Red Guard, not a soldier.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Collections, posters.
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Figure 1.14 The masses criticize a class enemy, late 1960s.
Source: “A bad element is publicly criticized,” Chinese Political Posters, Taschen,
131.
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Figure 1.15 Mother and daughter in a sea of flower petals. Tiananmen Huabiao in
the top-left corner. Published 1959.
Caption: Ten thousand years to Chairman Mao.
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.16 Mao and Jiang Qing are surrounded by actors, artists, dancers, and
musicians. Jiang’s book is titled “Mao Zedong’s Discussions on Literature and Art.”
Caption: The Unconquerable Mao Zedong Thought Illuminates the Revolutionary Art
Stage.
Source: Art in Turmoil, page 8.
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Figure 1.17 A Red Guard uses a sledge hammer to shatter a music record
(symbolizing capitalist music and bourgeois decadence), dice (symbolizing gambling
and vice), and religious symbols, including a buddha and a crucifix.
Caption: Destroy the Old World; Build a New World!
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.18 “Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan” by Liu Chunhua, 1968.
Sub-caption: 一九二一年秋， 我们伟大得导师毛主席去安源，亲自点燃了安源的
革命烈火. In the autumn of 1921, our great leader Chairman Mao went to Anyuan to
spark the flames of revolution.
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.19 A minority woman in costume sings into a microphone. The backdrop
shows the doves of peace, the hammer and sickle, and Lei Feng. Published 1981.
Caption: The Party is like a mother to me.

Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.20 Chairman Mao stands atop Tiananmen gate on 1 October 1949 to
declare the founding of the People’s Republic of China and an end to the Century of
Humiliation.
Title: “The Founding of the Nation,” by Dong Xiwen, 1953.
Source: Art and China’s Revolution, page 61.

Figure 1.21 From left to right: Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng,
Mao Zedong, Lin Biao. Artist: Shen Yaoding. Title: Long Live the Victory of
Chairman Mao’s Proletarian Revolutionary Line, 1968.
Source: Art and China’s Revolution, page 43.
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Figure 1.22 A nomadic minority group joyfully celebrates Mao’s successor, Hua
Guofeng. The banner reads: “Study agriculture from Dazhai.” Painted in 1977.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and Art
Education Materials, 1950s-1970s Box 5, Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial
1977 issue 12.
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Figure 1.23 A female nursery leader in a village commune. The boy’s banner reads
“little red guards.”
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and Art
Education Materials, 1950s-1970s Box 1, Yan’an Pictorial 1974 issue 6.
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Figure 1.24 China’s ethnic minorities in native dress with linked arms in front of
Tiananmen Gate. The Han triumvirate is in the center. Published 1975.
Caption: Ten thousand years to the great unity of the ethnic groups of the entire
country!
Source: University of Westminster, Chinese Poster Collection.
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Figure 1.25 Chairman Mao greets an adoring crowd in Tiananmen Square.
Caption: The Great Leader Chairman Mao Reviews the Red Guards. (From the art
series “Ten Thousand Years to the Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution”).
Source: Art and China’s Revolution, page 2.
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Figure 1.26 Chairman Mao studying late into the night. A scholar is greater than a
man of brute strength.
Source: Stanford University, East Asia Library, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and Art
Education Materials, 1950s-1970s Box 1, Yan’an Pictorial 1974 issue 9.
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ILLUSTRATIONS 2

Comic Books

Figure 2.1
Source: Shuhui Wang, Mulan Congjun [Mulan Joins the Army] (Beijing: Xinhua
Shudian [New China Bookstore], 1950), 5. Stanford University, East Asian Library,
Special Collections Archive, book number 5793 1136.
Translation: Mulan returned to the weaving room in low spirits. She contemplated her
father’s age and poor health and how he had no son able to take his place. How could
they call an old person to battle! To serve the nation was a primary responsibility, but
it was inappropriate for a woman to enlist. When she thought of this, she could not
help but sigh.
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Figure 2.2
Source: Shuhui Wang, Mulan Congjun [Mulan Joins the Army] (Beijing: Xinhua
Shudian [New China Bookstore], 1950), 11. Stanford University, East Asian Library,
Special Collections Archive, book number 5793 1136.

Translation: Old Hua prepared a feast for Mulan’s send-off. Mulan’s parents were
anxious all throughout the dinner, fearing that a woman in battle would be unable to
slay the enemy. Mulan then performed the sword dance to demonstrate her martial
talents. Indeed, her skills were outstanding, and she was very brave. Mulan’s parents
were eased.
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Figure 2.3
Source: Shuhui Wang, Mulan Congjun [Mulan Joins the Army] (Beijing: Xinhua
Shudian [New China Bookstore], 1950), 45. Stanford University, East Asian Library,
Special Collections Archive, book number 5793 1136.
Translation: Old Hua had no choice. All he could do was call for Mulan. Wearing
her blouse and skirt, Mulan walked into the hall. Commander He said that he still
wanted to see general Mudi; old Hua said: “that’s her.” Commander He looked
discerningly at her for a long time and was completely at a loss. It was as though he
were waking from a dream.
(The End of the Story).
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Figure 2.4
Source: Min Zhao, “Xin Hua Mulan [The New Hua Mulan],” in Dang he Renmin de
Hao Nüer: Ding Youjun [The Good Daughter of the Party and the People: Ding
Youjun] (Tianjin, China: Zhongguo Xin Minzhu Zhuyi Qingnian Tuan Tianjin Shi
Gongzuo Weiyuan Hui [The Tianjin City Workers Committee of the Chinese New
Democracy Youth League], 1951), 15. Stanford University, East Asian Library,
Special Collections Archive, book number 5793 5607.
Translation: As she was waiting to lead her soldiers in the second charge, she
suddenly felt her eyes go dark, she felt a cold shiver, her entire went achy and weak,
and she fell to the ground; it turned out that her period had come early.
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Figure 2.5
“‘San Ba’ Jitai [The ‘March Eighth’ Machine Station],” Hebei Gong-Nong-Bing
Huakan [Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial] (1972, issue 9): 5. Stanford
University, East Asia Library, Special Collections, Chinese Pictorial Magazines and
Art Education Materials 1950s-1970s, Box 5, 河北工农兵画刊 [The Hebei WorkerPeasant-Soldier Pictorial].
Translation: In the evening, the girls studied together the works of Chairman Mao,
they closely read: “times have changed, men and women are the same. What men
comrades can accomplish, women comrades can also accomplish.” They resolutely
criticized the lies spread by Liu Shaoqi and his ilk that “women are useless,” and
resolved that they would finish the well.
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Figure 2.6
Source: “Wafang Tai ‘Shi Er Jiemei’ [The ‘Twelve Sisters’ of Wafang Tai],” Hebei
Gong-Nong-Bing Huakan [Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial] (1973, issue 5):
5. Stanford University, East Asia Library, Special Collections, Chinese Pictorial
Magazines and Art Education Materials 1950s-1970s, Box 5, 河北工农兵画刊 [The
Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial].
Translation: The weather turned colder by the day, but the maidens braved the cold
winds and became more valiant the more they worked. At this time, a class enemy
started slacking off to the side and blew cold wind (made disparaging remarks): “this
kind of work is hard enough for tough men, you women…”
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Figure 2.7
Source: “Wafang Tai ‘Shi Er Jiemei’ [The ‘Twelve Sisters’ of Wafang Tai],” Hebei
Gong-Nong-Bing Huakan [Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial] (1973, issue 5):
6. Stanford University, East Asia Library, Special Collections, Chinese Pictorial
Magazines and Art Education Materials 1950s-1970s, Box 5, 河北工农兵画刊 [The
Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial].
Translation: Under the leadership of the production team’s Party branch, the “twelve
sisters” united with the masses of the commune and fiercely criticized the class
enemy’s crime of trying to wreck the construction of the reservoir. Through the midst
of real conflict, their understanding of class struggle and the struggle to hold the right
political line were increasingly improved.
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Figure 2.8
Source: Chongzhi Zhou, “Xin
Saosao [New Sister-in-Law],”
Yan’an Huakan [Yan’an
Pictorial] (1974, issue 3):
frame 10. Stanford University,
East Asia Library, Special
Collections, Chinese Pictorial
Magazines and Art Education
Materials 1950s-1970s, Box 1,
延安画刊 [The Yan’an
Pictorial].
Translation: After eating
breakfast, sister-in-law and I
were just about to go to the
fields to spray for bugs when
mama took a hold of sister-inlaw and said with tender
affection: “you cannot go!
Where is the logic of a new
bride going to work in the
fields?” “Ma, I’ll just go and
take a look and then come right
back!” When sister-in-law
finished saying this, she
grabbed my hand and we ran
out into the courtyard.
*Note, this “tender affection”
is itself drastically different
from traditional Chinese
relationships between mothers
and daughters-in-law. Mothers
typically enjoyed absolute
control over their daughters-inlaw, who became their virtual
slaves.
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Figure 2.9
Source: Dexi Zhang et al., “Zhuangli de Qingchun [Glorious Youth],” Hebei GongNong-Bing Huakan [Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial] (1973, issue 3): 5.
Stanford University, East Asia Library, Special Collections, Chinese Pictorial
Magazines and Art Education Materials 1950s-1970s, Box 5, 河北工农兵画刊 [The
Hebei Worker-Peasant-Soldier Pictorial].
Translation: Afterward, she was transferred to work in a military preparedness
engineering worksite. Because she persisted in perceiving everything in terms of
class analysis, she discovered just in time that a bad element was trying to foment
dissension and destroy the engineering project. Together with the masses, [she]
carried out a determined struggle against him. After an examination by the
engineering command headquarters, this wicked fellow was eliminated.
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Figure 2.10
Source: Donghai Xiao Shaobing [The Young Sentry of the East China Sea]
(Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1974), 82. Stanford University,
East Asian Library, Special Collections Archive, book number 5793 3357.

Translation: Platoon Leader Zhang gave the red scarf back to Xiaohong [and she] put
it back on. Everyone praised Xiaohong as someone that was truly worthy to be called
a good child of Chairman Mao’s instruction, a red successor to the revolution, and a
heroic young sentry of the East China Sea!
*Note the three spies in the bottom left. Xiaohong is wearing dark colors in this
comic book, but this only gives her greater prominence. Furthermore, the spies
cannot be wearing dark colors since they are impersonating the PLA.
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Figure 2.11
Source: Haiwen Zhu, Haiying [Haiying] (Beijing: People’s Fin Art Publishing House,
1975), 91.

Translation: At this time, Chen Wulao thought of the time when he had accidentally
cut up the old nets, and how the Party branch had examined his background. Now
that this time his destructive activities had been again discovered by the masses…, he
was overcome with both fear and hate.
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Figure 2.12
Source: Haiwen Zhu, Haiying [Haiying] (Beijing: People’s Fin Art Publishing House,
1975), 109.
Translation: In a moment, the sly Chen Wulao was about to swim across the national
border, but Haiying pounced on him from behind and grabbed him by the neck with
both hands. She exerted all her strength in pushing him down into the water.
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ILLUSTRATIONS 3

Yangbanxi Still Frames

Figure 3.1
Ke Xiang challenging the Viper and the Guomindang surrounded by villagers. Yin
and yang are represented as political power in this image. The Viper is armed and Ke
is in chains, but she stands over him dressed in white (the color of yang) while he
cowers away dressed in black (the color of yin).
Source: Dujuan Shan, 0:22:21.
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Figure 3.2
Tiemei and Grandma Li holding the red lantern as Tiemei sings about their
responsibility to the revolution.
Source: Hong Deng Ji, 0:53:05.
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Figure 3.3
Grandma Li stands prominently spotlighted in center stage despite her imprisonment.
Hatoyama stands in the background. Note his pale face and toothbrush mustache,
reminiscent of Adolph Hitler.
Source: Hong Deng Ji, 1:15:18.
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Figure 3.4
Yang Zirong of the PLA infiltrating the Vulture’s Guomindang stronghold and
surrounded by the Vulture’s men. Only he is spotlighted. Note the villains’ pale
faces “bourgeois” mustaches, and made-up scowl lines.
Source: Zhiqu Weihu Shan, 0:53:35.
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Figure 3.5
The PLA and the peasants have captured Huang Shiren and Mu Renzhi. Wang
Dachun is just about to execute them.
Source: Bai Mao Nü, 1:27:47.
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Figure 3.6
After killing the landlord Huang Shiren, the peasants celebrate the rising red sun,
symbolizing Chairman Mao and the Communist Party.
Source: Bai Mao Nü, 1:30:35.
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Figure 3.7
Landlord Nanbatian and his servant Ou Guangsi. Because they are the only
characters on stage, the lighting is kept to a minimum.
Source: Hongse Niangzi Jun, 1:27:37.
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Figure 3.8
Yang Zirong of the PLA infiltrates the Vulture’s Guomindang stronghold. Only he is
spotlighted. Note the vulture statue above Zuo Shandiao on his throne.
Source: Zhiqu Weihu Shan, 0:53:07.
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Figure 3.9
Hong Changqing raises a fist as he burns alive surrounded by Nanbatian’s henchmen.
Source: Hongse Niangzi Jun, 1:34:03.
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